DANGERS  AND 


TOEK 


ADDRESSED    TO    THE 


HON.  J.  B.  FLOYD,  SECRETARY  OF  WAR, 


MAJOR   J.    G.    BARNARD, 


CORPS    OF    ENGINEERS,    U.S.A. 


Published   by   order  of  the   Chamber   of   Commerce, 

BY   PERMISSION  OF  THE  SECRETARY   OF   WAR, 


NEW     Y  0  R  K  : 

I)  .    V  A  N     N  O  S  T  R  A  N  D  . 

1859. 


THE 


DANGERS  AND  DEFENCES 


NEW   TOEK 


ADDRESSED    TO   THE 


HON.  J.  B.  FLOYD,  SECRETARY  OF  WAR, 


MAJOR   J.    G.    BARNARD, 

CORPS    OF   ENGINEERS,    U.S.A. 


Published  by   order  of  the    Chamber   of   Commerce 

BY  PERMISSION  OF  THE  SECRETARY  OF  WAR. 


NEW     YORK: 
D.    VAN     NOSTRAND 

1859. 


TV 


[The  accompanying  report,  which  was  called  for  by  Gov.  Seward  in  the  Senate, 
not  having  been  sent  in  in  time  for  publication  by  that  body,  and  having  been 
seen  by  several  persons  interested  in  the  safety  and  commerce  of  the  port  of  >Vw 
York,  who  thought  it  important  that  ih<-  information  contained  in  it  should  be 
spread  before  the  public,  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  decided  to  publish  it.] 


iorh,  lanuarg  27%  1855. 
THE  HONORABLE  J.  B.  FLOYD, 

Secretary  of  War. 

SIR, — In  accordance  with  the  permission  kindly  given  me,  as  the  En 
gineer  Officer  in  charge  of  an  important  portion  of  the  Defences  of  New 
York,  to  communicate  my  views  to  you  in  writing,  on  this  most  momen 
tous  theme,  I  submit  to  you  the  following  pages,  trusting  that  its  intrinsic 
interest  and  the  variety  of  topics  I  have  found  it  necessary  to  treat,  will  be 
my  apology  for  the  unexpected  volume  to  which  they  have  swollen. 

I  am,  Sir,  very  respectfully, 

Your  most  obedient, 

J.  G.  BARNARD, 
Major  of  Engineers. 


THE 


DANGERS  AND  DEFENCES  OF  PW  IQEI. 


PART     I. 


IN  a  paper  prepared  nearly  a  year  ago,  but  which,  from  cir 
cumstances  unnecessary  here  to  explain,  has  not  yet  gone  out  of 
my  possession,  I  used  the  following  language,  which  will  now 
answer  my  purpose  as  a  brief  sketch  of  what  I  consider  to  be  the 
"  dangers  "  to  which  New  York  is  exposed,  and  as  an  introduction 
to  what  I  shall  say  as  to  the  defences  required. 

It  seems  to  me  proper  to  allude  to  the 

"  entire  change  in  the  nature  of  the  problem  to  be  considered  in 
"  the  defence  of  this  city,  since  the  system  under  which  the  exist- 
"  ing  works  have  been  constructed,  was  adopted — or  rather,  since 
"  the  defence  of  New  York,  as  a  part  of  the  general  system  of 
"  coast  defence,  was  decided  upon  by  the  Board  of  Engineers  of 
"  1816." 

"  As  late  as  1840, 1  find  the  Chief  Engineer,  in  describing  the 
"  then  existing  works  at  the  Narrows,  (viz  :  the  present  Fort  Ilam- 
"  ilton,  Fort  La  Fayette,  on  the  Long  Island  side,  and  the  old 
"  Forts  Tompkins  and  Richmond,  and  Batteries  Hudson  and  Mor- 
"  ton  on  Staten  Island)  reporting  that  (when  these  old  works  shall 
"  have  been  repaired)  <  with  the  Narrows  thus  defended,  and  the 
"  c  works  near  the  city  in  perfect  order,  New  York  might  be 
"  *  regarded  as  pretty  well  protected  against  an  attack  by  water 
"  c  through  this  passage.'  And  more  explicitly  he  elsewhere  states, 
"  with  regard  to  repairs  of  the  old  works  just  named  on  Staten 
"  Island,  '  Nothing  further,  indeed,  being  contemplated  for  this 
"  '  position,  except  the  construction  of  a  small  redoubt  on  a  com- 
"  '  manding  hill  a  little  to  the  southwest.'  When  it  is  borne  in 
"  mind  that  since  the  quite  recent  date  of  the  Report  from  which 
"  these  quotations  are  taken  (1840),  there  has  been  constructed  a 


6  THE   DANGERS   AND   DEFENCES 

»  "  new  Fort  Richmond,  of  three  or  four  times  tlic  size  of  the  old 
"work — that  a  large  new  work  in  place  of  Fort  Tompkins  has 
'•  been  commenced — that  a  new  water-battery,  nearly  equal  to  Fort 
k-  Uichmond,  has  been  recommended  and  planned  by  the  present 
"  Board  of  Engineers — in  fact,  that  an  enormous  increase  of  works 
"  has  been  decided  to  be  necessary,  over  those  thus  cited  by  the 
u Chief  Engineer  as  sufficient  to  render  New  York  ' pretty  well 
"  <protecte<J  .bv  w;jter  through  this  passage/  it  seems  to  me  evident 
'•i'ffliat  tliti*}*r^fd<Jni  involved  in  this  *  protection '  has  changed  its 

*"  character?'       .    ••«; 

;  \  ;  :•  ^Jlfu'se  :reftiaj«kfi/are  not  made  as  a  criticism  upon  former 

"  <l  boards,  or  the*  Cliief  Engineer,  but  to  show  that  a  defensive  sys- 

"  tern  for  New  York  such  as  is  now  demanded,  has  never  been 

"  contemplated  as  a  whole,  and  that  the  problem,  as  it  now  pre- 

"  sents  itself,  is  a  modified  and  enlarged  one." 

"  It  has  become  so,  owing  to  the  immense  developments  which 
"have  been  exhibited  in  the  means  of  maritime  attack  within  the 
"  last  few  years,  and  also  to  the  rapid  growth  of  the  city  itself, 
"  and  of  the  nation  of  which  it  has  become  the  commercial  me- 
"  tropolis.  Indeed,  the  experience  which  the  nation  had  had  when 
"  the  defensive  system  of  1816  was  adopted,  was  not  such  as  could 
"  prompt  a  system  adapted  to  our  present  circumstances.  While 
k-  formidable  invasions  of  our  territory  had  been  made  by  land, 
"  the  small  works  then  in  existence  on  Governor's  and  Bedlow's 
"Islands,  had  proved  sufficient  to  protect  the  city;  and  such 
"  efforts  as  were  made  elsewhere  against  our  maritime  places, 
k'  proved  how  weak  were  the  powers  of  attack  of  that  day  against 
"  fortifications — how  little  was  required  to  secure  our  sea-ports  and 
"  maritime  cities.  While  the  means  of  maritime  attack  have  of 
"  late  years  assumed  a  magnitude  and  formidableness  not  dreamed 
"  of  when  our  defensive  system  was  planned,  and  our  country  has 
"  so  increased  in  population,  wealth  and  military  resources,  that 
"  no  enemy  can  hope  to  make  any  impression  by  an  invasion  of 
"  our  territory, — our  great  maritime  places  like  New  York,  have,  on 
"  the  other  hand,  increased  in  even  greater  proportion,  in  every  - 
"  tiling  that  could  make  them  objects  of  attack.*' 

"  The  works  deemed  adequate  in  former  years  for  the  defence 
"  of  New  York  could  not,  therefore,  in  the  nature  of  things,  be 
"  adequate  at  the  present  day." 

"  The  recent  war  of  England  and  France  against  Eussia  may 
"  illustrate  my  meaning  ;  lor  it  has  taught  lis  what  to  expect 
"  were  either  of  these  nations  to  wage  war  against  the  United 
"Sta 

"  No  invasion  of  territory,  no  attempt  at  territorial  conquest 
"  was  made,  or  thought  of;  for  it  was  well  foreseen  that  no  decisive 
"  results  would  flow  from  such  means.  The  war  consisted  exclu- 
"  sively  in  attacks  upon  maritime  places — great  sea-ports — seats  of 


OFNEWYOKK.  7 

"  commercial  and  naval  power.  Such  places,  by  their  vast  import- 
"  ance  to  the  well-being  and  prosperity  of  a  nation — by  the  large 
"  populations  and  immense  amount  of  wealth  concentrated  in  them, 
"  and  by  their  exposure  to  maritime  attack,  offer  themselves  at 
"  once  as  points  at  which  the  most  decisive  results  may  be  pro- 
"  duced.  Cronstadt,  Sebastopol,  Sweaborg,  Kinburn,  Odessa, 
"  Kertchj  Petropauloski,  and  other  places  of  less  note,  were  in 
"succession  or  simultaneously  objects  of  attack;  while  such  as 
"  the  first  named  became,  indeed,  the  true  seats  of  war." 

"  Around  Sebastopol  assailed  and  assailant  gathered  their  re- 
"  sources,  and  on  the  result  of  the  arduous  struggle  may  be  said 
"  to  have  turned  the  issue  of  the  war.  Had  it  not  been  so  decided 
"  there,  Cronstadt  would  have  been  the  next  field  of  combat, — for 
"  which,  indeed,  the  Allies  had  made  the  most  enormous  prepara- 
"  tions." 

"  Is  it  not  certain  that  in  future  all  war  of  maritime  powers 
"  against  the  United  States,  will  take  a  similar  course  ?  All  ter- 
"  ritorial  invasion  being  out  of  the  question,  it  is  against  our  great 
"  sea-ports  and  strategic  points  of  coast  defence — such  as  New 
"  York,  New  Orleans,  and  San  Francisco — pre-eminently  New 
"  York, — that  an  enemy  will  concentrate  his  efforts.  Against  these 
"  he  will  prepare  such  immense  armaments, — against  these  he  will 
"  call  into  existence  special  agencies  of  attack, — which  (unless  met 
"  by  an  inexpugnable  defensive  system)  shall  insure  success." 

"  The  mere  defense  of  the  city  against  ordinary  fleets,  is  no 
"  longer  the  question ;  but  through  the  defensive  works  to  be  here 
"  erected,  the  nation  is  to  measure  its  strength  against  the  most 
"  lavish  use  of  the  resources  of  a  great  maritime  power,  aided  by 
"  all  that  modern  science  and  mechanical  ingenuity  in  creating  or 
"  inventing  means  of  attack,  can  bring  against  them  /  in  short, 
"  in  fortifying  New  York,  we  are  really  preparing  the  battle-field 
"  on  which  the  issue  of  future  momentous  contests  is  to  be  de- 
"  cided." 

I  most  respectfully  invite  your  attention  to  the  last  paragraph 
here  quoted.  No  language  that  I  could  now  use,  would  convey 
a  stronger  idea  of  my  profound  sense  of  the  real  dangers  of  New 
York.  If  the  conclusion  that  I  arrive  at  is  well  founded,  it  de 
mands  the  instantaneous  attention  of  the  War  Department,  and 
of  Congress.  If  this  conclusion  is  well  founded,  then  there  is  no 
topic  connected  with  the  question  of  national  defence  which  will 
have  a  stronger  bearing  upon  these  constantly  recurring  issues  with 
foreign  nations,  in  which  we  see  the  war-cloud  gathering,  which 
may  yet,  ere  long,  burst  upon  us,  than  this  same  topic  of  the  "  De 
fence  of  New  York."  I  will  say  more  specifically,  that  on  the 
alternative  whether,  on  the  one  hand,  New  York  is  open  to  the 
attack  of  a  maritime  force,  or  liable  to  be  sacked  by  the  sudden 
dash  of  an  army  landed  in  the  vicinity ;  or,  on  the  other,  is  so 


8  THE      DANGEE8      AND      DEFENCES 

•nvlv  defended  by  water  and  land,  that  it  may  hurl  the  invader 
back  to  the  ocean, — will  depend  greatly  the  issue  of  peace  or 
war. 

It  is  a  species  of  folly  approaching  to  insanity,  for  a  nation 
80  constantlv  holding  up  to  its  neighbors  tlie  momentous  issue 
of  war, — 10  unavoidably  liable  t<»  constant  entanglements  with  the 
most  powerful  nations  on  the  face  of  the  earth, — to  leave  this 
great  commercial  metropolis  liable,  the  very  day  almost  that  war 
is  declared,  to  the  most  fearful  blow. 

It  is  estimated  tliat  the -reat  tire  of  1835  destroyed  §17,000,000 
of  property.  Yet  its  ravages  were  confined  to  a  very  limited 
area.  How,  in  money  or  in  words,  could  we  estimate  tne  loss  of 
property,  the  destruction  of  military  and  naval  armaments  and 
stores,  the  paralysis  of  the  nation's  commerce,  the  shock  upon 
our  warlike  power,  the  disgrace  upon  our  scutcheon,  which  would 
or  rn  /<jh  t  result  from  a  successful  attack,  and  a  more  or  less  pro 
longed  occupation  of  the  port  and  harbor. 

I  trust,  Sir,  I  have  succeeded  in  impressing  you  with  a  vivid 
idea  of  the  "dangers"  to  which  New  lork  is  exposed,  and  of  the 
importance  of  its  perfect  defence.  If  so,  then  I  am  sure  you  will 
concur  with  me  in  the  opinion  that — not  as  a  local  question  con 
cerning  New  York  merely,  nor  of  the  State  of  New  York,  nor 
any  sectional  group  of  States — but  as  a  great  national  question, 
one  in  which  the  issues  of  peace  and  wrar,  of  national  triumph  or 
national  disgrace  are  involved,  the  prompt  organization  of  a 
complete  and  adequate  system  of  defences  for  New  York,  is  de 
manded. 

To  say  what  this  defensive  system  should  be,  will,  perhaps,  be 
more  difficult  I  have  said  before,  that  the  subject  as  a  whole, 
had  not  yet  been  discussed  in  the  new  lights  in  which  recent  years 
have  presented  it.  I  could,  therefore,  on  many  points,  give  only 
individual  opinions,  and,  of  course,  these  must  be  very  general  in 
their  nature. 

But,  even  in  attempting  to  give  such  opinions,  I  am  met  by 
the  embarrassing  fact  that  the  shadow  of  doubt  has  been  recently 
thrown  over  even  the  elementary  principles  which  have  generally 
governed  our  defensive  works,  by  high  authority  ;  even  yourself, 
bir,  seem  to  have  found  reason  to  entertain  such  doubts. 

Far  be  it  from  me  to  desire  to  withhold  from  the  freest  discussion 
anything  connected  with  this  great  question.  I  have  assumed  the 
problem  <>f  the  defense  of  New  York  to  be  a  modified  and  enlarged 
one.  I  am  willing,  if  you  choose,  Sir,  that  it  should  be  disciissed 
even  in  its  simplest  elements;  and,  still  further,  as  everv  species 
of  battery,  armed  witli  such  artillery  as  we  now  have,  whether  it 
be  the  simple  earthen  parapet,  or  the  massive  castellated  structure, 
lifting  its  numerous  guns,  tier  upon  tier,  are  confessedly  inadequate 
(without  auxiliary  aid  of  some  kind)  to  the  perfect  sealing  up  of 


OF      NEW      YOKE.  9 

a  channel  against  the  rapid  passage  of  a  hostile  fleet,  I  shall  be 
the  first  to  hail  the  inventor,  be  he  one  whose  "  functions  are  con- 
"  fined  to  the  most  elevated  branch  of  military  science,"  or  to 
the  workshop  of  the  mechanic,  who  will  provide  us  with  some 
thing  which  will  do  this. 

In  attempting  to  discuss  the  merits  of  our  coast  defences,  one 
is  met  at  the  very  outset  by  the  opposing  characters  of  the  crit 
icisms  by  which  they  have  been  assailed.  It  is  now  scarce  twenty 
years  since  the  entire  system  was  subjected  to  severe  animadver 
sion  from  the,  then,  highest  military  authority  of  the  government, 
from  one  whose  public  services,  military  and  civil,  and  high  posi 
tion  and  character,  gave  great  weight  to  his  strictures.* 

It  was  maintained  by  the  authority  to  whom  I  refer — 

"  1.  That,  for  the  defence  of  the  coast,  the  chief  reliance  should 
"  be  on  the  navy." 

"  2.  That,  in  preference  to  fortifications,  floating  batteries 
"  should  be  introduced  wherever  they  can  be  used." 

"  3.  That  we  are  not  in  danger  from  large  expeditions,  and, 
"  consequently, 

"  4.  That  the  system  of  the  Board  of  Engineers  comprises 
"  works  which  are  unnecessarily  large  for  the  purposes  they  have 
"  to  fulfil." 

It  was  owing  to  these  strictures  that  the  House  of  Represen 
tatives,  by  resolutions  of  May  9th,  1840,  called  upon  the  War 
Department  "  to  lay  before  this  House  as  soon  as  practicable,  a 
"  report  of  a  full  and  connected  system  of  national  defence,"  &c. 

The  subject  was  referred  by  the  War  Department  to  a  board 
of  officers  of  the  army  and  navy,  among  whom  was  the  present 
Chief  Engineer.  The  report  of  that  board  (see  Doc.  206,  H.  E. 
26th  Congress,  1st  session),  fully  endorsed  by  the  Secretary  of 
War,  Mr.  Poinsett,  is  universally  admitted  to  be  one  of  the  most 
able  and  comprehensive  expositions  of  the  whole  subject  of  coast 
defence  extant,  and,  generally,  as  a  complete  refutation  of  the 
strictures  upon  our  actual  system. 

This  discussion  has  become  now  somewhat  out  of  date.  I  al 
lude  to  it,  however,  to  call  your  attention  to  the  two  last  strictures 
there  made  against  our  system,  viz. : 

"  That  we  are  not  in  danger  from  large  expeditions,  and,  con- 
"  sequently, 

"  That  the  system  of  the  Board  of  Engineers  comprises  works 
"  which  are  unnecessarily  large  for  the  purposes  they  have  to  ful- 
"  fil ;"  and  to  ask  you  to  bear  in  mind  that  the  engineers  are  now 
censured  (whether  deservedly  or  not  is  not  the  question)  for  having 
been  for  the  last  twenty  years  carrying  on  its  constructions  under 

*  See  Senate  Document  No.  293,  page  1,  24th  Congress,  1st  session,  vol.  4. 


10  THE      DANGERS      AND      DEFENCES 

tliis  very  assumption,  that  we  arc  not  "in  danger  from  large  ex- 

"  p>'ditions." 

I  do  n..t  discuss,  at   present,  tin-  accuracy  of  this  proposition 
twenty  years  ago.  <»r  whether  it'  true  ///<•/<,  it  has  ceased  to  be  so 


The  report  which  I  have  mentioned  may  be  said  to  have 
silenced  opposition  for  the  next  ten  years;  but  it  will  (as  I  have 
said  bef  ore)  De  considered  out  of  date,  at  present,  owing  to  the  rapid 
developments  since  made  in  means  of  maritime  attack.  I  there 
fore  pass  to  more  recent  animadversions  upon  the  system. 

In  1S51  the  following  resolutions  were  adopted  by  the  House 
of  Representatives: 

u  Ut.  /iVv//m7,  That  the  Secretary  of  "War  be  directed  to 
"  report  to  this  House,  the  second  Monday  in  December  next,  on 
"  the  subject  of  the  land  defences  of  the  country,  in  which  he  will 
"review  the  general  system  adopted  after  the  war  with  Great 
"  Britain,  and  since  pursued,  in  regard  to  the  permanent  fortifica- 
k-  tions  then  divined  necessary  for  the  national  defence;  and  that 
k-  he  report,  whether  the  general  plan  may  not  be  now  essentially 
"  modified,  by  reducing  the  number  of  works  proposed  to  be 
"  erected,  and  by  abandoning  some  of  the  forts  now  in  progress  of 
"  construction." 

"  2d.  Resolwfl,  That  the  Secretary  of  War  also  report  the 
"  number  of  fortifications  which  have  been  built,  including  those 
"  nearly  completed  under  the  general  system,  the  number  in  pro 
gress  of  construction,  and  the  number  not  yet  commenced,  but 
"  proposed  to  be  erected,  and  in  such  form  as  will  conveniently 
"  show  the  States  and  Territories  in  which  the  several  forts  are 
"situated,  or  to  be  located;  when  the  work  was  commenced; 
"  when  completed,  or  expected  to  be  finished  ;  the  number  and 
"  calibre  of  the  guns  mounted  or  to  be  mounted;  the  estimated 
"  cost,  the  amount  expended,  and  the  sums  yet  required  to  finish 
"  or  construct,  as  the  case  may  be,  each  work  ;"  —  and  the  Secre 
tary  of  War,  to  carry  them  into  effect,  addressed  the  following 
queries  to  several  distinguished  oilicers  of  the  army  and  nav  ;. 

"1st.  To  what  extent,  if  any,  ought  the  present  system  of 
"  fortifications  for  the  protection  of  our  sea-board  to  be  modified 
"  in  consequence  of  the  application  of  steam  to  vessels  of  war. 


*  These  officers  were, — 
Commodore  Slcwnrt. 
('oiimio.loi-e  Morris, 
Commodore  Perry, 
Commander  Cunninirliam. 
Commander  I)ii|«>nt, 
I. it-ill. -Miuil  Lanman, 
Li.'Uleiiaiit  Maury, 
Lieutenant  Dahlgren, 


General  Totten, 
>.  Colonel  Tliaver, 


I),- 


Major  ChftM, 
Major  IMafu-U, 


OF      NEW      YORK.  11 

"  the  invention  or  improvement  of  projectiles,  or  other  changes 
"  that  liave  taken  place  since  it  was  adopted  in  the  year  1816  ? " 

"  2d.  What  reliance  could  be  placed  on  vessels  of  war,  or  of 
"  commerce,  floating  batteries,  gun-boats,  and  other  temporary 
"  substitutes  for  permanent  fortifications  ? " 

"  3d.  Is  it  necessary  or  expedient  to  continue  the  system  of 
"  fortifications  on  the  northern  lakes  ? " 

The  character  of  the  strictures  with  which  the  defensive 
system  was  then  assailed,  may  be  judged  from  the  resolutions  of 
Congress,  and  from  the  queries  proposed.  Essentially  they  were 
the  same  which  we  are  constantly  hearing  now — the  same  which 
forever  will  be  heard  to  the  end  of  time,  upon  all  established 
systems,  viz. :  that  it  was  behind  the  times, — that  railroads,  tele 
graphs,  increase  of  population,  war-steamers,  and  steam  ocean-nav 
igation  generally,  and  " Big  Guns"  in  particular,  had  rendered 
the  system  of  defence  quite  obsolete. 

As  to  the  replies  of  these  several  army  and  navy  officers,  it 
may  be  briefly  stated  that  the  defensive  system  was  sustained  by 
Commodores  Stewart  and  Morris,  Commanders  Cunningham  and 
Dupont,  Lieutenants  Lanman  and  (with  qualifications)  Dahlgren, 
of  the  navy,  and  by  General  Totten,  Colonel  De  Hussy,  and 
Major  Delafield,  of  the  Engineers/*  That  it  was  opposed  or 
censured  as  requiring  modifications  by  Commodore  Perry  and 
Lieutenant  Maury,  of  the  navy,  and  Major  Chase,  of  the  En 
gineers.  Now,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  all  the  recent 
"changes"  which  are  now  supposed  to  have  rendered  our 
maritime  defensive  works  obsolete,  or  "  old  fogyish,"  viz. :  in 
crease  of  population, — great  concentration  of  wealth,  population, 
and  national  resources  in  our  great  cities, — railroads,  telegraphs, 
ocean  steam-navigation,  and  the  consequent  facility  of  bringing 
upon  our  coasts  suddenly  large  armies  in  steam  fleets, — improve 
ments  in  calibre,  and  character  of  sea-coast  and  naval  ordnance, — 
horizontal  shell-firing,  &c., — were  then  well  known,  and,  indeed, 
formed  the  foundation  of  the  strictures  of  that  day.  What  has 
happened  since,  has  been  but  the  realization  of  what  was  then 
foreseen. 

If  there  is  any  exception  to  the  broad  statement  just  made,  it 
is  found  in  the  recent  improvement  in  small  arms  ;  but  this  is  a 
matter  which  I  conceive  to  have  very  little  bearing  on  the  topic 
in  hand. 

A  few  quotations,  therefore,  from  the  replies  of  those  officers 
who  opposed  or  demanded  modifications  in  the  system,  will  be 
interesting  for  comparison  with  the  views  of  objectors  of  the 
present  day. 

Commodore  Perry  says, — "  And  besides,  we  have  the  expe- 

*  Colonel  Thayer  did  not  respond;  his  opinions,  however,  were  well-known. 


1  li         THE   DANGERS   AND   DEFENCES 

"  rioncc  of  history  to  show  that  extensive  military  works  are 
"alike  destructive  of  the-  pm>perity  and  the  liberties  of  the 
"  j.i-Mjili-,  >a\ing  nothing  of  tin.'  enormous  cost  of  construction, 
u  and  ihe  k'-eping  tlu'in  in  condition  for  >ervice.  I  may  instance 
"the  fortresses  of  Spain,  of  Portugal,  and  of  the  former  republics 
"of  <u-noa  and  Venice,  as  gigantic  works,  now  of  little  u>e,  and 
u  lo,,ked  uj.on  by  tlu'  voyager  only  as  monument*  of  tin-  cxtrava- 
u  gance  and  peculating  Bpint  which,  at  the  time  of  their  erection, 
"characterized  the  people  of  tho-e  governments." 

"Experience,  moreover,  shows  that  while  the  fortifications  of 
"San  Juan  de  Tlloa  at  Vera  (.'nix,  the  Moro  of  Havana,  the 
"Castle  protecting  the  harbor  of  Carthagena  upon  the  coast  of 
"Columbia,  the  Venetian  fortress  of  Kapoli  de  Eomania  in 
"  Greece,  the  Castle  of  St.  Elino  in  Malta,  and  many  others  of 
"  similar  extent  ami  character,  are  considered  by  some  impregna- 
"  ble, — they  command  only  a  circuit  embraced  within  the  range 
"  of  their  guns,  and  cannot,  in  any  manner,  prevent  a  landing  of 
"  the  enemy  upon  the  coast  beyond  the  extent  of  such  range ;  in 
u  a  word,  these  works  are  useful  only  to  command  the  entrances 
"of  the  ports  which  they  were  intended  to  defend,  and  to  cover 
"  with  their  guns,  vessels  anchoring  in  their  immediate  vicinity. 
"The  celebrated  fortress  of  Gibraltar  neither  commands  the  pas- 
"  sage  of  the  Straits,  nor  the  anchorage  on  the  Spanish  side  of 
"  the  bay  of  that  name.  They  are,  in  truth,  like  chained  mons- 
"  ters,  harmless  beyond  the  reach  of  their  manacles;  not  so  with 
"  steam  batteries :  they  have  the  means  of  locomotion,  and 
"  their  power  can  be  made  effective  at  any  point  upon  the  coast 
"  capable  of  being  reached  by  an  enemy's  vessel." 

"  Of  all  the  coasts  of  Europe,  that  of  Great  Britain  is  the 
"least  provided  with  fortifications  ;  and  yet  her  soil  has  not  been 
"  trodden  by  a  successful  enemy  since  the  conquest ;  solely  pro- 
"  tecting  her  military  and  naval  arsenals  by  perfect  and  fir,  11- 
"  garrisoned  works.  She  depends  mainly  for  defence  of  her 
"  coast  upon  her  navy,  and  the  warlike  spirit  of  her  yeomanry  ; 
u  and  the  very  absence  of  fort 5 tied  works  prevent.-  a  deceitful 
"  reliance  upon  such  defences,  and  keeps  alive  the  more  gallant 
'•  and  more  certain  dependence  upon  their  own  personal  prow- 

," 

"  And  thus  it  should  be  with  us.  Man  to  man,  the  Americans 
"  arc  at  least  equal  to  any  other  race;  and  they  are  fully  capable 
"of  driving  back  to  their  ships  or  capturing  any  number  of 
"  tr<»op.>  that  might  have  the  temerity  to  land  upon  our  soil." 

Lieutenant  Maury  >ays, — "  Now  were  it  possible  for  an  enemy 
"  with  the  greatest  army  that  ever  was  led  into  battle  by  the 
"•gn-atest  captain,  to  take  the  country  by  -urprise,  and  to  land  at 
"  Long  Island  Sound,  or  in  Lynn  Haven  I  lav.  and  to  be  disem- 
k%  barking  his  la-t  piece  of  artillery  before  he  was  discovered, 
"these  railroads,  the  power  of  steam,  with  the  aid  of  lightning, 


OF      NEW      YORK.  13 

"  would  enable  the  government,  before  lie  could  reach  the  heights 
u  of  Brooklyn,  or  the  outskirts  of  Norfolk,  to  have  there  in  wait- 
"  ing,  and  ready  to  receive  him  and  beat  him  back  into  the  sea, 
"  a  force  two  to  one  greater  than  his,  however  strong." 

"  Suppose  that  in  1847,  there  had  been  in  active  operation 
"  between  Yera  Cruz  and  the  city  of  Mexico,  a  line  of  magnetic 
"  telegraph,  and  such  a  railroad  as  is  the  Erie  road  of  New  York, — 
"  can  it  be  supposed  that  our  generals,  being  cognizant  of  the 
"  facts,  would  have  so  much  as  entertained  the  idea  of  landing 
"  there  as  they  did,  and  laying  siege  to  the  town  ?" 

"  All  the  world  knows  where  our  railroads  are,  and  that  the 
"  country  is  protected  from  military  surprise  and  invasion  from 
"  the  sea,  by  a  net-work  of  telegraphic  wires ;  the  mere  know- 
"  ledge  of  the  fact  that  Norfolk  and  New  York  can  bring  to  their 
"  defence  such  resources,  will  forever  prevent  the  thought  in  the 
"  mind  of  an  enemy  of  landing  in  force  at  Lynn  Haven  Bay,  or 
"  on  Long  Island." 

"  Those  roads,  therefore,  render  a  siege  to  any  of  the  works  of 
"  defence  before  those  places,  out  of  the  question." 

"  To  lay  siege  to  any  place  along  our  sea-front  involves  not 
"  only  the  disembarking  of  an  army,  but  the  landing  also  of  the 
"  siege  train.  This  requires  time." 

"  From  the  time  that  the  head  of  our  invading  column  jumped 
"  out  of  the  boats,  up  to  their  waists  in  the  water,  at  Yera  Cruz, 
"  till  General  Scott  was  ready  to  send  his  summons  to  the  city, 
"  was  thirteen  days,  and  it  was  four  days  more  before  his  heavy 
"  artillery  drew  overtures  from  the  besieged, — total,  seventeen 
"  days. 

u  Imagine  an  army,  the  best  equipped,  it  may  be,  the  world 
"  ever  saw,  that  should  attempt  to  beleaguer  one  of  our  strong- 
"  holds  for  seventeen  days  !  Within  that  time,  we  could  bring 
"  against  him,  by  railroads  and  steamboats,  millions  of  the  free- 
"  men  which  this  country  ever  holds  in  reserve  to  fight  its  battles. 
"  It  might  be  Boston  before  which  this  imaginary  army  is  sup- 
"  posed  to  sit  down  in  imaginary  siege ;  or  it  may  be  New  York, 
"  Philadelphia,  Norfolk,  Charleston,  or  New  Orleans, — it  is 
"  immaterial  where.  In  less  than  half  the  Yera-Cruz  time,  we 
"  could  throw  millions  of  men  into  any  one  of  these  places,  and 
"  subsist  them,  in  the  meantime,  by  a  daily  market-train  of  cars 
"  and  steamboats  catering  for  them  in  the  abundant  markets  of 
"  the  Mississippi  Yalley." 

"  It  is  impossible  that  any  army,  however  brave,  spirited,  and 
"  daring,  should  ever  think  of  invading  a  country  like  this,  and 
"  attacking  us  upon  our  own  ground,  when  we  have  under  our 
"  command  such  powers  of  concentration,  and  such  force  in  reserve 
"  as  twenty  millions  of  freemen,  the  electric  telegraph,  the  railroad 
"  car,  the  locomotive,  and  the  steamboat." 


11          THE   DANGERS   AND   DEFENCES 

And  again,  alluding  to  an  invasion  of  Washington  :  "  Now,  is 
"  it  imt  obvious,  supposing  the  country  to  be  in  a  reasonable  state 
"of  preparation  at  the  commencement  of  war — supposing  this 
k-  much — is  it  not  obvious,  by  sending  telegraphic  messages,  and 
••  using  the  powers  of  steam  for  conveyance,  the  American  general 
"  might  sit  down  here,  in  Washington,  and  at  daylight  the  next 
*•  morning  commence  an  attack  upon  that  enemy,  both  in  front 
k>  and  in  rear,  with  almost  any  amount  of  force,  consisting  of 
"  regulars,  volunteers,  and  militia,  that  can  be  named  I  Retreat, 
"  for  such  a  foe,  would  be  out  of  the  question,  and  re-embarkation 
"  an  impossibility. 

"  Therefore,  so  far  as  the  system  of  1816  was  intended  to  defend 
"  the  country  from  invasion  along  the  Atlantic  sea-board,  steam, 
"  railroads,  and  the  telegraph  have  rendered  it  as  effete  as  did,  the 
"  invention  of  fire-arms  the  defences  which  the  military  science  of 
"  that  age  had  erected  against  the  shafts  of  the  archer." 

•Sf  -X-  *  •*  #  •*  # 

"  Suppose  the  system  of  1816  to  have  been  completed  ;  that 
"the  fortifications  therein  contemplated  had  all  been  built,  pro- 
"  visioned,  equipped,  and  garrisoned.  Now,  saving  only  those 
"  which  protect  the  large  cities  from  the  guns  of  men-of-war,  sup- 
"  pose  the  alternative  should  be  presented  to  our  military  men, 
"  whether  they  would  undertake  to  defend  the  country  from  inva- 
"  sion  with  such  a  complete  system  of  fortifications,  but  without 
"  the  assistance  of  railroads,  steamers,  and  telegraph  ;  or  with  the 
"  assistance  of  railroads,  steamers,  and  telegraph,  but  without  the 
"  aid  of  fortitications. 

"  I  suppose,  could  such  an  alternative  be  submitted  to  every 
"  officer  of  the  army,  from  the  oldest  down  to  the  youngest,  that 
"  there  would  be  but  one  answer — and  that  would  be,  '  Down 
"  '  with  the  forts, — and  give  us  the  railroad,  the  locomotive,  the 
"  c  steamboat,  and  the  telegraph.' " 

But,  Lieutenant  Maury  does  not  dispense  entirely  with  forts  ; 
he  says  further,  "  It  is  chiefly  to  keep  such  shigs  (i.  e.,  ships  of 
"  war)  from  burning  our  cities  and  havens  within  reach  of  their 
"  broadsides,  that  we  want  forts  and  castles." 

Exactly  so.  It  is  just /b/'  that,  and  if  he  had  said  "  burning 
our  cities  and  occupying  our  havens  "  (using  the  term  "  forts  and 
"  castles  "  technically),  I  might  almost  say,  only  that,  that  we  want 
them. 

But,  as  we  have  seen  before,  the  cry  "  Down  with  the  forts, — 
"and  give  us  the  railroad,  the  locomotive,  the  steamboat,  and  the 
"  telegraph,"  does  not  mean  "  Down  with  all  forts,"  but  only  such 
as  we  do  not  want  to  protect  our  "  cities  and  havens ;"  a  very 
important  qualification  certainly. 

Furthermore,  he  says,  "The  forts  already  completed,  or  well 
"  advanced  towards  completion,  are  believed  to  be  sufficient  for 


OF      NEW      YORK.  15 

"  this."  At  the  date  this  was  written,  the  great  port  of  the 
Pacific,  San  Francisco,  had  not  a  fort  even  begun  ;  the  great  port 
and  commercial  metropolis  of  the  Atlantic,  Sew  York,  had  not 
on  its  great  avenue  of  approach,  the  Narrows,  works  at  all 
capable  (see  the  opinion  of  Dahlgren,  a  brother  officer  of  the  navy, 
and  one  of  the  very  ablest  officers  of  the  navy,  printed  in  juxta 
position  to  Lieutenant  Maury's)  of  protecting  this  great  city  from 
"  burning  "  by  the  broadsides  or  curved  fire  of  ships  of  war.  But 
this  is  but  a  specimen  of  the  accuracy  and  soundness  of  criticism 
with  which  our  defensive  system  has  usually  been  assailed. 

Lieutenant  Maury,  however,  argues  that  "  if  one  gun,  in  open 
"  battery  on  the  shore,  '  whether  mounted  on  a  tower  or  not,  be 
"  superior  to  '  one  or  two  '  ships  of  war,  surely  our  seaport  towns 
"  of  second  and  third  rate  importance  (the  italics  are  mine)  may 
"  safely  rely  upon  open  batteries  on  the  beach,  to  protect  them 
"  from  '  British  '  or  any  other  '  men-of-war.' ': 

I  make  one  more  citation  from  Lieutenant  Maury,  that  you 
may  compare  with  opinions  more  recently  expressed : 

"  '  The  fortifications  of  the  coast,'  says  the  board  of  army 
"  officers,  whose  able  report  of  1840  quieted  the  public  mind,  and 
"  fastened  for  ten  years  longer  upon  the  country  the  effete  system 
"of  1816 — 'The  fortifications  of  the  coast,'  say  they,  '"must  be 
" '  competent  to  the  double  task  of  interdicting  the  passage  of 
"  '  ships,  and  resisting  land  attacks — two  distinct  and  independ- 
"  £  ent  qualities.  The  first  demands  merely  an  array  in  suitable 
"  '  number  s,  and  in  proper  proportions ',  of  heavy  guns,  covered  l)y 
"  *" parapets,  proof  against  shot  and  shells.'' ': 

"  Now,  I  propose  to  show  that  the  railroads,  and  the  means  of 
"  locomotion  in  this  country,  sufficiently  defend  our  fortifications 
"  from  land  attacks ;  and  tliat,  consequently,  the  principal  requis- 
"  ite  henceforward,  in  a  system  of  fortifications  for  the  coast,  is 
"  merely  an  array,  in  suitable  numbers  and  proper  proportions,  of 
"  heavy  guns  along  the  beach,  to  cover  the  approaches  of  ships 
"  from  sea,  to  seaport  towns."  And  particularly  I  call  your  atten 
tion  to  his  recommendation,  "  That  no  further  expenses  be  incurred 
"  for  preparing  our  fortifications  along  the  Atlantic  sea-board,  to 
"  withstand  sieges  by  land." 

Having  given,  I  think,  a  fair  view  of  the  arguments  of  the 
objecting  naval  officers,  I  now  proceed  to  give  a  few  citations  from 
Major  Chase's  response.  As  an  engineer  officer  of  rank,  connected 
with  the  present  system  of  coast  defence  from  its  initiation,  his 
objections,  or  demand  for  modifications,  deserved  careful  con 
sideration. 

After  giving  a  history  of  the  rise  and  progress  of  the  present 
system  of  coast-defence — referring  to  the  experience  of  our  last 
war  with  Great  Britain — reviewing  the  "  new  and  important 
"  elements  in  the  national  defence  and  security  which  have  been 


16  THE      DANGERS      AND      DEFENCES 

M  rapidlv,  almost  magically,  developed  in  the  last  thirty-five  years, 

-  —  SU(.M  as  tlu-  increase  of  population  —  the  progress  of  improve- 
k-  nil-lit  in  agriculture,  manufactures.  and  commerce,  and  in  facile 
k>  lines  of  intercommunication,"  he  says  : 

M  In  view,  then,  of  all  these  things,  and  especially  of  the  new 
"  elements  moral,  political,  and  physical  —  claimed  to  havejuvn 
«  developed.  and  to  have  greatly  increased  the  power  of  the  United 

•  States,  "//'/  H'h'irh  inuxt  l<  •  <'<n,t<'nl,  r<d  in  rdatton  to  the  future 
'•  ,//-/v/////.  /in  ut  of  the  national  d<f>  /«;  .  the  undersigned  thinks 
"  that  the  general  plan   adopted  thirty  -live  years  ago  should  be 

-entialiy  modified,  by  reducing  tlie  number  and  size  of  the 
"  works  proposed  to  be  constructed,  and  by  abandoning  some  of 
*•  the  defences  now  in  progress  of  construction,  or  which  are  about 
"  to  be  constructed  under  existing  appropriations  made  by  Con- 


"  The  undersigned  is  also  of  the  opinion  that  the  best  interests 
"  of  the  country  require  that  the  subject  of  modification  should  be 
"  submitted  to  a  board,  composed  of  artillery  and  engineer  officers, 
"and  some  eminent  civilians;  —  That  no  new  work  should  be 
"  commenced,  even  if  it  has  been  appropriated  for  by  Congress  ; 
"  and  that  no  appropriation  should  be  made  by  Congress  for  the  com- 
u  pletion  and  repairs  of  existing  works,  until  the  whole  subject  of 
"  the  national  defence  has  been  considered  and  reported  upon  by 
%%  the  said  board."  And  he  further  advances  the  opinion  —  "  Buffi* 
"  cient  has  been  said  to  show  that  railways  and  the  electric  tele- 
"  graph  contribute  largely  to  the  national  defence  ;  that  the  works 
"  covering  our  large  sea-ports  and  otfyer  important  points,  placed 
u  in  connection  with  the  railways  and  telegraph,  if  they  were  now 
"  to  be  constructed,  might  be  much  reduced  in  size  and  cost,  if  not 
"  in  number  ;  that  the  facility  wTith  which  these  works  could  be 
"  relieved  in  case  of  an  attempted  siege,  would  have  rendered  it 
necessary  for  them  to  be  made  secure  against  a  coup-de- 


"  Under  these  views  of  the  subject,  it  is  at  once  perceived  that, 
"  whilst  the  extension  and  invention  of  railways  (and  the  electric 
"  telegraph)  do  not  supersede,  they  greatly  diminish  the  necessity 
"  of  adding  to  the  number  and  cost  of  the  fortifications  on  the  sea- 
"  board;  or,  in  other  words,  that  the  future  prosecution  of  the 
"system  <>f  defence  by  permanent  fortifications,  should  be  on  a 
"very  reduced  scale,  in  comparison  with  the  magnificent  one 
"  adopted  thirty-five  years  ag«>." 

And,  in  relation  to  the  influence  of  steam-navigation  and 
improvements  in  artillery,  he  says  : 

"The  navigation  of  the  ocean  by  steam,  and  the  application  of 
"  -team  to  vosels  of  war,  have  certainly  added  to  the  facilities  of 
"  naval  operations,  in  making  attacks  and  transporting  troops, 
"  Hut  such  operations  are  necessarily  confined  to  short  lines,  like 


OF      NEW      YORK.  IT 

"  those  between  France  and  England,  in  the  Mediterranean,  or  on 
"  the  lakes  between  Canada  and  the  United  States." 

"  Attacks  by  steamers  can  only  be  formidable  when  they  are 
"  numerous,  and  filled  with  troops  destined  for  a  grand  attack ; 
"  but  when  they  are  thus  filled  with  troops,  munitions  of  war, 
"  provisions,  armament,  and  their  regular  crews,  little  room  is  left 
"  for  the  fuel  necessary  to  propel  them  to  the  scene  of  action  and 
"  in  retreat.*  Such  steamers  cannot  be  propelled  either  con- 
"  veniently  or  rapidly,  until  the  propelling  power  can  be  produced 
"  at  a  less  outlay  for  fuel.  At  the  rate  supposed  to  be  the  maxi- 
"  mum  of  speed  of  war  steamers,  lines  of  operations  over  one 
"  thousand  miles  (five  hundred  in  advance  and  five  hundred  in 
"  retreat)  cannot  be  occupied  advantageously,  or  with  the  effi- 
"  ciency  necessary  to  a  great  movement  of  strategic  or  direct 
"  attack.  Numerous  transports  would  be  necessary  to  convey 
"  supplies  of  coal  to  convenient  places  on  the  coast,  where  depots 
"  for  the  same  would  have  to  be  established  and  defended  at  great 
"  cost,  for  they  would  be  constantly  in  danger  of  attack  by  sea 
"  and  land  by  enterprising  assailants.  Besides,  the  great  loads  of 
"  men,  munitions,  armaments,  provisions,  and  fuel,  that  wrar  and 
"  transport  steamers  would  be  obliged  to  carry,  multiply  the  dan- 
"  gers  of  navigation." 

"  Certainly,  steamers  could  make  sudden  and  brief  attempts 
"  to  enter  harbors  and  destroy  towns  ;  but  fast-sailing  ships,  with 
"  favorable  winds,  could  do  the  same,  if  this  kind  of  marauding 
"  and  piratical  warfare  was  carried  on  by  any  Christian  nation 
"  calling  itself  civilized,  and  if  not  opposed  by  the  same  machines 
"  of  war  as  those  used  by  the  enemy  and  by  acts  of  retaliation." 

"  Such  attempts  might  be  successful  in  attack  and  retreat,  if 
"  made  in  the  night,  even  if  the  harbor  was  strongly  fortified,  if 
"  the  fortifications  were  unaided  by  rafts  and  hulks  lying  across 
"  the  channels." 

"  But  a  demonstration  on  a  large  scale  against  the  important 
"  ports  and  arsenals,  for  the  purpose  of  taking  possession  and 
"  levying  contributions,  requires  considerable  land  forces,  even 
"  against  such  points  as  were  not  defended  by  batteries ;  for  at 
"  such  points,  in  time  of  war,  earth  erections  would  be  made  and 
"  easily  supplied  with  cannon  of  heavy  caliber,  that  wmild  do 
"  great  damage,  by  direct  and  vertical  cannonade,  to  the  enemy's 
"  vessels  and  forces  afloat,  after  they  had  entered  the  harbor,  and 
"  probably  compel  them  to  leave  it,  and  force  them  to  select  a 
"  more  distant  point  for  the  initiative  of  attack." 

"  If  the  enemy,  strong  in  ships  and  soldiers,  could  be  driven 
"  from  Boston,  by  the  erection  of  some  redoubts  in  the  course  of 
"  one  night,  it  is  hardly  to  be  supposed  that  he  would  attempt  to 
"  recapture  the  position,  or  to  attack  any  other  position  similarly 
"  situated." 


18  THE      DANGERS      AND      DEFENCES 

••  Any  Mich  demonstration  .it  the  present  day  would  be  checked 
"by  the  means  just  ('numerated,  and  l»e  met  on  its  flanks  and  in 
"front  bv  the  mobile  forces  rallied  by  the  telegraph  to  the  point 
"of  attack." 

"The  improvement  in  artillery,  as  regards  size  and  efficiency, 
"lias  been,  of  late  year,-,  very  great  ;  but  it  inures  more  to  the 
'•  hem-lit  of  the  defence  than  the  attack.  In  the  same  way  that,  if 
"steam,  applied  to  ships  of  war,  affords  any  advantages  to  the 
"  attack,  steam,  applied  on  railways,  combined  with  the  electric 
"  trli'irraph,  affords  greater  advantages  to  the  defence,  by  reason 
u  of  the  greater  facility  with  which  forces  may  be  moved  by  the 
"  latter  means." 

••  From  all  which  it  may  be  safely  asserted,  that  the  navigation 
"  of  the  ocean  by  steam,  the  application  of  steam  to  vessels  of  war, 
'•  and  recent  improvements  in  artillery  and  other  military  inven- 
"  tions,  do  not  exhibit  the  attack  of  forts  on  the  sea-board  superior 
"to  the  defence,  when  those  forts  are  connected  with  railways, 
"  and  are  brought  within  succor  of  the  surrounding  population  ; 
"  nor  do  they  render  additions  to  the  present  fortifications  in 
H  number,  size  or. cost,  in  any  wise  necessary.  But,  on  the  con- 
"  trary,  the  improvement  in  artillery,  if  those  fortifications  had 
"  now  to  be  built,  would  enable  their  plans  to  be  reduced  one-J«i(f 
"  in  size,  and  the  armament  one-fourth  in  amount." 

In  wliat  precedes,  I  believe  1  have  given  a  fair  and  complete 
view  of  the  "  objections"  to  the  system  of  coast  defence,  as  they 
were  urged  scarcely  eight  years  ago.  I  do  not  pretend  that  our 
views  of  the  problem  of  coast  defence  should  be  exactly  the  same 
that  they  were  at  that  date  ;  for  I  think,  in  relation  to  some  of  our 
great  sea-ports  at  least,  the  developments  of  the  recent  war  of  the 
Allies  against  Russia,  has  made  the  problem  quite  a  new  one.  But 
I  do  affirm  that  that  war  exhibited  but  a  development — or  realiza 
tion  rather — of  the  changes  which  form  the  basis  of  these  criti 
cisms  of  1851.  Let  us,  therefore,  sum  up  these  objections  of 
1851. 

Our  forts  need  no  longer  be  so  large; — "  forts  and  castles" 
may  even  be  dispensed  with,  and  a  few  powerful  guns,  "  in  open 
batteries,"  substituted.  The  idea  of  strength  against  land  attack 
(or  siege)  is  by  one  critic  scouted.  "  Now,  were  it  possible  for  an 
"  enemy,  with  the  greatest  army  that  ever  was  led  into  battle,  by 
u  the  greatest  captain,  to  take  the  country  by  surprise,  and  to  land 
"  at  Long  Island  Sound,  or  in  Lynn  Haven  Bay,  and  to  be  disem- 
"  barking  his  last  piece  of  artillery,  before  he  was  discovered — these 
"railroads,  the  power  of  steam,  with  the  aid  of  lightning,  would 

.able  the  government,  before  he  could  reach  the  heights  of 
u  Brooklyn,  or  the  outskirts  of  Norfolk,  to  have  there,  in  waiting, 
"  and  ready  to  receive  him,  and  beat  him  back  into  the  sea,  a 
"force  two  to  one  greater  than  his,  however  strong."  "While 


OF      NEW      YORK.  19 

another  thinks  that,  "  the  facility  with  which  these  works  could 
"  be  relieved,  in  case  of  an  attempted  siege,  would  have  rendered 
"  it  only  necessary  for  them  to  be  made  secure  against  a  coup  de 
"main"  And  his  opinions,  as  to  "demonstrations  on  a  large 
"  scale,  against  the  important  ports  and  arsenals,"  will  be  found 
in  the  passage  already  quoted. 

I  pass  now  from  "  objections  "  of  1851  to  "  objections  "  of  1858. 
These  are  found  in  a  "  Letter,"  addressed  to  yourself,  Sir,  by 
Lieutenant  Morton,  of  the  Engineers,  which  has  been  published, 
and  which,  as  it  appears  to  have  not  only  had  much  influence  upon 
your  own  views,  but  on  the  minds  of  the  public,  deserves  much 
more  than  a  passing  notice.  They  are  summed  up  by  the  author 
in  the  following  language  : 

"  The  first  objection  I  offer  to  the  existing  system  is  with  re- 
"  spect  to  the  size.  It  adopts,  even  in  localities  where  there  is 
"  plenty  of  room,*  different  sorts  of  masonry  casemated  castles,  of 
"  the  smallest  area  that  will  hold  the  number  of  guns  required,  in 
"from  two  to  five  tiers  ;  the  guns  firing  through  embrasures. in 
"  the  scarp  wall,  which  is  exposed  to  its  base,  or  nearly  so,  to  the 
"  fire  of  flotillas.  This  remark  applies  to  the  sea  fronts  of  all  our 
"  sea-coast  forts  of  importance.  (Those  not  on  this  principle  are 
"  small,  and  situated  in  localities  where  one  sort  of  work  will 
"  answer  as  well  as  another.)  The  works  referred  to,  have,  in 
"  some  cases,  land  fronts ;  that  is,  fronts  which  do  not  bear  on 
"  the  approaches  of  ships,  or  on  anchorage  ground.  These  are 
"  arranged  sometimes  on  the  bastion  system,  sometimes  on  the 
"  German  ;  but  in  all  cases  are  contracted  and  weak,f  owing  to 
"  the  difficulty J  of  joining  strong  land  fronts  to  casemated  sea 
"  fronts,  of  small  development." 

"  The  small  area  of  these  works  will  prevent  them,  in  the  first 
"  place,  from  holding  any  more  ammunition  and  stores,  than  they 
"  will  need  if  exposed  to  protracted  bombardment.  As  to  a  siege, 
"  those  which  are  out  of  the  reach  of  help,  such  as  Key  West, 
"  Fort  Point,  Ship  Island,  and  Pensacola,  will,  probably,  be  short 
"  of  supplies  very  soon,  and  be  reduced  from  that  cause.  There 
"  will  be,  in  no  case,  the  interior  space  required  to  accommodate 
"  the  magazines,  &c.,  which  must  be  located  and  protected,  at  the 

*  "  As  at  Key  West,  Ship  Island,  Fort  Point,  Pensaccla,  the  site  of  Fort  Tompkins, 
"  and  Fort  Richmond,  at  Sandy  Hook,  Fort  Adams,  and  other  places." 
f  "  Without  any  exception,  they  are  smaller  than  a  Vauban  front." 
j  "  In  illustration  of  this,  see  Forts  Adams  and  Schuyler,  in  each  of  which,  two 
"  sides  of  the  main  work  are  flanked  by  flanking  casemates  in  the  outworks.     This 
"  arrangement  is  certainly  open  to  criticism  ;  but  I  mention  it  only  to  show  that  it 
"  has  been  found  difficult  to  connect  the  sea  and  land  fronts;  and  I  wish  it  to  be 
"understood,  that  I  do  not  find  fault  with  the  plan  of  these  works  but  only  object 
"  to  this  plan  being  followed  hereafter,  now  that  it  appears   to  be   unsuitable   to 
"circumstances  that  have  arisen  since  they  were  built." 


20  TlIK       DANGERS      AND      DEFENCES 

u  pniuts  I  have  specified,  and  where  the  plan  of  fortification  is  still 
"  t.»  In-  derided  upon." 

"  A  second  disadvantage  springing  from  the  contracted  area 
"is,  that  there  i>  n«»r  enough  room  <>u  tin-  terrepleins  to  spare  for 
"  triii]..  .rary  homhpmofs,  traveives,  Are..  which  are  necessary  to 
"protect  the  barhette  guns  i'mm  ricochet  and  reverse  fire,  and 
k-  vertical  lire.  Also,  the  garrisun,  as  well  as  the  guns,  will  be 
"closely  packed,  and  during  a  bombardment  the  chances  of 
"casualties  will  be  increased  from  this  cause  ;  and  from  the  fact 
"  that  the  heads  of  the  casemate  arches  heing  open  on  the  interior, 
"and  having  a  direction  towards  a  common  Centre.  more  frag- 
"  ments  of  a  single  shell,  bursting  inside  the  work,  will  probably 
"  enter  them,  than  if  they  were  developed  on  longer  lines." 

"  3d.  Works  built  on  this  system  expose  a  large  mark  to  the 
"  fire  of  flotillas,*  which  can  liardly  be  missed  ;  and  a  certain 
"  proportion  of  the  entire  number  of  shots  must,  therefore,  be 
"  counted  upon  to  enter  the  embrasures,  carrying  with  them 
"  splinters  of  stone." 

"Those  shots  wh  irh  do  not  hit  the  embrasures,  will  produce  a 
"certain  eil'ect  in  shaking  the  wall;  and,  considering  the  calibres 
"  and  number  of  the  guns  that  enter  into  the  armament  of  a 
"modern  flotilla,  there  is  reason  to  Tear  breaehing."f 

"  It  must  be  noted,  also,  that  a  small  front  is  exposed  to  a 
"more  converging  fire  than  a  large  one  ;  a  point  of  importance, 
"according  to  all  military  authorities/1 

k'  4th.  The  use  of  casemates  brings  one  tier  of  guns  about  at  the 
"level  of  the  ground,  or  site  ;  and  in  those  cases  where  a  ditch 
"  cannot  l»c  made  to  surround  the  work  (as  is  the  case,  for  exam- 
"  pie,  at  Fort  Adams,  Fort  Schuyler,  Fort  Sumtcr,  Fort  Indepen 
dence,  Fort  Hamilton,  and  others),  the  defect  results  that  an 
"entrance  may  be  effected  by  the  enemy  by  surprise,  or  under 
"certain  other  circumstances,  by  these  embrasures.  [It  appears 
"that  the  southern  tower  at  Bomarsund  was  entered,  and  taken, 
"  by  a  small  party  of  French,  who  entered  through  the  embrasures, 
"  though  all  the  garrison  had  not  yet  retreated  from  it  into  the 
"  keep.]  The  iron  shutters,  recently  proposed,  will  not  entirely 
"  remove  this  defect,  which  is  inherent  to  small  fronts" 

*"M.  Riehild  Grivcl  (1857)  13  of  opinion  that,  considering  the  greater  calibre 
"nn<l  force  of  the  sea-service  guns  recently  adopted,  and  tin-  co////^/-"/'"'  safety 

"afforded  them  by  floating  batteries,  no  isolated  masonry  fort,  however  solidly  cou 

nted,  ran  long  r.-M  an  att-.ck  properly  conducted.'" 

I  -  It  is  c.-rtain  that  the  scarps  of  our  sea-coast  works  are  no  stronger  than  those 
"of  Boiiiursund;  brick  -.vails  of  ei<rht  feet  thi.-kn.-ss,  or  tin-  same  backed  with  coii- 
"  crete,  or  granite  back«-d  with  mncrete,  form  our  scarps,  which  are  three  feet 
"thinner  around  each  «  mbrasuiv,  and  are,  in  ninny  ca<e-  not  bonded  to  the  eounter- 
"  f'cits  in  their  rear.  J  do  not  assert  that  the  walUof  J!omar-und  were  breached  from 
"the  water,  but  refer  back  fur  a  comparison  between  lari:«'  nuns  afloat  and  small 
•i-hore,  to  show  that  a  less  accurate  fire,  provided  it  is  from  heavier  guns, 


"  will  effect  a  breach. 


OF      NEW      YORK.  21 

"  5th.  The  present  system  is  carried  out  to  advantage  only  on 
"  sites  close  to  the  water  ;  and  hence,  in  many  cases,  the  advan- 
"  tages  offered  by  the  nature  of  commanding  plateaus  or  promon- 
"  tories  have  been  neglected,  and  works  built  at  the  foot  of  heights, 
"  even  when  an  artificial  site  was  necessary  for  the  purpose.""* 

A  system  of  fortifications,  or  of  anything  else,  which  requires 
time  and  money  to  construct,  and  which,  when  constructed,  are 
intended  to  last  for  years,  must  have  more  flexibility  than  ordi 
narily  belongs  to  works  of  this  nature,  if  it  can  meet  the  views  of 
objectors,  who,  in  the  brief  space  of  seven  years,  on  the  one  hand, 
scout  the  idea  of  lund  defense  entirely,  or  denounce  our  works  as 
too  strong  in  this  particular ;  and  on  the  other,  criticise  these  land 
defences  as  "  weak  and  contracted." 

I  do  not  exactly  understand  what  Lieutenant  Morton's  remedy 
is  for  all  these  alleged  evils  ;  for,  though  he  has  proposed  a  "  sys 
tem  "  of  "  detached  bastions,"  connected  by  earthen  curtains,  the 
"  smallest  application  of  which  .would  be  a  pentagon  of  550  yards 
"  a  side,  and  the  largest  sizes  being  polygons  of  750  yards  a 
side,"  he  himself  records,  without  answering,  the  objection,  "  that 
"  the  extent  of  ground  occupied  by  the  enclosure  is  too  great  for 
"  some  of  the  sites  which  are  available  for  the  location  of  bat- 
"  teries  ;"  and  moreover  states  expressly — "  It  must  be  recollected 
"  that  I  propose  to  fortify  in  this  manner,  only  certain  points  of 
"  the  sea-coasts,  which  I  mention,  and,  in  view  of  future  cases, 
"  define  the  nature  of ;"  and  his  specification  and  definition  is  as 
follows : 

"  I  propose  that  the  system  sketched  in  the  preceding  cliscus- 
"  sion  should  be  used  at  Key  West,  Ship  Island,  San  Francisco, 
"  possibly  at  Pensacola,  and  at  other  or  future  points  of  United 
"  States  territory,  which  are  comprised  in  the  following  class,  or 
"  classes,  viz :  places  that  are  fitted  by  nature  to  form  bases  of 
"  operations  for  sea  warfare,  by  being  located  where  they  may 
"  protect  our  commerce,  and  from  which  that  of  the  enemy  may 
"  be  annoyed ;  that  are  convenient  places  of  retreat  for  repairs  or 
"  safety,  for  government  ships  and  for  privateers,  or  merchantmen 
"  pursued  by  the  enemy  ;  that  can  be  made  also  safe  and  conve- 
"  nient  depots  for  artillery,  ammunition  and  stores ;  or  places  that 
"  may,  in  addition  to  some  or  all  of  the  above  properties,  be  made 
"  centres  of  defence,  from  land  as  well  as  sea  attacks  of  territories 
"  isolated  or  distant  from  the  United  States." 

Neither  the  specification  nor  the  definition  apply  to  more  than 
an  exceedingly  small  portion  of  the  "  sites"  requiring  sea-coast 
batteries,  while  the  objection  that  he  records  applies  to  most  of 
them.  If,  therefore,  the  objections  made  to  the  "  different  sorts  of 
"  masonry  casemated  castles  "  are  valid,  we  find  no  substitute  in 

*  "  As  at  Fort  Adams,  Fort  Richmond,  Fort  Point,  and  others." 


L'l'  THE      DANGEKS      AND      DEFENCES 

his  essay,  and  however  forcible  the  objections  maybe,  until  some 
thing  better  i>  proposed  m-  invented,  we  must  be  content  with 
them  :  t'»r  I  shall  show  hereafter  that  "  ma>onry  ca>emated  castles" 
have  played  a  great  part  in  preserving  Bea-porte — commercial  and 
naval  depots  (the  true  and  proper  ohjeets  of  coast  defence)  from 
dc.-truetion — that  they  have  t'uliilled  completely  the  objects  for 
which  they  were  constructed. 

Let  us  examine  the  subject  a  little  more  closely.  Years  ago  it 
had  passed  into  a  proverb  in  France,  that  "  a  gun  on  shore  is  worth 
"a  snip  at  sea,"*  and  the  French  "Aide-memoire  d'artillerie" 
expresses  the  same  idea  in  other  words:  "That  a  battery  of  four 
k-  pieces  of  large  calibre,  well  placed,  and  well  served,  ought  to 
••  iivt  the  better  [avoir  raison]  of  a  ship  of  \'2()  guns." 

Hut  the  question,  which  of  the  two  will  "  get  the  better"  in  a 
direct  contest,  is  a  very  different  one  from  that  which  concerns  the 
mere  rapid  passage  OI  a  ship  or  steamer  through  a  channel  de 
fended  by  a  battery  ;  and  it  is,  I  think,  in  overlooking  in  a  measure 
this  important  distinction  that  Lieutenant  Maury  and  many  others, 
arguing  from  the  surprising  results  of  certain  well-known  contests 
between  very  small  open  batteries  and  ships,  have  proposed,  in 
stead  of  stone  batteries,  "  one  or  more  heavy  guns  planted  in  open 
"  battery  along  the  beach/' 

Even  if  it  was  admitted  that  the  fire  of  a  gun  in  an  "open 
"  battery  "  was  necessarily  so  much  more  effective  (which  I  greatly 
doubt)  than  that  of  one  in  a  casemate,  it  may  be  remarked  that  as 
(in  the  present  state  of  artillery)  it  is,  at  best,  but  one  out  of  great 
many  shots  that  touches  a  ship  in  a  vital  part,  or  sets  her  on  fire, 
a  ft-ii*  IJH.HX  cannot  be  expected  to  prevent  the  passage  of  a  fleet, 
nor  even  of  a  single  vessel. 

I  have  said  already  that  no  battery  or  system  of  batteries  has 
yet  be-e-n  invented  which  shall  seal  hermetically,  a  channel  (like 
the  Narrows,  for  instance)  the  passage  of  which  offers  to  an  en 
terprising  enemy  an  object  sufficient  to  induce  him  to  run  the  risk 
at  all  hazards.  What,  then,  can  be  done  (  We  must,  to  defend 
sHr/t  a  passage,  use  only  guns  of  the  most  cl*t /•/{<•/ !ve  capacit<<* — 
and  we  must  inuli'ipl  ij  f/«  ///,  so  that  we  can  throw  upon  him  a  per 
fect  hail-storm  of  lire,  throughout  his  whole  path — and  we  must 

''e  no  spot  either  in  approaching  his  object,  or  after  he  gets  he- 
fore  it,  not  under  our  fire ;  and  even  then,  we  must,  in  many  cases, 
call  in  auxiliary  aid. 

Again,  with  regard  to  the  open  battery,  this  peculiar  efficiency 
which  Lieutenant  Maury  attributes  to  it,  does  not  belong  to  it  at 
all,  except  in  e</'f<i<n  ftito,  which  cannot  always,  nor  even  fre 
quently,  be  found. 

Lieutenant  Dahlgren  says,  "So  far,  therefore,  as  casemated 

*  "  Un  canon  a  terre  vaut  un  vai^seau  a  la  incr." 


OF      NEW      YORK.  23 

"  batteries  are  concerned,  shells  have  added  very  little  to  the  power 
"  of  ships ;  but  against  guns  en  barbette  they  will  be  found  of  ma- 
"  terial  assistance,  especially  if  charged  with  balls  and  used  as 
"  shrapnel.  And  against  open  works,  the  concentration  afforded 
"  by  the  well-served  broadsides  of  one  or  more  ships,  should  suffice 
"  to  silence  the  works,  if  the  vessels  have  no  unusual  disadvantages 
"  to  encounter,  and  are  brought  within  sure  distance."  And  again, 
in  his  very  interesting  and  able  remarks  on  the  "  Incidents  of  the 
"  War"  at  the  conclusion  of  his  work  on  "  Shells  and  JShell 
"  Guns  :"— - 

"  The  fire  of  a  small  barbette  or  uncovered  work,  can  always 
"be  kept  under  by  the  rifled  musket  and  shrapnel,  judiciously 
"  postcd;  taking  the  advantage  of  such  shelter  as  the  locality  af- 
"  fords,  or  using  pits  for  the  sharp-shooters  if  necessary.  The 
"  broadside  can  then  be  brought  to  bear,  or  the  men  sent  ashore 
"  in  force  to  assault — circumstances  may  even  admit  of  the  land- 
"  ing  one  or  two  cannon  to  breach  the  work. 

"  The  unqualified  assumption,  that  a  tower  or  small  redoubt, 
"  with  its  two  or  three  guns,  can  of  itself  make  good  the  defence 
"  against  a  heavy  ship,  would  naturally  suggest  more  than  is  con- 
"  templated ;  for  in  that  case,  why  resort  to  the  cost  of  extensive 
"  works  to  defend,  a  harbor,  when  a  few  towers  might  fully  answer 
"  the  purpose  ?  But  the  fact  is,  that  the  advantage  of  site  which 
"  is  required  to  give  effect  to  this  species  of  defence,  is  rarely  to 
"  be  found  just  where  it  is  neecfed.  It  existed  neither  at  Cronstadt 
"  nor  at  Sweaborg ;  and  at  Sebastopol  the  elevated  works  of  this 
"  nature  only  served  to  command  the  position  for  attack  on  Fort 
"  Constantine  from  seaward.  Of  themselves,  they  could  not  have 
"  prevented  the  entrance  of  a  single  vessel  into  the  port,  nor  have 
"  inflicted  any  material  damage  on  an  enemy  making  the  at- 
"  tempt. 

"  Again,  it  frequently  happens  that  the  works  are  too  limited 
"  in  extent,  or  isolated  and  not  capable  of  mutual  support ;  the 
"  masonry  may  be  bad — the  site  low  and  the  guns  unprotected  by 
"  casemates — the  ordnance  of  inefficient  power,  and  not  command- 
"  ing  all  accessible  positions — the  garrison  inadequate  in  numbers 
"  and  quality.  In.  such  cases  the  ship  cannot  fail  to  have  the  ad- 
"  vantage,  and  it  only  remains  to  use  it  by  attacking  in  proper 
"  force,  rapidly  and  energetically,  concentrating  the  full  fire  of  the 
"  line  at  decisive  distances  upon  the  unguarded  or  weak  points, 
"  and  affording  no  opportunity  for  improving  the  state  of  the 
"  works.  Under  this  head  may  be  classed  those  actions  where 
"  ships  have  been  eminently  successful — Algiers,  Acre,  Vera  Cruz, 
"  Kinburn,  Petropauloski,"  &c.,  &c. 

Even  if  the  "advantages  of  site"  existed,  a  small  number  of 
guns  would  not  always  answer  the  purpose.  The  whole  front  of 
the  public  lands  on  Staten  Island,  at  the  Narrows,  is  (or  wrill  be) 


24:          THE   DANGERS   AND   DEFENCES 

girdled  by  open  earthen  batteries,  but  if  /'*  ?W  enough — nor  would 
I  tru-t  tneee  open  battorfa  alone,  if  they  could  contain  guns 
enough.  y 

Grivel  *  (who  is  ^  noted  as  entertaining  the  opinion  that  "no 

"  isolated  masonry  tort,  however  -<>lidly  c«>n>tnicted.  can  long 
"  iv-i>t  an  attack  properly  Conducted,")  uses  the  following 
language: 

"  We  could  then"  (he  refers  to  the  case  in  which  the  site  is  low 
and  ships  can  approach  near),  "  if  we  feared  being  commanded  or 
-  taken  in  enfilade  hy  tires  of  ships,  substitute  for  earthen  batte- 
kt  rie>.  works  in  masonry,  calcinated,  and  irifji  several  stories  of 
"  cor.  i;<liJi'es.  [The  italics  are  mine.]  This  kind  of  fortification 
"  will  expose,  it  is  true,  its  '  personnel  to  the  chance  of  embrasure 
"  sliot,  or  to  wounds  from  stone  fragments"  (as  if  any  warlike 
structure  had  yet  been  invented  in  which  there  was  no  /A///*/,  r) 
"  and  its  material  to  that  of  a  breach;  but  these  inconveniences 
"will  be  in  part  compensated  by  the  <txxur«1  jn'<>t>  r/ /'////,  to  tlie 
"  greater  part  of  its  artillery,  from  the  plunging  or  enfilading  tires 
"of  ships."  An  "  assured  protection  to  the  greater  ]»art  of  its 
"artillery"  is  certainly  a  irreat  object  attained  by  "  this  kind  of 
"  fortification,"  and  it  doubtless  would  lie-  aide  longer  4t  to  resist 
u  an  attack  propei'ly  condnctetl  "  than  a  work  which,  like  Kinburn, 
had  no  such  assured  protection. 

Let  me  now  allude  to  objections  applying  ]>arti<-iilni-ly  to  these 
kind  of  works  ;  \\\\&  first  as  to  thil^iabilitv  to  hi><  <'>•],',  n<j  here  hinh'd 
at  by  (Jrivel,  and  nrired  airain  by  Lieutenant  Morton,  who  refers 
to  GrivePfl  authority  and  opinions.  Tliere  is  not  one  single  fact 
on  record  derived  from  the  numerous  attacks  of  the  Allies  on 
Kiir-ian  "cast-mated  castles"  (and  they  presented  themselves  to 
the  Allied  fleets  almost  everywhere,  and  with  all  that  constitutes 
the  "objections"  to  this  class  of  works  in  their  most  glaring  form), 
nor  in  the  history  of  any  other  maritime  attacks  on  fortifications, 
to  justify  this  fear.  The  only  event  of  the  war  which  gives  any 
iijijh/,*'  at  ground  for  it,  is  the  attack  on  Kinburn. 

To  draw  any  conclusion  from  this  affair,  it  is  necessary  to  un 
derhand  the  character  of  the  works  which  had  to  oppose  the 
tremendous  armament  arrayed  against  them,  (irivel's  account  of 
them  conveys  a  very  erroneous  impression.  lie  says,  "  The 
"citadel  of  Kinburn,  builtupon  a  tongue  of  >and,  could  be  ranked 
"  in  the  category  of  those  masonry-ca>emated  works  for  which  the 
"  Uu>-ians  seem  to  manifest  a  preference  for  the  defence  of  insular 
"  positions  or  of  such  low  >ites.  This  fort,  armed  upon  all  its 
"  faces,  offered  an  incomplete  tier  of  covered  fires,  surmounted  by 

*  "La  Mavin.-  dan?  I'attnqin-  «!••«  fortifications  ct  le  bombardeim-nt  •!«•*  vill.--  •!•! 
"littoral."  j-ai-.M.  lviohil«l  (M-ivd,  I Jfut.'iiant  <!»•  Vaisecau  :  1'ai'i-,  J.s.'iO.  Hi>  "t>]iinion" 
i-  \\orth  as  nmrli  a-  any  other  iiKlivitlual's,  pcfhnjts.  AVe  ^luill  see  hcrcafti-r  on  what 

s'.u-h  opinion.s  a 


OF      NEW      YORK.  25 

"  a  long  barbette  battery  with  earthen  parapets ;  its  armament 
"amounted  to  more  than  sixty  guns  (bouches  a  feu),  of  which, 
"  about  half  bore  upon  the  open  sea.  Two  new  batteries,  armed, 
"  one  with  ten,  the  other  with  eleven  pieces,  and  Covered  with  sand 
"  parapets,  were  located  beyond  on  the  extreme  point,  and  com- 
"  pleted,  in  concert  with  those  of  the  other  shore,  the  defence  of 
"  the  pass  of  Otchakow." 

One  would  imagine  from  this,  that  we  had  here  a  very  perfect 
specimen  of  Russian  works  and  of  sea-coast  defences  generally ; 
that  the  "  masonry-casemated  works"  were  such  as  set  at  defiance, 
before  Cronstadt,  the  united  maritime  power  of  France  and 
England. 

Lieutenant  Morton  appears  to  draw  his  account  of  Ivinburn  en 
tirely  from  Grivel  (adding,  however,  quite  gratuitously,  "  a  certain 
proportion  of  sixty-pounder  guns"  to  the  armament  of  these  (sup 
posed)  formidable  works.) 

Having  arranged  his  works,  Grivel  disposes  of  them  as  fol 
lows  : 

"  The  contest  had  lasted  four  hours,  and,  during  this  short 
"  space  of  time,  the  combined  fires  of  our  cannon  of  great  pene- 
"  tration,  and  of  our  mortars,  had  sufficed  to  put  the  place  out  of 
"  condition  (hors  d'etat)  to  resist  longer.  Represent  to  yourself  all 
"  its  cannon  dismounted,  practicable  breaches  in  the  sea-front,  all 
"  its  edifices  burnt  or  in  ruins !  In  a  word,  the  fort  of  Kinburn 
"  was,  after  the  picturesque  expression  of  our  sailors,  capsized 
"  (chavire  de  fond  en  comble),  and  if  its  entire  garrison  was  not 
"  buried  under  this  complete  disaster  of  the  defences  (son  materiel), 
"  it  is  because  the  soldiers  not  employed  at  the  pieces  had  been 
"  sheltered  in  the  casemates,  of  which  a  portion,  resisting  our 
"  bombs,  had  remained  intact." 

So,  the  men  in  the  "  casemates"  fared  rather  better  than  those 
serving  barbette  guns  (open  batteries),  with  which  our  modern 
critics  are  so  exclusively  in  love ;  and  had  they  been  gun-casemates 
well  arranged,  and  well  constructed,  it  is  likely  that  the  compara 
tive  security  would  have  been  about  the  same. 

But  let  us  contrast  this  imposing  account  of  the  works,  and 
the  somewhat  terrific  exposition  of  the  result,  with  the  actual 
facts.* 

Dahlgren,  drawing  his  information  from  "  official  accounts  by 
"  English  and  French  Admirals,"  describes  the  works  and  their 
location  as  follows : 

"  The  Boug  and  the  Dnieper  issue  into  a  large  basin,  formed 

*  The  author  of  Chambers'  Pictorial  History  of  the  Russian  War,  says  of  Kin- 
burn  :  "  The  fort  at  that  place  had  been  so  little  attended  to  by  the  Russians,  that  an 
"  English  lieutenant  had  some  time  previously  offered  to  seize  and  blow  it  up  if  he 
"  had  three  hundred  men  to  aid  him  ;  but  when  the  Russians  saw  the  English 
"  steamers  cruising  about,  they  begun  to  strengthen  the  fort  and  augment  the  garri- 
"son,  <fec." 


26          T  HK   DANGERS   AND   DEFENCES 

"  ]>artly  by  the  projection  of  the  main  shore,  partly  by  a  long 
"  narrow  >trip  of  sand-beach,  which  continues  from  it  and  takes 
u  ft  north  westerly  direction,  until  it  passes  the  promontory  of 
"  Otchakov,  where  it  terminates,  and  from  which  it  is  separated 
"  l»v  the  channel  whereby  the  waters  of  the  estuarv  empty  into 
"the  1  Hack  Sea." 

••  The  distance  between  the  spit  or  extremity  of  this  tongue 
"  and  the  Point  <»f  ( )tcliakov,  or  the  main  shore  opposite,  is  about 
"  two  miles  ;  but  the  water  is  too  shoal  to  admit  of  the  passage  of 
"larire  voscls  of  war,  except  in  the  narrow  channel  that  runs 
"nearest  to  the  >pit  and  its  northern  shore.  Here,  therefore,  are 
"placed  the  works  designed  to  command  the  entrance.  They 
'•are  three  in  number.  Near  the  extreme  point  of  the  spit  is  a 
"covered  battery,  built  of  logs,  which  are  tilled  in  and  overlaid 
k>  with  sand, — pierced  for  eighteen  guns,  but  mounting  only  ten." 

"Advancing  further  along  the  beach  is  a  circular  redoubt, 
"connected  with  the  spit  battery  by  a  covered  way.  This  work, 
"  built  of  stone,  and  reveted  with  turf,  is  open,  and  said  to  be  the 
"  most  substantial  of  the  three  ;  it  has  eleven  cannon,  and  within 
"is  a  furnace  for  heating  shot." 

"  Further  on,  and  where  the  beach  has  widened  considerably, 
"  is  Fort  Kinburn,  a  square,  hastium-d  work,  extending  to  the  sea 
"  on  the  south,  and  to  the  waters  of  the  estuary  on  the  north.  It 
"is  ca-einated  in  part,  though  but  few  of  these  embrasures  were 
"armed, — its  chief  force  being  in  the  pieces  en  ~barltdt»\  and 
"  some  nine  or  ten  mortars.  The  masonry,  though  solid,  is 
"represented  by  an  eye-witness  not  to  be  bomb-proof,  and  so 
"dilapidated  by  age  that  the  mortar  was  falling  out  from  the 
"  interstices,  leaving  the  stone  to  disintegrate.  The  interior  space 
"was  occupied  by  ranges  of  wooden  buildings,  slightly  con- 
w'  stnicted,  and  plastered  over." 

"  This  fort  is  said  to  be  armed  with  sixty  piece?.  The  English 
"admiral  states  that  all  three  of  the  works  mounted  eighty-one 
"guns  and  mortars.  The  calibers  are  not  given  officially,  but 
"  Mat'-d  in  private  letters  to  be  ls-pounders  and  32-poundere." 

The  above  description  will,  I  think,  quite  justify  the  further 
remark  as  to  these  works: 

"  They  were  inferior  in  every  respect,  and  manifestly 'incapable 
"of  withstanding  any  serious  operation  by  sea  or 'land.  The 
kt  main  fort  was  particularly  weak  in  design,  and  dilapidated  ;  all 
"of  them  were  indifferently  armed  and  garrisoned." 

:iuch  for  the  works.    As  to  the  character  of  the  armament* 
brought  to  the  a.—ault.  the  same  autlmritv  savs  : 

u  The  Allied  force  was  admirably   adapted  to  the  operation, 

*  I  find  no  detailed  statemont  of  tlio  total  number  of  vessels,  guns,  troops,  il,-.t  ..f 
tlio  Allied  force.  The  "  I'irtorial  History"  um-s  the  following  as  tin-  Knirlish  quota, 
viz.,  "  i;  strum  line-of-buttle  ships,  17  steam  frigates  and  bloops,  10  gun-boats,  f,  mor- 


OF      NEW      YORK.  27 

"  embracing  every  description  of  vessel,  from  the  largest  to  the 
"  smallest,  and  all  propelled  by  steam.  There  were  screw-liners, 
"  and  like  vessels  of  inferior  class,  side-wheel  steamers,  screw  gun- 
"  boats,  floating-batteries,  mortar-vessels,  &c.,  each  armed  in  what 
"  was  considered  the  most  approved  manner."  And  this  truly 
formidable  naval  force  carried  besides  "  some  thousand  troops  "  on 
board,  all  designed  to  attack  these  "  dilapidated  "  works  of  Kin- 
burn. 

Without  going  into  the  particulars,  I  will  simply  give  Dahl- 
gren's  account  of  the  affair. 

"  The  French  floating-batteries  (Devastation,  Lave,  and  Ton- 
"  nante)  steamed  in  to  make  their  first  essay,  anchoring  some  six 
"  or  seven  hundred  yards  off  the  S.  E.  bastion  of  Fort  Kiiiburn, 
"  and  at  9.20  opened  fire,  supported  by  the  mortar-vessels,  of 
"  which  six  were  English,  by  the  gun-boats,  five  French  and  six 
"  English,  and  by  the  steamer  Odin,  16." 

"  The  heavy  metal  of  the  floating-batteries  (said  to  be  twelve 
"  50-pounders  011  the  broadside  of  each)  soon  told  on  the  walls  of 
"  the  fort ;  and  the  vertical  fire  was  so  good  that  the  French 
"  admiral  attributed  to  it,  in  great  part,  the  speedy  surrender  of 
"  the  place.  The  gun-boats  also  made  good  ricochet  practice, 
"  which  was  noticed  to  be  severe  on  the  barbette  batteries." 

"  The  Kussian  gunners,  in  nowise  daunted  by  this  varied  fire, 
"  plied  their  guns  rapidly  in  return,  directing  their  attention 
"  chiefly  to  the  floating-batteries,  which  were  nearest." 

"  Exactly  at  noon,  the  admirals  steamed  in  with  the  Royal 
"  Albert,  121,  Algiers,  91,  Agamemnon,  90,  and  Princess  Royal, 
"  90,  with  the  four  French  liners  in  close  order,  taking  position  in 
"  line,  ranging  N.  W.  and  S.  E.,  about  one  mile  from  the  fort,  in 
"  twenty-eight  feet  water." 

"  At  the  same  time,  a  squadron  of  steam-frigates,*  under  Kear- 
"  Admirals  Stewart  and  Pellion,  dashed  in  through  the  passage 
"  to  the  basin,  opening  fire  on  the  spit  and  central  batteries  in 
"  passing,  and  anchoring  well  inside  of  Fort  Nicholaiev  and 
"  Otchakov.  The  attack  seaward  was  completed  by  the  Acre,  100, 
"  CuroQoa,  30,  Tribune,  30,  and  Sphynx,  6,  opening  on  the 
"  central  battery ;  while  the  Ilannioal,  91,  Dauntless,  24,  and 
"  Terrible,  21,  assailed  that  on  the  spit.  To  this  storm  of  shot 
"  and  shells,  the  Russians  could  not  reply  long.  In  the  spit 
"  battery,  the  sand  falling  through  between  the  logs,  displaced  by 

"  tar-vessels,  3  steam-tenders,  10  transports, — making  52  vessels,  carrying  in  all  about 
"  1500  guns,  arid  5000  troops  of  all  kinds. ' 

The  French  force  is  not  stated;  but  there  were  4  ships  of  the  line,  a  number  of 
steam-vessels  and  gun-boats,  besides  the  3  famous  floating-batteries  (here  first 
employed),  and  a  considerable  body  of  troops.  The  troops  of  both  nations  were 
landed  previous  to  the  naval  attack,  and  the  place  invested  by  land. 

*  Valorous,  16,  Furious,  16,  Sidon,22,  Leopard,  12,  Gladiator,  4,  Firebrand,  6 
Stromboli,  6,  Spiteful,  6,  Asmodee,  Cacique,  and  Sane. 


28  THE   DANGERS   AND   DEFENCES 

"shot  and  shells,  choked   the  embrasures,  and    Mocked  up  the 

ing,  In  the  fort,  the  light  wooden  buildings  were  in  ilaines  at 
k-  a!i  early  hour;  then  the  walls  In -pin  to  crumble  before  the  balls 
k- which  came  from  every  quarter,  front.  Hank,  and  rear;  and  as 
"  the  guns  were  disabled  successively,  the  return  became  feeble, 
"until  few  were  in  condition  to  lie  tired,  the  central  redoubt  alone 
k-  dix-harging  single  guns  at  long  intervals.  The  Russian  com- 
u  mander.  however,  made  n<>  Mgn  of  surrender  ;  but  the  admirals, 
ing  that  his  fire  had  ceased,  and  further  defence  was  unavail- 
k*  ing.  hoisted  the  white  flap:  at  1.35  P.  M.,  upon  which  the  works 
"  were  given  up  on  honorable  terms." 

u  The  garrison  consisted  of  about  fourteen  hundred  men  ;  their 
"loss  is  differently  stated, — the  French  admiral  says  eighty 
"  wounded, — another,  forty-three  killed  and  one  hundred  and 
"fourteen  wounded." 

4-  The  English  suffered  the  least,  having  but  two  men  wounded, 
"  besides  two  killed  and  two  wounded  in  the  Arrow,  by  the  burst- 
"  ing  of  her  two  68-pounder  Lancaster  guns." 

u  The  superiority  of  the  Allied  vessels  in  number  and  caliber 
"  of  ordnance  was  very  decided  ;  they  must  have  had  at  least  six 
"  hundred  and  fifty  pieces  in  play,  chiefly  32-pounders,  and  S-inch 
"  .-h-.-il  guns,  with  a  fair  proportion  of  OS-pounders  and  mortars, 
l-  bi'-ides  the  50-pounders  of  the  French  floating-batteries.  To 
"  which  the  Russians  could  only  re]>ly  with  eighty-one  cannon 
"and  mortars,  and  no  guns  of  heavier  caliber  than  32-pounders, 
"  while  many  were  lower.  The  great  disparity  in  offensive  power 
"  was  not  compensated  to  the  works  by  the  advantage  of  coin- 
"  manding  position,  the  Russian  fort  and  redoubt  being  upon 
"nearly  the  same  level  with  the  ships'  batteries,  and  al.-o  very 
"  delicieiit  in  proper  strength.  On  the  other  hand,  the  depth  of 
%%  water  did  not  allow  the  liners  to  approach  nearer  than  one  mile; 
"  and  thus  their  flre  was  by  no  means  so  intense  as  it  would  have 
"  been  at  shorter  range." 

"  This  was  the  sole  occasion  in  which  the  floating-batteries  had 
k*  an  opportunity  of  proving  their  endurance:  which  was  the  ques- 
"  tion  of  most  importance,  as  no  one  could  doubt  the  effect  of  long 
u  50-pounders,  or  68-pounders,  when  brought  within  a  few  hun- 
"  divd  yards  of  masonry,  and  able  to  retain  the  steadiness  indis- 
M  pi -n.-able  to  a  breaching  fire." 

"  No  siege  operation  had  ever  embraced  batteries  of  such 
M  power,  for  though  the  Knglish  had  employed  long  68-pounders 
"at  Sevastopol,  yet  the  distance  from  the  objects  exceeded  a 
u  thousand  yard-;  and  the  concentration  of  fire,  so  far  as  any 
"opinion  can  be  formed  from  the  published  statements,  was  far 
"inferior  to  that  of  tin-  thirty-six  ."io-pounders.  in  the  broadsides 
"  of  the  three  batteries  anchored  in  dose  order." 

••They  were  hulled   repeatedly   by   shot;  one   of  them   (the 


OF      NEW      YORK.  29 

"  Devastation),  it  is  said,  sixty-seven  times,  without  any  other 
"  eifect  on  the  stout  iron  plates  than  to  dint  them,  at  the  most, 
"  one  and  a  half  inches, — still,  there  were  ten  men  killed  and 
"  wounded  in  this  battery  by  shot  and  shell  which  entered  the 
"  ports, — and  the  majority  of  damage  to  the  French  personel 
"  (twenty-seven  men)  occurred  in  the  three  floating-batteries." 

The  affair  proves  nothing,  unless  it  be,  that  "  dilapidated  " 
and  ill-designed  and  ill-constructed  works,  armed  with  inferior 
calibres,  cannot  contend  against  such  an  overwhelming  array  of 
force  as  was  here  displayed.  But  the  failure  to  derive  from  it 
any  conclusion  against  "  masonry-casemated  "  works,  or  "  castles," 
is  the  more  signal,  owing  to  the  very  important  fact  that  it  was 
mainly  a  contest  of  "  open  "  or  "  barbette  "  batteries,  whose  supe 
riority  over  casemated  ones  has  been  so  much  insisted  on. 

In  this  account  we  hear  nothing  of  "  practicable  breaches," 
though  doubtless  thirty-six  50-pdrs.,  at  500  yards,  would  "  tell  " 
on  the  walls  of  such  a  fort.  Yet,  as  the  "  vertical  fire  was  so 
"  good  that  the  French  admiral  attributed  to  it,  in  good  part,  the 
"  speedy  surrender  of  the  place,"  while  the  "  ricochet  practice," 
from  the  gun-boats,  was  "  severe  "  upon  these  open  batteries — 
while  the  "  edifices  "  behind  them  (old  wooden  buildings,  "  slightly 
constructed,  and  plastered  over ")  were  in  a  blaze,  which  must 
have  made,  by  heat  and  smoke,  the  service  of  the  guns  almost 
impracticable — there  is  no  difficulty  in  accounting  for  the  result 
of  the.  contest. 

Whether  or  not  a  "  practicable  breach"  was  made,  is  of  little 
consequence,  in  such  a  case ;  but,  turned  up-side  down  as  (accord 
ing  to  Grivel)  the  defences  were,  with  the  garrison  nearly  buried 
in  the  "  ruins,"  it  appears  there  were  only  157  (out  of  1,400) 
killed  and  wounded — a  very  small  loss,  under  all  the  circum 
stances. 

The  fact  is,  that  these  "  open  batteries  "  were  "  turned  upside 
down" — the  guns  disabled  and  dismounted,  by  the  deluge  of 
direct,  vertical,  and  ricochet  fire  poured  upon  them — as  in  all 
" open  batteries,"  in  such  situations,  ever  will  happen* 

*  According  to  the  "  Pictorial  History,"  the  Russian  artillerymen  at  these  "  open 
batteries,"  were  exposed  besides  to  the  fire  of  sharpshooters.  It  says,  "  Bazaine," 
(the  General  commanding  the  French  troops)  "  placed  two  companies  of  chasseurs 
"  under  cover,  at  a  distance  of  400  yards  from  the  east  side  of  the  fort,  and  kept  up 
"a  fusilade  on  the  Russian  artillerymen." 

As  to  the  armament,  the  same  author  says, — "The  captors  found  nearly  80  guns 
"mounted  in  the  fort  and  batteries,  mostly  long  and  heavy  18  and  24  pounders  ;  but 
"  there  were  many  others  ready  for  mounting,  platforms  to  support  them,  and  newly 
"  constructed  casemates,  raising  the  total  of  guns  to  174." 

Notwithstanding  that  the  fort  was  (according  to  Grivel)  "capsized"  (chavire) 
and  the  garrison  nearly  buried  in  the  "  ruins,"  it  does  not  appear  that  they  were 
fully  sensible  of  their  condition.  The  "Pictorial  History"  says, — "The  officers  in 
"  general  bore  the  scene  "  (the  surrender)  "  with  dignity,  but  with  deep  mortifica- 
"  tion  ;  and  many  of  them  were  said  to  be  on  the  verge  of  mutiny  against  the  gover- 
"  nor,  so  strongly  did  they  resist  any  proposals  for  a  surrender." 


30  THE      DANGERS      AND      DEFENCES 


I  have  u-iveii  much  space  to  this  affair  of  Kinbum,  for  Grivel 
parades  it  ;is  a  lair  illustration  of  what  "  floating  batteries,  com 
bined  with  bomb-vessels,  gun-boats.  Arc.,"  can  do  against  "nia- 
sonr\  -rasemated  "  works.  I  have  shown  how  inaccurate  (by 
comparison  with  the  official  accounts)  fcs  GriveFs  version  of  the 
ail'air  ;  and  I  have  further  shown,  that  no  conclusion  whatever  can 
l)i-  drawn  from  this  contest  of  insignificant  works,  armed  with  low 
calibres,  against  such  overwhelming  means  of  attack  as  were  here 
arrayed  ;  unless,  indeed,  it  be  this  (a  fact  before  well  known),  that 
for  low  sites,  open  luff-  /•/'•  *  are  the  most  inefficient  of  all.  The 
fort  of  Kinburn  surrendered,  not  because  it  was  breached,  —  not 
because  its  defenders  were  so  far  diminished  by  their  losses,  as  to 
be  unable  to  protract  the  contest,  —  but  simply  because  the  guns 
and  gunners,  exposed  in  all  possible  ways,  were  put  hors-de-com- 
bat,  and  the  calibres  were  incapable  of  doing  any  great  damage 
to  the  vessels,  at  the  distance  they  were  stationed. 

"With  regard  to  the  effects  and  endurance  of  the  much-vaunted 
floa1<ii<j-l<itt>  i'i<  .v.  Commander  I  )ahlgren  very  judiciously  remarks  : 

"The  use  that  can  be  made  of  noating-batteries,  as  auxiliaries 
"  in  attacking  shore-works,  must  depend  on  further  confirmation 
"  of  their  asserted  invulnerability.  It  may  be  that  the  perform- 
"  ancc  at  Kinburn  answered  the  expectation  of  the  French  empe- 
"  ror  as  regards  offensive  power,  for  that  is  a  mere  question  of  the 
"  battering  capacity  of  the  heaviest  calibres,  which  is  undoubted  ; 
"but  the  main  issue,  which  concerns  their  endurance,  cannot  be 
"  settled  by  the  impact  of  ;-tt-pdr.  shot,  fired  at  600  and  700  yards. 
"  Far  heavier  projectiles  will  in  future  be  found  on  all  sea-board 
"fortifications;  and  the  ingenuity  of  the  artillerist  may  also  be 
"  exerted  more  successfully  than  at  Kinburn.  Still,  it  is  not  to  be 
"doubted  that  the  floating-battery  is  a  formidable  element  in 
"  assailing  forts,  even  if  its  endurance  falls  short  of  absolute  invul- 
"  nerability  ;  and  the  defence  will  do  well  to  provide  against  its 
••  .  Mplovnient." 

Kxperiments  in  England  have  shown,  that  such  vessels,  pro 
tected  by  wrought-iron  plates  4£  inches  thick,  were  incapable  of 
resisting  a  solid  GS-pdr.  shot  at  400  yards.*  Such  shot,  and  even 
greater,  they  will  certainly  have  to  resist,  if  they  are  to  contend 
with  the  modern  armament  of  our  fortifications.  Grivel  sagely 
cautions  them  to  take  position  at  such  a  distance  that  they  cannot 
be  penetrated.  The  only  possibility,  however,  of  broaching  a 
well-constructed  masonry  revetment  consists  in  placing  the  bat- 


*  "The  t.-irg.'t  was  nn  immense  construction  of  timber  and  iron,  combined  exactly 
"like  tin-  M.les  oMIn-  l.att.-ri.'-i;  —  iron  4  in.  thick.  Twenty-four  rounds  of  68-pdrs. 
••  irere  fnv.l,  the  first  14  of  which,  at  600  yards;  and  after'the  first  few  rounds,  the 
"timber  i::ive  way  in  nil  din-,-ti..ns.  The  last  10  rounds,  at  4uo,  and  the  work  of 
Itruction  WM  complete.  The  last  shot  fired  went  completely  through  target, 
••  timber  and  iron  included"  (Civil  Engineer  and  Architect's  Journal,  Jan.  1858.) 


OFNEWYOKK.  31 

tery  at  very  short  distance.  The  difficulty  of  breaching  increases 
enormously,  even  in  land  batteries,  with  increase  of  distance  ;  far 
more  in  floating-batteries,  owing  to  the  unavoidable  motion  of  the 
vessel,  which,  at  considerable  distances,  scatters  the  projectiles. far 
and  wide.* 

The  works  at  Bomarsund  were  taken  by  means  of  land  bat 
teries,  which  breached  the  exposed  walls  of  the  towers  and  main 
work. 

There  is  no  more  stringent  rule  of  fortification  than  that 
which  demands  that  all  masonry  shall  be  covered  (by  earth  works 
or  otherwise)  from  the  action  of  land  batteries,  where  the  circum 
stances  of  the  location  render  their  use  practicable.  The  Russians 
disregarded  this  rule  in  the  arrangement  of  their  works  at  Bomarr 
sund,  and  to  that  disregard  owed  the  prompt  reduction  of  the 
place.  The  masonry  was  faced  with  large  blocks  of  granite,  of 
very  irregular  shape,  backed  by  rubble.  I  doubt  very  much, 
whether  Lieutenant  Morton's  assertion  is  tenable,  that,  "  It  is  cer- 
"  tain  that  the  scarp  of  our  sea-coast  works  are  no  stronger  than 
"  those  of  Bomarsund.  "f 

Concerning  the  action  of  the  land  latteries,  Sir  Howard 
Douglas  says,  "  Authentic  information,  for  the  accuracy  of  which 
"  thetauthor  vouches,  enables  him  to  state,  that,  with  respect  to 
"  the  effect  of  solid  shot  on  the  granite,  with  which  the  walls  were 
"  faced,  the  French  guns  made  no  impression  on  the  blocks  when 
"  they  struck  perpendicularly  in  the  middle  of  their  faces ;  nor 
"  did  the  shot  fired  from  the  powerful  32-pounder  British  guns 
"  split  the  granite  when  so  struck  ;  but,  when  the  blocks  were  hit 
"  by  the  latter  near  the  edge,  or  on  a  joint  of  the  masonry,  they 
"  were  displaced,  the  joints  penetrated,  the  wall  shaken ;  and 
"  this  not  being  backed  with  solid  masonry,  but  filled  in  with 
"  rubble,  the  mass  was  thrown  down,  and  a  practicable  breach 
"  formed.  This  successful  operation  is  very  generally,  but  erro- 
"  neously,  stated  to  have  been  effected  by  the  fire  of  the  ships, 
"  and  is  even  strongly  held  up  as  a  proof  of  what  ships  can  do, 
"  and  ought  to  attempt  elsewhere." 

The  large  joints  which  the  rubble  facing  of  Bomarsund  offered, 
facilitated  greatly  the  action  of  batteries.  Such  joints  are  not 
found  in  our  scarps,  exposed  to  vessels'  fire ;  nor,  in  general,  are 
such  walls  (where  casemated  and  pierced  for  guns),  "  backed  with 
concrete." 

But  the  experimental  practice  of  the  "  Edinburgh,"  upon  the 
walls  of  Bomarsund  (after  the  capture),  deserves  to  be  recorded  ; 

*  The  idea  that  a  floating  structure  can  be  made  shot-proof,  while  the  walls  of  a 
fort  cannot  be,  is  so  transparently  absurd  as  scarcely  to  require  refutation.  All  that 
will  be  maintained,  probably,  will  be,  that  in  general  the  lattej  are  not  shot  proofc 
I  shall  allude  to  this  subject  again. 

f  See  Appendix"  A." 


32  THE      DANGERS      AND      DEFENCES 

for  here,  if  ever,  with  all  the  means,  and  no  hostile  shot  to  en 
counter,  a  ship's  batteries  might  he  expected  to  breach  k-  granite 
walls."  The  "  Edinhurgh"  had  in  this  case,  all  th^  /  AW  nt'«il  <j"<i- 

I  ,.f  a  floating-battery,  viz.,  the  largest  and  most  powerful 
iruns  in  the  JJritish  navy  :  shot-proof  sides  would  not  have  added 
t<»  her  '.'//'  unto  powers. 

I  give  Sir  Howard  Douglas'  own  words: — "  Bnt  the  results  of 
"  the  experimental  tiring  at  the  remnant  of  the  fort,  which,  unless 
"  the  previous  tiring  of  the  slii])s  during  the  attack  was  absolutely 
"harmle>s,  must  have  heen  somewhat  damaged,  and  moreover 
"shaken  hy  the  blowing-up  of  the  contiguous  portions,  do  not 
"  warrant  this  conclusion.  even  should  the  attacking  sliips  he  per- 
^  mitted,  like  the  '  Edinburgh,'  to  take  up,  quietly  and  coolly, 
"positions  within  500  yards,  and  then  deliberately  commence  and 
"  continue  their  firing,  without  heing  fired  at !  The  firing  of  the 
"  '  Edinhurgh,'  at  1,060  yards,  was  unsatisfactory.  390  shot  and 
"  shells  were  fired,  from  the  largest  and  most  powerful  guns  in  the 
"  1'ritMi  naw  (viz.,  from  the  Lancaster  gun  of  95  cwt.,  with  an 
"  elongated  shell  of  100  Ibs. ; — from  68-pounders  of  95  cwt.,  and 
" 82-ponnders  of  56  cwt.,  solid  shot  guns; — from  10-inch  shell 
k-  iruns  of  81  cwt.,  with  hollow  shot  of  81  Ibs.  ; — from  S-inch  shell 
"  guns  of  65  and  60  cwt.,  with  hollow  shot  of  56  Ibs.),  did  but 
"little  injury  to  the  work.  At  480  yards,  250  shot,  shells*  and 
"hollow  shot  were  fired.  A  small  breach  was  formed  in  the 
"  facing  of  the  outer  wall,  of  extremely  bad  masonry,  and  consi 
derable  damage  done  to  the  embrasures  and  other  portions  of 
"  the  wall  ;  but  no  decisive  result  was  obtained — no  practicable 
"breach  formed,  hv  which  the  work  mi^ht  be  assaulted,  taken, 
-and  effectually  destroyed,  although  640 "shot  and  shells  (-10,000 
"  Ibs.  of  metal)  were  fired  into  the  place,  first  at  1,060,  and  then 
"at  480  yards." 

Truly,  if  floating  batteries  can  do  no  better  than  this  when 
thev  have  it  "  all  their  own  way,"  1  think  we  need  not  be  in  very 
great  apprehension  for  (even)  our  "isolated  forts,"  which  Grivel 
seems  to  think  (and  Lieutenant  Morton  quotes  his  opinion) 
"cannot  long  resist  an  attack  properly  conducted,  however 
"  W /'/////  constructed  they  may  be"  (The  italics  are  mine.) 

The  harbor  defenses  of  Sebastapol  were  very  fair  specimens 
of  Itiissian  "  masonry -casemated"  works,  and  are  types  of  the 
same  class  of  works  built  in  this  country;  though  the  material 
of  which  they  were  built  was  very  inferior,  and  they  were  in 
many  r,  /•;/  important  details  (as  I  shall  show  hereafter),  particu 
larly  &mbra#we*)  vastly  inferior  to  our  oldest  specimens,  and  not 
to  he  compared  at  all  with  those  built  by  us  in  the  last  few  years. 
The  "  Naval  Cannonade"  of  these  works  on  the  17th  October, 
1854.  might  be  expected  to  throw  some  light  upon  the  relative 
powers  and  liabilities  to  injury  of  the  two  characters  of  anna- 


OF      NEW      YORK.  33 

ments  here  opposed.  But  such  is  not  the  case.  The  Russian 
works  were  not  armed  with  the  powerful  sea-coast  guns  now 
deemed  essential ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  allied  fleet  was 
nothing  but  a  fleet, — i.  e.,  it  was  not  provided  with  those  special 
means  of  attack  (gun-boats,  mortar-vessels,  floating-batteries,  &c.) 
which  will  always  hereafter  be  provided  for  such  attacks.  It  was, 
therefore,  an  old-fashioned  affair,  and  might  rather  be  set  down 
as  the  last  attempt  to  array  ships  of-the-line  and  ordinary  vessels- 
o£-war  against  fortifications.  This  question  has  long  been  prac 
tically  (though  not  confessedly,  perhaps)  settled.  It  was  settled 
before  our  Mexican  war,  when  for  near  a  whole  year  our  fleets 
threatened  San  Juan  de  Ulloa,  yet  never  ventured  to  measure 
their  strength  with  it,  notwithstanding  they  had  the  precedent  of 
the  quite  recent,  much- vaunted  French  triumph  over  this  very 
work.  It  was  practically  settled  throughout  this  whole  European 
war,  in  which  the  powerful  allied  fleets  (the  most  powerful  naval 
armaments  the  world  had  ever  seen),  threatened  in  turn  all  the 
strongholds  of  Russia  on  the  Baltic ;  and,  notwithstanding  that 
public  opinion  at  home,  and  naval  pride  in  the  fleet,  demanded 
some  exploit  which  should  be  commensurate  with  the  immense 
preparations  made, — retired  abashed,  and  confounded,  before  the 
"  masonry-casemated  castles,"  whose  "crockery"  walls  did  not, 
after  all,  seem  to  invite  a  close  contact,  or  "  hard  knocks ;"  and 
which  so  proudly  fulfilled  their  mission  in  protecting  throughout 
that  war,  the  military  and  naval  depots,  the  wealth,  the  com 
merce,  and  the  national  honor  of  Russia. 

Sweaborg,  indeed,  suffered ;  but  it  was  from  a  distant  bom 
bardment,  which  left  her  fortifications  and  her  harbors  intact,  and 
only  showed  the  necessity  of  protecting  at  greater  distance,  all 
great  depots,  or  great  cities. 

Bomarsund alas  for  Bomarsund ! — or  rather  for  the  pres 
tige  of  the  mighty  naval  armament  which  would  have  assaulted 
it.  One  single  "  masonry-casemated  castle"*  bid  defiance  to  this 
proud  armament,  whose  chiefs,  concluding  wisely  that  "  discretion 
"  was  the  better  part  of  valor,"  sent  home  for  10,000  French 
troops,  who,  with  a  few  16  and  32-pounder  guns  in  land-batteries, 
speedily  reduced  the  work. 

The  "  Naval  Cannonade"  at  Sebastapol  was  a  mere  "  simu- 
"  lacre  "  of  an  operation  of  which  the  inutility  was  felt,  and  from 
which  no  other  results  were  expected  than  a  diversion  of  the 
attention  and  strength  of  the  garrison  from  the  land  side,  where 
a  real  struggle  for  predominance  was  going  on  between  the  artil 
lery  fires  of  besieged  and  besiegers. 

*  It  is  worthy  of  remark,  in  this  place,  that  this  "  casemated  castle"  (like  very 
many  of  the  Russian  batteries  of  the  same  character),  had  nothing  but  casemate  guns. 
There  was  not,  (as  is  invariably  the  case  with  our  own  works),  an  "  open  battery  " 
(barbette)  on  the  top;  the  upper  tier  of  arches  being  simply  made  bomb-proof  by 
earth,  and  roofed  over. 

3 


34  THE      DANGERS       AND      DEFENCES 

The  allied  fleet  consisted  of  H  French,  10  British,  and  2  Turk- 
i>h  ships-of-the-line  (some  few  of  which  liiul  auxiliary  steam 
power),  and  a  number  of  side-wheel  steamers  tu  tow  these;  and 
carried  in  all  about  ^"ino  guns.  It  wa>  opposed  by  about  ^^n  guns 
from  the  works.  Thetleet  kept  itself  (in  general) at  a  respectable 
distance  (from  1500  to  2000  yards)  ;  too  far  to  inflict  any  material 
injnrv  with  its  armament  (82-pOUnders,  with  a  moderate  propor 
tion  of  8-inch  shell-guns)  upon  the  works; — too  far  to  receive 
much  from  the  inefficient  armament  of  the  Russian  works. 

The  only  exception  to  this  remark  applies  to  the  detached 
English  squadron  under  Sir  Edmund  Lyons,  consisting  of  the 
"  Agamemnon,"  "  Sanspareil,"  "  London,"  "  Arethusa,"  and  "  Al 
bion,"  the  first-named  of  which  vessels  took  a  position  at  750  or 
800  yards  from  Fort  Cons tantine,  while  the  others  stretched  along, 
at  about  the  same  distance  from  Fort  Constantino,  the  "  Wasp 
Tower,"  and  "Telegraph  ISattery."  Dahlgren  describes  the  result 
as  follows : 

"  The  Agamemnon  was  very  seriously  maltreated,  though  not 
"  to  such  an  extent  as  to  impair  her  power  of  battery  or  engine. 
"  She  was  on  fire  several  times  ;  was  struck  by  240  shot  or  shells  ; 
"  and,  singular  to  say,  only  lost  29,  while  her  second,  just  by,  lost 
"  70  men.  The  Albion  suffered  still  more,  and  in  an  hour  was 
"  towed  out,  crippled,  and  on  fire  in  more  than  one  place,  with  a 
"  loss  of  81  men.  The  crews  of  the  London  and  Arethusa  fared 
"  rather  better,  but  the  ships  nearly  as  ill ;  and  they,  too,  remained 
"in  station  but  a  little  time  after  the  Albion.  The  Queen  was 
"driven  off  soon  after  she  got  into  her  new  position,  in  great 
"danger;  and  the  Itodn< //  Bad  the  bare  satisfaction  of  getting 
"  aground  and  afloat  after  experiencing  some  damage." 

^~"  The  value  of  the  small  works  on  the  cape  and  bluffs,  was 
"  clearly  defined  in  these  results  ;  being  above  the  dense  cloud  of 
"smoke 'that  enveloped  the  ships  and  the  lower  forts,  their  aim 
"  was  not  embarrassed,  while  the  seamen  labored  under  the  diffi- 
"  culty  of  firing,  with  an  inconvenient  elevation,  at  objects  that 
"they  saw  but  seldom,  and  then  but  dimly  and  briefly-  As  a 
"  consequence,  three  line-of-battle  ships  and  a  frigate  were  driven 
"  off  very  shortly  and  in  great  peril,  and  a  fourth  badly  cut  up  ; 
"  while  the  Agamemnon  lay  opposed  to  one  of  the  heaviest  sea- 
"  forts  with  two  tiers  of  casemates,  and  at  the  end  of  five  hours 
"  came  off  with  comparatively  little  loss." 

Whatever  superiority  of  effect  the  batteries  on  the  heights  may 
have  had  (and  we  have  so  few  details  about  these  works  that  we 
can  draw  no  sure  conclusion  from  this  mere  naked  statement  of 
damages  received  by  the  vessels),  it  evidently  was  not  for  want  of 
being  kit  often  enough  (smoke  or  no  smoke),  that  the  "  Agamem 
non  "  escaped  with  so  little  injury.  She  "  was  struck  by  2-10  shot 
"  and  shells;"  and  it  is  only  due  to  the  inefficiency  of  the  projec 
tiles  by  which  she  was  struck,  that  she  was  not  destroyed. 


OF      NEW      YORK.  35 

"With  respect  to  the  damages  received  by  Fort  Constantino,  I 
quote  again  from  Dahlgren,  at  length  : 

"  The  distance  of  the  Agamemnon  and  Sanspareil  from  Fort 
"  Constantine  (17th  October,  1854),  was  assumed  to  be  about  800 
"  yards  ;  Lord  Raglan  states  it  to  have  been  rather  less.  These 
"  two  ships  could  bring  to  bear  about  87  guns,  and  the  firing  from 
"  them  probably  lasted  some  four  hours.  There  can  be  no  doubt 
"  that  it  inflicted  much  damage,  for  the  Russian  commander-in- 
"  chief  admits  it  in  his  official  report ;  but  not  sufficient  to  impair 
"  the  strength  of  the  masonry,  and  far  short  of  effecting  a  breach 
"  in  it." 

"  At  Bomarsund,  the  results  were  rather  different : — Three 
"  32-pdrs.  of  42  cwt.  (guns  of  inferior  weight),  were  landed  from 
"  a  ship's  spar  deck,  and  placed  in  battery  at  950  yards  from  the 
"  North  Tower — the  masonry  of  good  quality  and  6-J  feet  thick. 
"  In  eight  hours,  the  wall  between  two  embrasures  was  cut 
"  through  from  top  to  bottom,  offering  a  practicable  breach,  to 
"  effect  which  487  shot  and  45  shells  were  fired,*  being  at  the 
"  rate  of  one  round  from  the  battery  in  rather  less  than  a  minute ; 
"  or,  from  each  gun,  one  in  2f  minutes.  The  Tower  surrendered." 

"  It  seems  almost  incredible  that  three  pieces  should  be  able 
"  to  accomplish  fully  that  which  eighty-seven  pieces  utterly  failed 
"to  do,  the  distances  from  the  object  being  alike — particularly 
"  when  it  is  considered  that  many  of  the  latter  were  of  greater 
"  calibre,  and  most  of  them  employed  much  heavier  charges  where 
"  the  calibres  were  similar.  The  guns  of  the  ship,  if  fired  at  the 
"  same  rate  as  those  of  the  battery,  which  was  not  unusually 
"  rapid,  (one  round  in  two  and  three-fourth  minutes,)  would  have 
"  discharged  some  seven  thousand  seven  hundred  shot  and  shells 
"  in  the  course  of  the  four  hours,  supposing  no  interruption :  a 
"  number  of  which,  if  properly  applied,  would  appear,  from  the 
"  results  of  three  guns,  to  have  been  sufficient  to  breach  the  wall 
"  of  the  fort  in  fourteen  places ;  whereas  they  did  not  effect  a  single 
"  breach,  which  is  abundant  proof  of  the  lack  of  accuracy.  They 
"  must  either  have  been  dispersed  over  the  surface  of  the  fort,  or 
"  else  missed  it  altogether,  and  this  could  have  been  due  only  to 
"  a  want  of  the  precision  which  was  attained  by  the  battery. 
"The  constantly  preferred  complaint  of  motion  in  the  ships  was 
"  not  to  be  urged,  because  on  the  day  of  cannonading  Sevastopol, 
"  there  was  scarcely  a  breath  of  wind,  and  the  ships  were  too  large 
"  to  be  easily  moved  by  the  swell,  unless  very  considerable.  That 
"  the  fort  did  no  greater  damage  to  the  ships,  than  it  received  from 
"  them,  proves  no  more  than  that  its  fire  was  quite  as  illy  directed, 
"  and  the  calibres  too  low.  It  is  said  that  the  Agamemnon  was 
"  struck  in  the  hull  by  two  hundred  and  forty  shot  and  shells, 
"  which  must  have  been  but  a  small  portion  of  what  was  fired, 

*  Report  of  General  Neil,  Commanding  Engineers. 


36  THE      DANGERS      AND      DEFENCES 


sufficient  to  be  decisive  if,  as  already  observed,  the 
"calilnvliad  been  heavier." 

A  uuniher  of  projectiles  sufficient  to  produce  fourteen  "prac 
ticable  breaches  "  if  thrown  by  a  land  battery,  here  failed,  not 
only  to  produce  a  single  breach,  but  even  "  to  impair  the  strength 
of  the  masonry." 

Commander  Dahlgren,  indeed,  deprecates  the  "  want  of  pre 
cision  ;"  but  that  degree  of  precision  by  which  a  breach  is  effected 
by  a  land  battery,  is  ititerly  unattainable  from  a  floating  structure, 
and  the  perfect  calm  which  prevailed  on  this  occasion  cannot  be 
counted  on,  in  general,  and  even  the  swell  in  the  calmest  days 
is  quite  sufficient  to  disperse  the  projectiles  from  a  floating  battery, 
at  four  hundred  and  five  hundred  yards,  far  and  wide.* 

I  have  said  that,  as  to  the  contest  of  ordinary  naval  means,  or 
fleets,  with  fortifications,  the  question  has,  long  since,  been  prac 
tically  settled. 

The  following  extract  from  Grivel  will  show  how  the  matter  is 
regarded  even  by  those  who  believe  that  fortifications  may  be 
successfully  attacked  by  naval  means  specially  adapted  to  the 
objects. 

"  If  the  coast  defences  are  at  the  same  level,  or  can  be  com- 
"  manded  by  the  floating  artillery  ;  if  the  depth  of  water  permits 
"to  combat  them  separately  and  to  approach  at  half-point-blank 
"  distance,  (that  is  300  or  400  metres,)  we  would  still  say  to  the 
"ships,  however  well-armed  we  suppose  them: 

"  Never  attack  without  an  imperious  and  absolute  necessity." 

"  But  if  these  works  occupy  positions  which  command  the  sea 
"  while  they  reciprocally  sustain  each  other  ;  if  sub-marine 
"  obstacles,  or  other  causes,  oblige  the  floating  artillery  to  main- 
"  tain  a  greater  distance,  we  do  not  hesitate  to  say  to  ships  :" 

"  Keep  off,  the  match  is  too  unequal  —  but"  — 
"  Bring  up  your  siege  floating-batteries." 

"  For  then  will  be  the  time  to  substitute  these  formidable  machines 
"  of  war,  and  their  artillery  of  great  penetration,  for  the  vulner- 
"  able  sides  and  guns  of  less  range  of  ordinary  vessels."  Even 
in  the  most  favorable  case  he  can  describe,  lie  says  to  ships  : 
"  Attack  not  without  an  imperious  and  absolute  necessity." 

The  question  of  direct  contest  for  superiority  between  forts 
and  naval  armaments,  will  be  narrowed  down  to  this.  If  forts 

and 
t<>  s<>  coru- 


trifling  damage  done  to  the  Fort,  was  a  poor  com- 
jions;it  ion  for  the  loss  of  over  two  hundred  men,  and  the  serious  injuries  all  the 
vessels  of  this  detached  squadron  received. 


OFNEWYOEK.  37 

are  to  protect  the  channel  (as  they  usually  are)  through  which 
a  fleet  must  pass  to  reach  our  ports  or  cities,  or  naval  and 
military  depots,  the  fleet  will  either  run  by — or,  if  the  works  are 
too  formidable — decline  contest  altogether : — but,  if  the  object  of 
attack  is  sufficient  to  justify  the  preparation — (the  great  port  and 
city  of  New  York  fo  r  instance)  and  the  defences  are  such  as  to 
invite  the  effort,  the  m  aritime  enemy  will  provide  these  "  formi 
dable  machines  of  war,"  and  enter  into  a  direct  contest  with  them, 
with  a  view  to  their  reduction. 

I  am  now  considering  the  latter  branch  of  this  subject,  and 
think  that  I  have  made  it  clear,  that  so  far  as  we  have  yet  any 
experience,  there  is  nothing  to  justify  the  apprehension  tnat  the 
masonry  scarps  of  casemated  batteries  can  be  destroyed  by  the 
cannonade  of  floating-batteries.  Of  course,  if  such  vessels  are 
permitted,  unopposed  by  the  guns  of  the  battery  itself,  to  take 
their  own  time,  and  to  expend  unlimited  quantities  of  projectiles, 
they  doubtless  can  latter  down  any  wall.  So  far  as  yet  tested  by 
experience,  their  bulwarks  are  not  proof  against  eight-inch  and 
ten-inch  solid  shot  at  400  yards.  //'  proof  against  such  projectiles 
at  800  or  1,000  yards  *  it  is  a  well-known  fact  in  breaching,  that 
the  number  of  projectiles  necessary,  even  from  a  land  battery, 
increases  enormously  with  increase  of  distance.  How  much  more 
from  a  floating  structure,  which  cannot  maintain  any  such  con 
centration  of  fire,  at  such  a  distance,  as  is  necessary  to  cause 
serious  injury  to  well-constructed  walls!  Those,  however,  who 
believe  in  such  operations,  will  probably  contend  that  nothing 
analogous  to  producing  a  "  breach"  is  necessary,  but  that  embra 
sures  will  be  destroyed,  and  guns  dismounted,  and  gunners 
disabled  by  embrasure  shots  and  splinters  from  the  masonry 
cheeks,  or  by  fragments  of  broken  projectiles. 

This  subject  has  not  been  overlooked  by  the  corps  whose  duty 
it  is  to  make  such  constructions.  A  series  of  experiments  'was 
commenced  five  years  ago  at  "West  Point  by  General  Totten, 
Chief  Engineer,  and  taken  up  again  in  185 5,  for  this  very  purpose 
of  determining  the  best  kind  ol  embrasure,  and  the  necessary 
thickness  of  the  scarp,  to  resist  these  modern  projectiles.  The 
results  have  been  published  f  and  are  open  to  the  examination  of 

*  I  think  it  somewhat  discreditable  to  the  inventive  resources  of  those  whose 
duty  it  is  to  construct  and  perfect  artillery,  that  this  question  of  a  shot-proof  vessel 
should  be  an  open  one.  The  quantity  (and  therefore  the  thickness)  of  the  iron 
sheathing,  is  limited  for  the  floating-battery.  I  know  no  necessary  limit  to  the 
calibre  or  weight  of  the  projectile  used  against  it,  or  why  we  should  now  stop  at 
ten-inches,  when  the  navy  has  already  successfully  introduced  an  eleven-inch  gun,, 
capable  of  throwing  a  solid  shot. — The  eleven-inch  shot  weighs  1-3  more  than  the 
ten-inch. — I  shall  allude  to  this  subject  of  large  calibres  for  sea-coast  batteries  in 
another  place.  See  Appendix  "  D." 

f  "  Casemate  Embrasures,  Totten,"  being  No.  6  of  "  Papers  of  Practical  Engi 
neering,"  published  by  the  Engineer  Department. 


38  THE      DANGERS      AND      DEFENCES 

everyone.     They  may  be  briefly  summed  up   in   the  following 
quotations: 

"  A  thickness  there  of  five  feet  has  been  assumed  in  our 
"constructions,  and  satisfies  all  these  conditions  well.''  (Alluding 
to  the  interior  arrangement  of  the  casemate  with  reference  to  the 
handling  of  the  gun,  Arc.,  &c.)  "  But  it  has  been  a  question  of 
••  interest,  increasing  with  the  growing  calibre  of  naval  armaments, 
*•  whether  this  thickness  is  now  sufficient  And  it  was  in  con- 
"  sequence  thereof  that  some  very  severe  firing  \vas  directed 
M  against  our  second  target.  The  gun  was  a  ten-inch  Columbiad, 
4-  placed  within  114  yards,  firing  solid  balls,  weighing  128  Ibs., 
"  with  a  charge  of  18  Ibs.  of  powder." 

"  The  general  conclusion  from  these  trials  is,  that,  whether  of 
"  cement  concrete,  of  bricks,  or  of  hard  stones,  the  portion  of  the 
"  wall  at,  and  around  each  embrasure,  having  the  thickness  of 
"five  feet  only,  should  be  no  larger  than  is  indispensable  for  the 
"adaptation  of  the  gun  and  carriage  to  the  embrasure;  if 
"  restricted  to  a  small  area,  this  thickness  will  suffice — not  other- 
"  wise." 

"  The  thickness  of  five  feet  will  resist  a  number  of  these  balls, 
"  impinging  in  succession  on  that  space,  provided  the  bond  expand 
"  promptly,  above,  below,  and  on  each  side,  into  a  thickness 
"  greater  by  some  2  1-2  feet,  or  3  feet,  or  more.  "Were  the  wall 
"  no  thicker  generally  than  five  feet,  being  re-inforced  only  by 
"piers  some  15  feet  apart,  it  would  soon  be  seriously  damage'd 
"  by  battering  at  short  distances  with  such  calibres." 

"  To  repeat :  the  scarp  at  the  embrasure  may  be  safely  made 
"  of  the  thickness  of  five  feet,  provided  the  thickness  immediately 
"  above,  below,  and  on  the  sides,  be  increased  considerably.  The 
"  space  required  to  be  of  about  this  thickness,  to  accommodate 
"  advantageously  the  gun  and  carriage,  is  so  small,  that  it  may  be 
"  sakl  to  be  part  of  the  thicker  surrounding  mass,  by  which  it 
"  really  is  supported  in  its  resistance." 

And  with  regard  to  the  embrasure,  it  is  stated : 

"  Our  experiments  show  that  wronght-iron  is  the  best  material 
"  for  insertion  as  above,  mentioned ;  and  that  a  thickness  of 
"  wrought-iron,  of  eight-inches,  solidly  backed  with  masonry,  will 
"resist  an  eight-inch  solid  ball,  fired'Vith  10  1-4  Ibs.  of  powder 
"  from  a  distance  of  200  yards.  It  is  necessary,  as  is  also  shown 
"  by  the  firings,  that  the  plates  of  iron  should  have  considerable 
"breadth  to  prevent  heavy  balls  from  forcing  themselves  in 
"  between  the  inner  edge  and  the  masonry,  thereby  crowding  the 
"  plate  edgewise  into  the  throat." 

From  these  results  an  embrasure  has  been  devised  by  the 
Chief  Engineer,  and  sanctioned  by  the  War  Department,  having 
wrought-iron  throat-plates  8  inches  thick  (capable  of  resisting 
the  impact  of  an  8-inch  solid  shot,  from  200  yards  distance),  and 


OF      NEW      YORK.  39 

the  whole  surrounding  structure  of  granite-blocks,  of  large  dimen 
sions,  bonded  together,  and  into  the  adjacent  thick  parts  of  the 
wall,  in  the  strongest  manner  that  such  a  structure  can  be  made. 
Those  who  deny  the  capability  of  such  a  construction,  to  resist 
sufficiently  the  projectiles  of  an  hostile  armament,  should,  at 
least,  prove  that  their  incredulity  is  justifiable,  by  experiments  as 
elaborate  as  those  I  have  referred  to. 

But  the  discussion  is  cut  short,  at  once,  by  the  following  para 
graph  from  the  report : 

"  Were  it  not  for  the  vastly  greater  cost,  the  whole  scarp 
"  might  be  faced  with  iron — indeed  might  be  made  of  iron  only ; 
"  but,  until  there  shall  be  much  stronger  reasons  than  now  exist, 
"  or  are  now  anticipated,  for  believing  that  well-constructed 
"  masonry  batteries  may  be  breached  by  naval  broadsides,  the 
"  cheaper  construction  may  be  safely  followed — especially  as, 
"  should  such  a  necessity  ever  arise,  they  may  be  externally 
"  plated  with  iron." 

If  the  necessity  arises — if  there  shall  hereafter  be  "  stronger 
"  reasons  than  now  exist,  or  are  now  anticipated,"  for  giving 
still  greater  strength  to  the  surrounding  wall — the  alternative  is 
open  to  us,  as  to  those  who  construct  the  floating-battery,  (with 
out  the  objection  of  weight,  so  very  difficult  to  overcome  in  that 
structure),  to  coat  it  (about  the  embrasures,  or  further,  if  neces 
sary),  with  iron  plates. 

Those  who  are  curious  on  the  subject  of  "Embrasures,"  and 
of  the  risks  to  which  the  gunners  behind  them  are  exposed,  would 
do  well  to  examine  the  work  referred  to. 

They  will  find,  among  other  things,  that  while  some  of  the 
modern  European  works  present  an  exterior  opening  of  54  square 
feet  (in  which  area,  owing  to  the  flaring  cheeks,  nearly  all  the 
small  projectiles  are  reflected  through  the  throat,  while  large  ones 
are  broken  and  their  fragments  hurled  within),  no  embrasure  has 
been  constructed  in  the  united  States,  since  1815,  having  an  ex 
terior  opening  exceeding  10  or  11  square  feet ;  and  that  the  model 
embrasure  of  1855,  practically  reduces  the  opening  to  that  of  the 
throat,  which  is  but  3T\  square  feet, — an  object  not  much  larger 
than  the  muzzle  of  a  large  gun.  The  security  of  the  gunners  be 
hind  this  embrasure  is  as  great,  probably,  as  it  is  practicable  to 
give  anywhere  ;* — it  is  probably  greater  than  in  an  open  barbette 
battery. 

The  question  of  the  capacity — actual  and  possible — of  "  ma- 
sonry-casemated  castles,"  to  resist  the  fire  of  a  hostile  armament, 

*  A  simple  expedient,  advocated  by  one  of  our  officers,  and  partially  practiced 
in  Europe,  to  raise  the  embrasure  so  that  all  embrasure  shot  would  pass  over  the 
heads  of  the  gunners  (as  in  the  barbette  battery),  would,  in  a  great  degree,  do  away 
with  the  danger  of  the  "  embrasure  shot "  of  all  kinds,  and  with  the  necessity  of 
grape-proof  "  shutters,"  applied  to  the  new  embrasure. 


40          T  II  K   DANGERS   AND   DEFENCES 

need  Tint  l.e  ]Mir.-ued  further.  AVhen  we  hear  in  mind  that  the 
hnstile  "floating  hatterirs,"  «•!'  whatever  description,  will  them 
selves  lie  exposed  to  the  most  formidable  projectiles  that  can  be 
thrown  iVoiu  shore  batteries, — that  when  they  choose  to  come  to 
"close  quarters,"  to  attempt  to  breach,  their"  embrasures"  pre 
sent  (.pollings  (see  Paper  £so.  6,  before  referred  to)  through  which 
deluges  of  grape,  canister,  and  mu.-ket  balls  can  be  poured  upon 
the  gunners  ;*  and  consider  what  experience  has  so  far  shown,  and 
reason  has  taught  us,  with  regard  to  the  casemate, — we  need  not 
be  under  apprehension  that  our  casemated  works  will  be  battered 
down  ;  nor  doubt  that  they  will,  as  they  did  in  Russia,  answer  the 
important  purposes  for  which  they  were  designed. 

It  only  remains  to  show  the  ///wxv/V//  of  such  works.  It,  in 
general,  costs  much  less  to  place  a  gun  behind  an  earthen  parapet, 
than  to  build  a  masonry  sructure  covered  with  bomb-proof  arcnes, 
in  which  to  mount  it.f  All  authorities  agree  that  an  open  bar 
bette  battery  (Grivel's  very  forcible  admission  has  been  quoted), 
on  a  low  site,  and  to  which  vessels  can  approach  within  300  or  400 
yards,  is  utterly  inadmissible.  It  may  safely  be  said,  that  in  nine 
cases  out  of  ten,  the  sites  which  furnish  the  efficient  raking  and 
cross  fires  upon  the  channels,  are  exactly  of  this  character;  and 
indeed  it  very  often  happens  that  there  are  no  other*. * 

When  such  sites  are  found,  it  rarely  happens  that  they  afford 
room  for  sufficient  number  of  guns  in  open  batteries.§  Hence  the 
necessity  of  putting  them  tier  above  tier,  which  involves,  of  course, 
the  casemated  structure.  Such  works  furnishing  from  their  lower 
tier,  a  low,  rasing  fire,  and  (if  of  several  tiers)  a  plunging  fire  from 

*  Grivel  seems  to  think  that,  as  to  embrasure  shot,  the  floating  and  land  battery 
are  on  equal  terms;  but  the  embrasure  of  the  floating  structure  cannot  be  made  as 
small  as  that  of  tin-  casemate;  nor  can  the  expedient  of  "  shutters,"  or  of  raising  the 
embrasure*  above  the  heads  of  the  men,  be  resorted  to. 

f  The  discrepancy  in  cost  is  not,  ho\vever,  by  any  means,  what  this  naked  state 
ment  would  make  it  appear.  A  gun  behind  an  open  parapet  is  exposed  to  being 
disabled  or  spiked,  by  a  nn-re  boat's  crew  taking  the  battery  by  surprise.  Some 
<!><;,•,>•  of  defen>ive  strength  is  necessary  in  all  cases  ;  ami  in  *<,///'•  ca-es  the  neces-.iry 
-trength  involves  (independent  of  other  causes)  the  construction  of  a  regular  forti- 
tication.  The  open  earthen  batteries  of  Lieutenant  Morton,  rest  on  enclosed  bas 
tions  of  masonry,  each  of  which  is  larger  than  m<>st  of  our  harbor  works. 

^  Take  the  ea>e  of  Sevastopol,  about  which  there  are  heights.  None  of  them 
(Commander  Dahlgren's  remarks  have  already  been  quoted),  furnish  proper  sites  for 
defending  the  harbor.  Cron-tadt  offered  no  other  sites  whatever  than  artificial  ones  in, 
or  islands  almost  level  with,  the  water.  Our  own  harbors  vjenerallv  offer  the  same 
illustration  of  the  absence  of  favorable  sites  for  open  batteries. 

?  Staten  Island,  at  the  \arro\vs,  furni-hes  an  apt  illustration.  The  heights  here 
are  of  about  120  feet.  From  the  open  batteries  of  Fort  Tompkins,  on  the  summit, 
heavy  guns  will  rake  the.  approach,  and  have  a  plunging  fire  upon  passing  vessels. 
The  entire  face  of  the  heights  (so  far  as  the  United  States  properly  extends)  is,  or  is 
to  be,  girdled  with  open  earth  batteries,  at  heights  of  60  and  45  feet.  We  have  here 
about  a->  many  guns  as  can  6e  ranged  in  xnch  batteries.  But  it  is  not  deemed  enough  ; 
nor  is  the  character  of  the  fire  such  as  to  dispense  with  the  numerous,  and  close,  and 
><!  tires  to  be  obtained  from  the  sites  at  the  water's  edge,  on  which  Fort  Rich 
mond  is  already  built,  and  another  similar  "  casemated  castle"  is  to  be  built. 


OFNEWYOKK.  41 

their  barbettes,  offer  as  favorable  emplacements  for  guns  as  can  be 
contrived,  and  afford  to  their  gunners  a  degree  of  security  quite 
as  great  as  can  be  given  to  men  thus  engaged.* 

On  subjects  which  have  a  mere  speculative  importance,  there 
is  no  danger  in  giving  rein  to  speculation ;  but  on  those  of  such 
real  and  intense  practical  importance  as  the  security  against  hos 
tile  aggression,  of  the  great  city  and  port  of  New  1  ork,  it  is  not 
admissible  to  set  aside  the  experience  of  the  past,  or  the  opinions 
of  the  best  minds  who  have  devoted  themselves  to  such  subjects. 
A  means  of  defence,  sanctioned  by  its  being  confided  in  to  protect 
the  great  ports  of  Europe — which  has  protected  the  great  ports  of 
Russia  against  the  most  formidable  naval  armament  that  ever 
floated  on  the  ocean,  has  a  claim  upon  our  confidence  which  mere 
criticism  cannot  diminish  ;  and  a  claim  to  be  adhered  to  in  place 
of  all  new  "  systems,"  until  time  and  trial  shall  have  necessitated 
(not  merely  justified)  the  change. 

If,  then,  we  refer  to  the  practice  of  other  nations,  to  find  what 
has  been  judged  necessary  for  the  defence  of  important  ports, — to 
experience,  to  find  how  such  defensive  systems  have  stood  the  test 
of  actual  trial, — we  may  draw  useful  conclusions  wTith  regard  to 
what  is  now  required  to  defend  New  York.  We  shall  find  at 
Sevastopol — a  narrow  harbor,  which  owed  its  importance  to  its 
being  the  great  naval  depot  of  Russia  on  the  Black  seaf — an 
array  of  TOO  guns,  about  500  of  which  were  placed  in  five  "  ma- 
sonry-casemated  "  works  (several  of  them  of  great  size),  and  the 
remainder  in  open  batteries.:):  These  defensive  works  fulfilled 
their  object,  and  sustained  the  attack  of  the  allied  fleet,  on  the 
17th  of  October,  1854,  without  sensible  damage. 

The  facility  with  which  sea-ports  are  attacked  by  fleets — the 
enormous  preparations  required — the  great  risks  encountered  in 
landing  a  besieging  army  on  the  coast  of  a  formidable  enemy 
(while,  for  protection  against  the  former  species  of  attack,  costly 
works  are  necessary,  and  against  the  latter,  field  works  and  men 
can,  in  emergency,  afford  protection),  naturally  caused  the  Rus 
sians  to  make  these  water  defences  their  first  object.  Yet,  though 
almost  unprotected  on  the  land  side,  Sebastopol  resisted,  for  a 
whole  year,  an  attack  on  that  quarter ;  and  illustrated  how,  with 

*  The  criticism  as  to  their  capacity  for  men  and  stores,  is  scarcely  deserving  of 
notice.  When  they  are  merely  water-batteries  (as  most  of  them  are),  they  require 
quarters  enough  for  men  to  work  the  guns  (5  or  6  to  each  piece),  and  ammunition 
storage  enough  for  one  or  two  protracted  cannonades.  In  the  mere  service  of  the 
guns  there  is  no  crowding  whatever. 

f  An  important  point  surely ;  but  how  small  its  importance,  and  the  interests 
involved  in  its  defence,  compared  with  New  York  ! 

\  It  is  worthy  remark,  that  the  only  battery  mentioned  as  silenced  by  the  allied 
fire,  during  the  cannonade  of  the  17th  of  October,  1854,  is  tha't  of  the  Quarantine 
Fort,  an  "  open  barbette," — silenced,  as  Grivel  says,  "  malgre  1'abri  de  son  parapet 
en  terre"  (notwithstanding  the  shelter  of  its  earthen  parapet.) 


42          THE   DANGERS   AND   DEFENCES 

plentv  of  mi'ii  and  material,  an  energetic  and  eflectual  Itnul  de- 
fence  may  be  improvised,  where  tin-  sea  <l<f<  ncc  is  provided  for, 
as  thoroughly  as  it  was  at  that  place.* 

Let  Cronstadt  be  another  example,  (iivat  as  was  the  import 
ance  of  its  defence  to  Kussia,  it  was  not  greater, — it  was  by  no 
means  <i*  <jr,  <if,  as  that  of  New  York  to  our  own  country.  This 
port,  and  military  and  naval  depot,  was  defended  (in  its  main  ap 
proach)  by  upwards  of  600  guns,f  500  of  which  were  mounted  in 
live  "  masonry-casemated  "  works;  the  remainder  in  an  open  bar 
bette  battery,  which  enfiladed  the  main  channel.  This  number 
is  formidable  in  itself;  yet  the  same  number  mounted  in  2sV\v 
York  harbor  would  not  afford  anything  like  such  a  formidable 
defence  as  was  found  at  Cronstadt,  owing  to  its  great  area,  and 
long  line  of  approach,  compared  with  the  latter.:): 

These  works  ful Jiff  I'd  their  object.  They  protected  the  great 
port  and  depot  of  Cronstadt  and  the  capital  of  the  empire  from 
invasion.  For  two  successive  years  did  the  mighty  armaments  of 
France  and  England  threaten  ;  but  they  were  over-awed  by  the 
frowning  array  of  "  casemated  castles  "  which  presented  itself,  and 
declined  the  contest.§ 

Let  us  turn  our  eyes  now  to  the  great  naval  depot  of  France. 
After  the  almost  incredible  expenditure  lavished  here,  in  creating 
a  harbor  facing  the  shores  of  her  great  rival,  England,  and  an 
equally  profuse  expenditure  in  providing  all  that  constitutes  a 
great  naval  depot,  we  may  suppose  that  the  best  means,  without 
regard  to  cost,  which  the  science  of  man  could  devise,  would  be 
employed  here,  to  make  this  great  seat  of  naval  power  secure 
against  the  formidable  means  of  attack  possessed  by  the  great 
maritime  power  most  likely  to  be  the  assailant.  The  means  there 
employed  are  (so  far  as  regards  mere  harbor  defence)  precisely 
the  same  (viz.,  casemated  works  in  several  tiers,  combined  with 
open  batteries  where  the  locations  are  favorable) ;  and  the  appli 
cation  of  means  is  the  same  as  we  have  found  so  successful  in 
Hussia, — the  same  which  constitute  the  system  of  harbor  defence 
of  New  York. 

*  See  Appendix  "  E." 

f  Besides  120  guns  on  two  ships  of  war,  stationed  so  as  to  rake  the  approach. 

i  For  a  more  detailed  account  of  the  defences  of  Sevastopol,  see  Appendix  "  IV 

§  A  special  armament  was  being  fitted  out  in  England,  expressly  to  attack  Cron- 
stadt,  had  the  war  lasted  another  year.  It  consisted  of  several  hundred  "floating- 
batteries,"  gun-boats,  mortar-vessels,  (fee.,  <fec.  It  would  have  been  interesting  in  a 
professional  point  of  view,  to  have  seen  the  result;  but  it  is  quite  doubtful  after  all, 
•\vht-ther  the  Allies  would  have  taken  the  "bull  by  the  horns."  They  would  proba 
bly  have  directed  their  attack  upon  the  shoal- water  approaches  between  the  Finland 
shore  and  the  island  of  Cronstadt. 


OFNEWYOKK.  43 


PART    II. 


LET  us  now  consider  what,  in  the  present  state  of  the  art  of 
war,  and  in  the  light  of  the  experience  we  now  have,  is  required 
for  the  defence  of  the  port  and  city  of  New  York. 

In  commencing  this  paper,  I  have  ventured  to  call  this  problem 
a  modified  and  enlarged  one ;  the  course  of  the  previous  discus 
sion  will  have  shown,  however,  that  I  do  not  believe  that  we  know 
of  anything  particularly  new  in  the  means  to  be  employed.  It  is 
rather  in  the  amount  and  character  of  the  armaments  to  which 
New  York  will  be  exposed,  which  involves  a  new  consideration  of 
the  amount  and  arrangement  of  defensive  means. 

In  reviewing  the  recent  European  war,  we  are  struck  with  the 
facility  with  which  immense  bodies  of  troops  were  transported  and 
maintained  in  a  distant  country,  which  of  itself  furnished  nothing. 
France  shipped  to  the  Crimea  upwards  of  300,000  men,  and  Eng 
land  some  90  or  100,000.  We  cannot  doubt,  therefore,  that  either 
of  these  powers  can  suddenly  equip  a  large  army,  transport  it  over 
the  ocean,  3000  miles,  to  our  shores,  and  maintain  it  a  year  or 
more  in  a  hostile  attitude. 

(The  question  of  being  able  to  maintain  a  footing  on  OUT 
,  is  quite  another  thing.) 

We  are  struck,  too,  by  the  immense  power  of  creation  possessed 
by  these  powers  (particularly  England),  in  calling  forth  all  manner 
of  warlike  military  and  naval  constructions.  It  seemed  as  if,  the 
government  had  but  to  will,  and  the  immense  manufacturing 
establishments  and  ship-yards  of  England,  were  capable  of  re 
sponding  to  the  most  unlimited  demands,  in  the  briefest  possible 
time.  Taught,  by  the  experience  of  two  seasons,  the  inutility  of 
ordinary  naval  means  against  the  Russian  defences  in  the  Baltic, 
a  flotilla  of  several  hundred  vessels — gun-boats  of  different  sizes, 
bearing  pieces  of  the  most  formidable  calibres,  mortar  vessels, 
"  floating-batteries,"  despatch  vessels,  &e.,  all  propelled  by  steam 
— were  constructed  in  an  incredibly  short  space  of  time.* 

Such  flotillas  could  be  created  with  the  same  facility  and  sent 
to  our  shores,  if  there  should  be  found  a  sufficient  motive  for  it. 

*  A  brief  account  of  these  vessels,  taken  from  an  interesting  paper,  "  Notes  and 
"  Observations  on  the  Review  at  Spithead,  by  Commander  W.  M  Walker,  U.  S. 
"  Navy,"  will  be  found  in  Appendix  "  C." 


44  THE   DANGERS   AND   DEFENCES 

t  The  third  point  which  attracts  attention,  is  the  peculiarly  ma- 
ritii/i'  character  of  the  war.  It  was  not  by  marching  armies  into 
the  interior  of  the  enemy's  territory,  but  by  assailingnis  maritime 
Beats  of  population,  wealth  and  power,  that  the  war  was  prosecuted; 
and  one  of  their  great  maritime  depots  became  the  true  seat  of 
war,  about  which  its  issue  was  decided. 

The  lesson  to  be  derived  by  ourselves  is  too  obvious  to  be 
dwelt  upon.  Our  own  yt\<it  martiim*  places  would  be  the  points 
at  which  alone  an  European  enemy  could  hope  to  strike  great 
blows  ;  New  Yuri-  pre-eminently.  If  it  is  left  undefended,  or  is 
inadequately  defended,  its  immense  commerce,  its  rich  depots  of 
wealth  and  military  and  naval  resources,  the  lives  and  property  of 
its  citizens,  will  be,  throughout  tie  wh<  l<>  period  of  the  war,  at  an 
unpitying  enemy's  mercy ;  and  the  national  honor  will  suffer  an 
indelible  stain,  by  such  a  degradation  of  its  great  commercial 
emporium.  If  defended  as  it  should  be,  its  defences  must  be  cal 
culated  to  grapple  with  such  armaments*  as  we  know  can  and  will 
le  brought  against  it ;  and  upon  the  success  of  the  contest,  im 
mense  consequences — perliaps,  as  at  Sebastopol,  the  issue  of  the 
war — will  depend. 

The  Boards  of  Engineers  who  have  recently  had  under  consi 
deration,  portions  of  the  defensive  system  of  New  York,  have  not 
been  insensible  that  great  additional  strength  was  now  required, 
over  what  had  been  considered  sufficient  in  former  years.  But 
they  have  never  had  time  (each  member  being  charged  with 
onerous  individual  duties)  to  take  that  patient  survey  of  the  whole 
t<if}>j>rf  which  it  requires.  Moreover  they  have  only  been  called 
upon  to  decide  projects  of  particular  works  ;  and  I  may  add,  that 
it  is  only  quite  recently  that  we  have  had  the  means  of  taking 
this  re-survey  of  our  wants,  with  the  full  light  which  a  perfect 
knowledge  of  the  events  of  the  recent  European  war  alone  could 
give  us. 

It  would  be  presumptuous  in  me,  to  say  exactly  what  new 
works,  or  what  new  arrangements  are  required  ;  but  I  can  say, 
with  confidence,  that  the  security  of  New  York  requires  a  vast 
addition  to  what  now  exists ;  that  it  demands  their  prompt  execu 
tion  •  and,  enlightened  by  previous  labors  of  the  Boards  of  Engi 
neers,  and  by  the  opinions  of  officers  of  experience,  can  point  out, 
in  a  general  way,  what  is  necessary,  or,  at  least,  what  I  believe  to 
be  so. 

First — The  Narrows  is  the  great  avenue  of  approach  to  New 
York,  and  the  shores  being  there  barely  one  mile  apart,  they  fur 
nish  the  means  of  a  most  formidable  defence.  I  have  before 
alluded  to  the  difficulty  of,  by  mere  array  of  batteries,  absolutely 
sealing  a  channel  against  the  rapid  pas^uje  of  vessels.  The  true 
principle,  therefore,  for  the  defence  of  an  object,  like  New  York, 


OF      NEW      YORK.  45 

of  such  importance  that  the  mere  passage  of  the  batteries  would 
be  risked,  is,  not  only  to  make  those  batteries  of  the  most  formi 
dable  nature,  but  so  to  array  batteries  that  the  entire  waters,  not 
only  of  the  channel  of  approach,  but  those  in  which  the  enemy 
must  lie,  in  his  after  offensive  operations,  shall  be  under  their 
fire.*  The  Board  of  Engineers  has  already  considered  the  nature 
and  extent  of  additional  works  at  the  Narrows  ;  and,  so  far  as  the 
first  condition,  of  a  formidable  array  of  batteries  is  concerned,  I 
think  they  have  met  all  the  requisites.  They  have  decided  that 
there  should  be,  at  this  passage,  batteries  sufficient  to  concentrate 
a  fire  of  300  guns  upon  every  point  of  a  vessel's  path  within  range. 
When  we  consider  the  character  of  the  armament  intended  for 
these  works,f  it  will  be  admitted  that  the  passage,  under  the  most 
favorable  circumstances,  will  be  a  thing  of  no  ordinary  risk. 
Combined  with  the  use  of  obstructions,  either  floating  or  fixed, 
and  of  floating  defences  on  our  part,  the  defence  can  be  made  of 
the  most  formidable  character. 

But  such  an  array  of  batteries  does  not  now  exist.     To  aecom- 

5lish  it,  we  require,  on  Staten  Island,  besides  Fort  Richmond, 
learly  completed)  the  completion  of  Fort  Tompkins  (just  com 
menced)  ;  the  construction  of  another  casemated  battery  south  of 
Fort  Richmond,  (for  which  plans  are  proposed)  and  the  extension 
of  the  earthen  batteries.  Fort  Tompkins  will  cost  about  $650,000, 
and  the  new  battery  and  earthen  works  about  as  much  more ;  or 
$1,300,000  in  all,  for  the  works  yet  to  be  constructed  on  Staten 
Island. 

This  is  but  for  the  Staten-Island  side  of  the  Narrows.  To 
provide  the  concentration  of  300  guns  upon  the  passage,  and  to 
command  the  waters  of  Gravesend  Bay,  the  works  on  the  Long- 
Island  side  must  be  enlarged  by  extending  batteries  (either  open 
or  casemated)  along  the  bluff  below  Fort  Hamilton,  and  Fort 
Lafayette  must  be  re-modelled.  As  the  additional  works  on  this 
side  have  not  been  planned,  I  can  only  say  that  I  suppose  that  an 
expenditure  of  about  $500,000  will  be  required  on  the  Long- 
Island  shore. 

So  much  for  the  defences  of  the  Narrows ;  but  to  fulfill  the 
condition  that  an  enemy's  fleet  shall  be  kept  under  fire  wherever 
he  may  be,  J  one  or  more  works  are  required  to  fill  the  gap 
between  the  Narrows  and  the  interior  line  of  works,  on  Bedlow's 
and  Governor's  Islands.  At  least  one  such  work  should  be  built 
on  Bobbins'  reef — a  site  about  midway  between  the  Narrows  and 
Governor's  Island,  which  rakes  the  approach  through  the  Narrows 

*  See  Appendix  "D." 

f  8"  and  10"  Columbiads,  and  42-pounders  for  hot  shot,  and  8-inch  sea-coast 
howitzers  for  the  shorter  ranges. 

\  The  fulfillment  of  this  condition  would  be  completed  by  throwing  up  temporary 
batteries  along  the  East  and  North  Rivers,  in  the  city  and  upon  the  opposite  shores. 


46  THE      DANGERS      AND      DEFENCES 

and  commands  the  outlets  of  the  "  Kills."     A  work  on  this   site 
may  he  roughly  estimated  at  $500,000. 

'The  foregoing  an-  what,  I  tliink,  are  imperatively  demanded 
for  tlic  Narrows  approach  to  the  city.  They  include  (Fort  Rich 
mond  being  nearly  completed,)  the  construction  of  two  new  works 
on  Stateii  Island,  "Fort  Tompkins,  (just  Commenced)  and  the  new 
projected  casemated  battery;  of  additional  works  at  Fort  Ham 
ilton,  and  the  re-modelling  of  Fort  Lafayette;  and  the  construc 
tion  of  at  least  OIK  new  work,  on  Bobbins'  Reef,  and  an  expenditure 
of  from  two  to  three  millions  of  dollars. 

But  to  prevent  the  occupation  of  the  outer  harbor  and  a  dis 
embarkation  in  Gravesend  Bay,  and  march  on  Brooklyn,  other 
works  are  required,  and  they  may  be  so  arranged,  while  they 
fulfill  these  objects  as  to  add  greatly  to  the  risks  an  enemy  would 
encounter  in  reaching  New  York  with  his  fleet. 

To  prevent  disembarkation  in  Gravesend  Bay,  a  work  seems 
indispensable  on  the  point  of  Coney  Island.  Such  a  work,  in 
conjunction  with  the  proposed  new  batteries  at  Fort  Hamilton, 
would  sweep  the  waters  of  Gravesend  Bay,  and  take  up  fire  upon 
a  fleet  attempting  the  passage  of  the  Narrows,  at  a  lower  point 
than  the  Narrows  batteries,  crossing  fire  with  them.  It  may 
indeed,  in  conjunction  with  another  work  to  be  mentioned  here 
after,  be  made  to  constitute  another  and  outer  line  of  defence  to 
the  Narrows  approach. 

The  work  on  Sandy  Hook,  authorized  by  Congress,  and  just 
being  commenced,  is  intended,  mainly,  to  prevent  the  occupation 
and  use  of  the  outer  bay  by  an  enemy's  fleet. 

It  does  not  thoroughly  seal  all  the  entrances  to  that  bay ;  but 
if  the  works  I  have  described  exist  above,  he  will  not  encounter 
the  fire  of  Sandy  Hook  with  no  greater  object  than  merely  to 
enter  the  bay.  To  make  a  more  perfect  defence  of  these  outer 
waters,  however,  a  work  on  the  "  West  Bank"  is  desirable,  which 
would  command  the  mouth  of  all  the  lesser  entrances  to  the  outer 
harbor,  and,  in  conjunction  with  the  Coney-Island  work,  form  the 
outer  line  of  the  Narrows  defences,  already  mentioned.  Perhaps, 
too,  a  work  on  the  Romer  shoal  which  should  co-operate  with 
Sandy  Hook,  and  command  the  "  Swash  "  and  "  East "  channels, 
might  be  judged  expedient. 

The  work  on  Sandy  Hook  will  cost  $2,000,000  ;  and  as  to  those 
I  have  mentioned,  it  can  only  be  stated  that  they  would  require 
something  like  $2,000,000  more. 

The  narrow  passage  around  Staten  Island  through  the  Kills 
can  be  passed  by  light-draught  gun-boats  and  similar  craft.  It 
can  be  easily  defended  by  obstructions  or  shore  batteries ;  but 
whichever  means  are  resorted  to,  some  shore  works  sufficiently 
strong  to  endure  an  assault  are  necessary.  I  only  point  out  the 
fact,  without  attempting  to  indicate  what  they  should  be. 


OF      NEW      YORK.  47 

The  East-River  approach  is  defended  by  the  formidable  work 
of  Fort  Sehuyler.  Another  work  opposite  to  it,  on  Willett's 
Point,  is  deemed  necessary ;  and  the  two  will,  with  such  auxiliary 
means  as  can  be  easily  provided  in  time  of  war,  complete  the 
defence.  The  work  on  Willett's  Point  may  be  set  down  at  the 
same  cost  as  Fort  Sehuyler,  $800,000. 

I  have  now  indicated  in  a  very  general  way,  what  I  suppose 
necessary  to  put  New  York  in  a  satisfactory  state  of  security. 
I  have  shown,  or  have  attempted  to  show,  not  only  that  it  was 
not  now  in  such  a  state,  but  that  works  requiring  some  six  or 
eight  millions  of  dollars  are  imperatively  demanded.  The  sum 
is  large,  it  is  true ;  but  it  is  only  about  the  amount  of  revenue 
collected  here  in  two  months.  If  I  have  convinced  you,  as  I  have 
tried  to  do,  and  as  I  certainly  believe,  that  in  our  next  war  with 
a  great  maritime  power,  more  important  issues  will  be  involved 
in  the  adequate  defence  of  New  York  than  in  almost  any  other 
preparation,  defensive  or  offensive,  we  can  make,  then,  I  shall 
not  fear  that  you  or  the  nation  will  consider  the  millions 
required  disproportionate  to  the  object.  I  believe  that  the  people 
of  the  United  States  can  and  will  be  made  to  understand  that  the 
defence  of  New  York  is  a  national,  and  not  a  local  question  ;  and 
as  such  will  be  willing  to  provide  for  it. 

If  I  am  asked  when  these  works  should  be  undertaken,  I 
answer  that  I  consider  that  all  those  that  involve  the  defence  of 
the  Narrows  are  so  immensely  important  to  New  York  that  they 
should  be  commenced  immediately ,  and  carried  on  with  the  largest 
appropriations  that  can  be  advantageously  applied,  to  completion ; 
and  simultaneously  with  them,  the  work  on  Coney  Island.  These 
works,  (Fort  Tompkins,  the  new  water-battery  on  Staten  Island — 
the  additional  works  at  Fort  Hamilton — and  the  work  on  Coney 
Island)  will  cost  about  $2,000,000  ;  and  I  urgently  recommend 
that  at  least  $500,000  be  asked  from  Congress  for  them. 

The  works  just  mentioned,  (with  the  work  on  Sandy  Hook, 
also  in  progress)  would  place  this  approach  in  a  respectable  state 
of  defence ;  and  the  other  works  in  the  outer  bay  could  be  com 
menced  at  a  later  period ;  but  all  that  are  decided  by  competent 
authority  to  he  necessary  should  be  built  as  soon  as  possible. 

A  complete  view  of  the  dangers  and  defences  of  New  York 
requires  some  allusion  to  the  subject  of  an  invasion  by  land,  and 
particularly  from  Long  Island.  The  idea  of  such  a  danger  has 
nothing  whatever  of  novelty  in  it.  That  the  British  army  actually 
did  land  in  Gravesend  Bay — defeat  the  Continental  forces  under 
Gen.  Washington,  at  Brooklyn,  and  capture  New  York,  is  well 
known.  That,  to  prevent  the  repetition  of  such  an  operation  during 
the  last  war,  a  large  body  of  militia  was  called  out,  is  equally  well 
known ;  and  the  liability  to  a  repetition  of  such  an  attack  has 


48  THE      DANGERS       AND      DEFENCES 

"been  dwelt  upon  in  almost  every  official  paper  treating  of  the 
defences  of  New  York. 

The  Chief  Enpnei-r,  General  Totten,  proposed  to  secure  the 
c-itv  from  danger  in  this  particular  quarter  by  an  outer  l><irr'«  r ; 
and  if  the  outer  bay  could  be  tif'i  i:t u < i II y  cfased1,  of  bourse  the 
danger  would  be  removed.  But  so  to  close  it  will  require  works  * 
which,  if  built  at  all,  will  not  probably  be  very  soon. 

The  subject  has  been  before  almost  every  Board  of  Engineers 
tli at  has  had  the  defence  of  New  York  under  consideration  from 
1  ^  16  to  the  present  time.  They  have  presented  no  formal  plan 
that  I  recollect,  for  land  defences  on  Lon<*  Island,  (at  least  not  of 
late  years)  for  they  have  always  found  otner  demands  concerning 
the  defences  of  New  Y^ork  far  more  pressing ;  and  have  probably 
thought,  too,  that  while  the  general  character  of  the  defence  was 
sufficiently  obvious,  every  year  that  elapsed  would  alter  the  details 
of  the  problem. 

There  are  two  or  three  very  broad  principles  bearing  on  this 
subject,  which  I  think  every  one  will  assent  to. 

Pirst :  A  landing  in  the  face  of  such  a  force  as  could  speedily 
be  concentrated  (or  rather  such  as  always  would  be  at  hand  in 
New  York)  is  an  operation  of  great  risk  as  well  as  great  labor, 
requiring  special  means  and  arrangements.  No  enemy  will  take 
this  course  so  long  as  he,  can  with  Ids  fleet,  (or  with  vessels  specially 
adapted  to  the  object}  reach  the  city  and  effect  his  object  without 
a  landing.  While,  therefore,  this  latter  operation  is  open  to  an 
enemy,  while  he  can  with  his  fleet,  or  the  gun-boats,  or  the 
floating-batteries  of  his  fleet,  force  his  way  within  range  of  the 
city  from  his  shell-guns  or  curved  fire,  the  question  of  danger 
from  land  attacks  sinks  into  utter  insignificance. 

The  works  to  prevent  this  latter  operation  are  of  great  mag 
nitude,  as  I  have  endeavored  to  show  in  the  course  of  this  paper ; 
require  large  amounts  of  money,  and  much  time  to  complete. 
Those  to  prevent  the  former  (land  attack)  are  of  a  comparatively 
trivial  character.  I  concur,  in  fact,  with  the  opinion  expressed 
by  yourself,  Sir,  in  your  Annual  Report,  that  (at  least  until  the 
harbor  defences  are  completed)  nothing  but  earth  works,  to  be 
thrown  up  in  time  of  war,  are  necessary.f 

Second:  All  the  arguments  which  opposers  to  our  system  of 
coast  defences  have  of  late  years  brought  forward,  bear  with  their 
full  force,  upon  our  defensive  strength  in  ////'*  relation  ;  not  at  all, 
upon  the  degree  of  strength  required  for  harbor  defences.  In  the 
words  of  a  Maury,  if  the  "  greatest  army  that  ever  was  led  into 

*  It  is  not,  anticipated  that  the  work  on  Sandy  Hook  can  alone  close  this  bay. 

•f  I  consider,  however,  that  the  work  on  Coiu'y  Island  should  be  immediately 
built,  t.»  juvv.-nt  a  landinir  in  (Inm-send  Bay,  or  on  Coney  Island  ;  but  this,  is  not 
included  in  the  category  of  land  defences,  as  advocated  by  others. 


OF      NEW      YORK.  49 

"  battle  by  the  greatest  captain"  were  to  land  on  Long  Island, 
"  and  be  disembarking  liis  last  piece  of  artillery  before  lie  was 
"  discovered — these  railroads,  the  power  of  steam,  with  the  aid 
"  of  lightning,  would  enable  the  government,  before  he  could 
"  reach  the  heights  of  Brooklyn,  to  have  there  in  waiting  and 
"  ready  to  receive  him,  and  beat  him  back  into  the  sea,  a  force 
"  two  to  one  greater  than  his,  however  strong ;"  and  Major  W. 
II.  Chase,  (in  a  quotation  already  given,)  has  expressed  opinions 
if  not  quite  so  strong  as  these,  somewhat  similar.  It  is  not 
necessary  to  embrace  the  particular  views  of  either  of  these  officers 
to  acknowledge  that  there  is  force  in  their  arguments. 

Third.  The  great  danger  to  New  York  and  its  dependencies, 
from  this  kind  of  an  attack,  is  from  the  safe  and  convenient  land 
ing  at  Gravesend,  and  the  short  line  of  march  thence  to  Brooklyn. 
Should  we  find  ourselves  engaged  in  war,  with  no  other  defence 
in  this  quarter  than  those  now  existing,  prompt  and  energetic 
measures  would  have  to  be  taken  to  improvise  a  defence  against 
this  danger ;  and  doubtless  prompt  and  energetic  measures  could 
and  would  be  taken. 

"With  the  work  I  propose  on  Coney  Island,  however,  this 
landing  becomes  unavailable,  and  the  danger  of  land  attack  on 
Brooklyn  or  New  York  becomes  comparatively  insignificant.  A 
landing,  as  before  remarked,  in  the  face  of  the  dense  and  warlike 
population  of  New  York,  augmented  as  the  numerical  force  of  its 
defenders  may  be,  in  a  day  or  two,  by  overwhelming  numbers 
from  other  quarters,  is  one  of  the  most  dangerous  operations  of 
war.  It  will  not  be  undertaken  on  the  open  tea-shore  of  Long 
Island,  where  at  any  moment  the  disembarked  force  would  be 
liable  to  have  its  communication  with  its  fleet  cut  off.  It  would 
only  be  made  from  Long  Island  Sound,  whence  a  march  of  fifteen 
or  twenty  miles,  at  the  shortest,  would  be  necessary  to  reach 
Brooklyn.  At  whatever  rate  such  a  danger  may  be  estimated,  it 
is  sufficient  to  say  that  in  twenty-four  hours  after  a  declaration  of 
war  (if  thought  necessary)  an  army  of  50,000  men  may  be 
entrenched  on  the  line  of  approach  to  Brooklyn. 

The  work  on  Willett's  Point  will,  by  no  means,  have  an  insig 
nificant  bearing  on  such  defence.  To  "  leave  it  behind"  is  not 
simply  to  leave  a  "  fortification"  in  the  enemy's  rear ;  it  is  to  have 
in  his  rear,  an  entrenched  "  tete-d>>-pont"  whence  in  twenty-four 
hours,  an  overwhelming  force  may  oe  thrown  from  the  New- 
YorJc  side,  upon  his  rear,  cutting  him  off  from  his  fleet. 

In  conclusion,  I  would  say  in  this  connection,  that  the  policy 
of  our  government,  and  of  the  Engineer  Department,  has  always 
~been  (and  I  conceive,  always  should  be)  first,  to  close  all  the  great 
approaches  l>y  water,  leading  to  our  dock-yards,  commercial  cities, 
&c.,  and  to  locate  their  defences  in  such  a  manner  as  to  force  any 
landing  that  may  oe  attempted,  to  as  great  a  distance  as  possible. 


50  DANGERS     AND     DEFENCES     OF     NEW     YORK. 

The  defence  against  approaches  by  an  army  landing,  must  be  ly 
our  troops,  (surely  ii'  the  nation  and  the  people  have  in  themselves 
a n '/  inherent  power  of  self-defence — it  is  here  they  can  meet  the 
foe,  and  "beat  him  back  into  the  sea,")  with  the  assistance  of 
temporary  works,  and  all  the  expedients  of  engineering  talent 
and  skill,  on  *'/,•//  routs  as  an  enemy  may  have  selected.  But  to 
leave  the  coast  and  construct  a  girdle  of  forts  about  any  of  our 
cities  as  they  now  exist,  would  be  as  wise  as  to  have  constructed 
permanent  defences  along  Brooklyn  and  Harlem  heights,  where 
they  were  made  in  1814  and  '15;  now  within  the  cities,  and  to  be 
traced  or  known  only  from  old  maps  and  plans.  Fort  Greene, 
one  of  the  commanding  sites  of  the  Brooklyn  line  of  1814—15, 
has  been  not  only  occupied  by  the  city,  but  its  commanding  emi 
nence  levelled.  Nothing  short  of  the  power  of  a  despotic  gov 
ernment,  with  ability  to  take  possession  of  hundreds  of  acres  (and 
dwellings,)  and  forbid  the  erection  of  any  structures  either  upon 
the  sites  or  within  yu-n-«hot  <>f  tln-m,  could  accomplish  the  scheme 
of  either  establishing  a  girdle  of  works  about  Brooklyn,  or  secure 
permanently  the  sites  for  them. 

The  fact  that  sites,  deemed  eligible  now,  are  being  built  upon, 
is  the  best  proof  that  they  are  becoming  no  longer  so. 

Whether  these  propositions  are  admitted  or  not,  it  is  most 
certain  that,  at  ^>/ >*'///,  the  great  "dangers"  of  New  York  are 
through  the  inadequately  <!<  f<  nded  water  approaches.  It  is  to 
these  dangers  I  most  urgently  call  your  attention,  and  the  atten 
tion  of  Congress  and  of  the  people  of  the  United  States ;  for  it  is 
not  a  question  of  local,  but  of  national  concern. 

This  paper  has  swollen  to  a  length  unanticipated  by  me  in 
commencing  it;  but  I  have  judged  it  imperative,  at  a  period  in 
our  growth  as  a  nation,  and  in  the  history  of  our  relations  with  the 
other  great  powers  of  the  world,  when,  I  conceive,  the  subject 
of  security  to  our  great  cities  and  ports  has  acquired  more  than 
ordinary  urgency,  and  when  at  the  same  time  the  very  principles  on 
which  such  security  can  be  obtained  are  called  in  question — to 
review,  thoroughly^  the  whole  subject,  glancing  at  the  arguments 
of  past  years  to  see  how  they  have  been  justified  by  the  progress 
of  events,  and  discussing  at  length  the  occurrences  of  the  recent 
European  war  which  bear  on  this  subject.  If  I  shall  convince 
you  that  there  is  urgent  and  immediate  necessity  for  prosecuting 
in  the  most  energetic  manner  all  the  defenwto  works  now 
authorized  by  Congress  for  the  defence  of  ]N  ew  York  and  of  com 
mencing  new  ones  without  delay — and  if,  by  means  of  this  paper, 
I  shall  awaken  the  attention,  not  only  of  the  people  of  New 
York,  but  of  all  who  take  the  "  safety,  honor,  and  welfare,"  of 
their  country  to  heart,  to  the  importance  of  the  subject,  my 
object  will  be  accomplished.  - 


APPENDIX 


[A.] 

THE  following  description  of  the  manner  of  construction  and  materials 
used  in  some  of  the  Russian  and  Prussian  works  (Bomarsund  among 
others)  is  interesting ;  and  will  illustrate  the  degree  of  authority  belonging 
to  the  assertion  just  quoted.  It  is  derived  from  authentic  sources  : 

The  masonry  is  described  as  of  boulders,  with  one  end  broken  off  to 
form  the  face ;  then  the  sides  broken,  to  give  beds  and  builds  of  every 
variety  of  shape,  varying  in  the  number  of  sides,  their  length,  and,  hence, 
angles  made  with  each  other.  No  stone  other  than  the  Finland  granite, 
scattered  over  the  surface  in  boulders,  is  available  in  a  large  part  of  north 
ern  Europe.  These  are  used  for  the  face  of  the  wall,  the  filling  being  brick 
or  other  masonry.  The  result  is  a  facing  of  most  excellent  material  for 
durability  as  to  time,  but  very  inferior  and  of  little  or  no  strength  in  bond. 
The  stones  are  left  with  rounded  surfaces  on  the  back,  and  present  no  bond 
of  any  value,  and  in  size  vary  as  they  were  picked  from  the  fields,  every 
stone  being  worked  to  its  largest  dimensions  for  a  face,  and  cut  to  fit  the 
adjacent  ones  previously  laid. 

^X/NX  Thus,  for  example,  the  face  of  the  wall  is  formed. 
/ —  \  J  The  joints  perpendicular  to  the  face,  as  a  necessary 
^X^\X_I7~"  \  consequence,  vary  in  depth,  according  to  the  size  of  the 
\  ,/  \  /boulders,  and  the  bed  into  which  it  is  being  prepared 
to  be  laid ;  varying  from  6  to  12  inches  in  a  work  wit 
nessed  under  construction.  None  of  the  stones  could  be  considered  as  large  ; 
altogether  an  exceedingly  indifferent  character  of  masonry  to  resist  artil 
lery,  although  good  against  weather  and  escalade.  Such  were  the  Bomar 
sund  towers  and  casemated  water-battery.  At  Cronstadt  the  masonry  of 
the  scarps  and  the  water  fronts  is  superior  to  any  masonry  to  be  found  in 
the  fortifications  of  Europe ;  and  equal  in  every  respect  to  that  in  our  dry- 
docks  at  Brooklyn  and  Norfolk.  At  Sebastopol  it  was  very  indifferent  as 
to  the  size  and  quality  of  the  material,  though  well  put  together,  being  of 
headers  and  stretchers,  with  horizontal  beds  and  vertical  joints ;  but  in 
pieces  from  8  to  12  inches  rise,  and  2  to  4  feet  in  length  for  the  stretchers, 
and  the  mortar  not  very  hard.  The  coping  of  the  docks  and  sea-wall  of 
the  dock  harbor  was  excellent,  and  of  large  blocks  of  Finland  granite,  and 
what  appeared  to  be  Quincy  granite;  but  the  scarps  of  the1  Malakoff,  the 
crenated  wall  on  the  west  of  the  city,  and  the  harbor  casemated  forts,  were 
very  poor  masonry,  both  in  quality  of  material  and  its  small  size  ;  the  ma 
terial  not  as  good  as  the  Connecticut  sandstone  in  some  of  our  old  harbor 
defences. 


52  APPENDIX. 


[B.  ] 

The  following  more  detailed  account  of  the  defences  of  Cronstadt  and 
Sebastopol,  is  derived  from  an  authentic  source  : 

The  Russians  ^ivr  their  attention,  first,  to  securing  the  dock-yards  and 


establishment  at  Cronstadt.  By  permanent  casemated  batteries,  upon  pre 
cisely  the  same  principles  we  have  adopted  (differing  in  some  details  only), 
they  closed  the  main  entrance  against  large  and  small  vessels  ;  and  were 
adding,  during  the  existence  of  the  contest,  to  these  casemated  defences, 
in  the  construction  of  a  new  work  on  the  shoal  opposite  Cronstadt  (south 
si.le  of  main  channel.)  The  narrow,  circuitous  channels  through  the 
shoals,  from  the  island  of  Cronstadt  to  the  Finland  shore,  were  defended 
by  hulk  ships  permanently  anchored  at  advantageous  positions  ;  as  was, 
likewise,  the  shoal  water  between  the  island  of  Cronstadt  and  the  main 
land  to  the  southward.  A  numerous  flotilla  of  steam  propellers  and  sail 
ing  gun-boats,  with  many  boats  propelled  with  oars,  armed  each  with  a 
heavy  gun,  together  with  many  steam  sloops  of  war,  were  ready  to  operate 
anywhere,  about  or  on  the  shoals,  their  services  would  be  most  available 
at  critical  moments. 

The  city  of  Cronstadt,  on  the  eastern  end  of  the  island,  was  enclosed 
by  permanent  fortifications. 

On  the  western  side,  crossing  the  island,  these  works  took  in  every 
building  of  the  commercial  city  and  naval  dock-yards;  but  were  so  near 
as  to  have  brought  destruction  upon  the  city  and  naval  establishment, 
by  any  siege  operations  carried  on  against  the  permanent  defences;  To 
obviate  this  serious  difficulty  a  line  of  entrenchments  was  thrown  up 
across  the  island,  far  in  advance  of  the  permanent  works.  .  These 
entrenchments  were  armed  with  heavy  ship's  guns,  having  ditches  com 
manded  by  concealed  caponiers,  fraised  and  palisaded. 

Such  were  the  defences  of  the  main  ship-channel  to  St.  Petersburg 
and  the  naval  establishment,  again  &t  floating  offensive  operations.  Within 
this  line  the  city  of  St.  Petersburg  is  approached  only  through  shoal 
water  and  among  islands. 

All  these  channels  were  commanded  by  temporarily-constructed  bat 
teries,  mounting  from  6  to  12  heavy  guns,  on  wrought-iron  carriages. 

But  the  city  of  St.  Petersburg  on  the  land,  and  the  whole  coast  and 
shores  from  it,  down  to  the  enemy's  anchorage,  on  the  north  and  south, 
were  bare  of  lines  or  entrenchments  of  any  kind. 

A  large  army  was  in  camp  south  of  St.  Petersburg,  ready  to  march  at 
any  moment,  to  oppose  a  landing,  or  meet  any  troops  the  Allies  might  ven 
ture  to  land.  Both  at  Cronstadt  and  Sebastopol,  as  well  as  Sweaborg, 
Bomarsund  and  Riga,  their  defences  were  in  progress  of  construction,  or 
rather  unfinished;  those  at  Cronstadt  being  actually  under  construction, 
both  in  the  dock-yard  and  casemated  forts  ;  but  the  land  defences  they 


APPENDIX.  53 

had  the  good  sense  to  omit,  until  the  great  and  open  route  by  water  had 
been  secured.  This  latter  object  they  had  most  successfully  attained  at 
Sebastopol,  that  resisted  the  combined  attack  of  the  most  powerful  arma 
ment  Europe  could  bring  to  bear  against  fortifications  ;  and  the  works  thus 
prepared  effectually  served  to  protect  the  .fleet,  dock-yards,  city,  and  all 
they  were  destined  to  secure.  But  time  did  not  enable  the  Russians  to 
carry  out  their  plans  to  cover  the  land  side  of  these  harbor  defences.  On 
the  west  of  the  city  they  had  a  crenated  scarp,  which  held  out  to  the  last 
against  the  French.  Along  the  south  they  had  nothing  but  the  little  Mala- 
koff  tower,  of  two  tiers  of  loop-holes  for  infantry,  and  five  guns  in  barbette 
— a  work  with  a  circular  trace,  the  gorge  not  exceeding  27  feet  radius  (out 
to  out),  admitting  of  5  loop-holes  only  on  each  side  of  the  door.  Tempo 
rary  earthen  works  were  hastily  thrown  up,  on  ground  most  advantageously 
formed  for  such  a  noble  and  gallant  defence  as  the  Russian  engineer's  skill 
enabled  him  to  call  into  action  ;  while  the  resources  of  an  immense  fleet 
enabled  him  to  arm  and  equip  his  works. 

A  first,  second,  and  even  third  line  of  defences,  the  two  latter  always 
in  advance  of  their  first,  occupying  positions  on  the  crest  of  the  dock-yard 
lulls,  the  Russian  engineers  pushed  forward  to  meet  their  allied  enemy ; 
but  no  permanent  works  of  any  kind  existed  to  oppose  the  Allies  on  the 
south,  saving  the  little,  exposed,  masonry  Malakoff,  the  stone  of  which  was 
no  better  than  some  of  our  best  mortar,  and  was  destroyed  from  a  dis 
tance  of  more  than  1500  yards,  by  the  first  battery  constructed  against  it. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  Russians  labored  under  every  disadvantage 
from  the  temporary  character  of  their  works  ;  and  it  is  very  certain  that 
neither  the  Redan  nor  Korniloff  bastion  (the  Malakoff)  would  have  been 
entered  by  a  French  or  English  soldier  to  the  day  the  Russians  evacuated 
them,  had  there  existed  either  a  MASONRY  counterscarp,  or  scarp  with 
suitable  BOMB-PROOFS,  for  the  Russian  troops.  Another  winter's  campaign 
would  unquestionably  have  been  necessary,  had  the  works  been  of  this 
more  permanent  character ;  and  it  may  well  be  doubted  whether  the 
resources  of  the  Allies  could  have  equalled  such  a  prolonged  contest. 


APPENDIX. 


[C.] 


The  Floating-Batteries  are  of  very  uncouth  and  unwieldy  appearance, 
partaking  in  model  about  equally  of  a  canal  boat  and  a  galliot.  In  general, 
their  construction  is  that  of  iron  ships  ;  the  decks  arc  of  9-inch  plank  rest 
ing  upon  lo.J-inrh  beams,  placed  1  foot  9  inches  from  centre  to  centre  ;  the 
"top  sides"  are  covnvd  \\ith  6-inch  plank,  over  which,  extending  to  3 
f>-et  below  the  water-line,  is  a  sheathing  of  wrought-iron  plates,  14  feet 
long,  20  inches  wide,  and  4J  inches  thick,  each  secured  to  the  hull  by 
1^-inch  screw  bolts.  They  are  brig-rig^'d,  are  fitted  with  non-condensing 


engines  and  screw  propellers,  and  can  make,  under  steam  alone,  4^  to  5  knots. 
They  are  pierced  for  30  guns,  an 


/  -ff 

and  mount  from  14  to  16  sixty-eights. 


DIMENSIONS. 


Horse  -power. 

Length. 

Extreme 
Breadth. 

Depth. 

Draft 

"  Meteor"  

150 

173 

48.6 

14.7 

7.9 

"Thunderbolt"... 

200 

186 

48.6 

18.6 

6.6 

The  only  vessel  of  this  class  which  has  been  tested  in  action  was  under 
French  colors  in  the  attack  upon  Kinburn.  She  was  struck  in  the  hull  58 
times,  without  receiving  any  other  injury  than  the  indentation  of  the 
plates  to  depths  varying  from  one-fourth  to  one  and  one-fourth  inches.*  Of 
important  particulars  respecting  the  alleged  invulnerability  of  these  vessels, 
I  could  get  no  account,  and  must  admit  a  want  of  faith  in  it. 

The  Mortar  Boats  are  cutter-rigged  vessels  of  about  70  tons,  very  much 
resembling  in  general  form  and  appearance  the  "Anchor  Hoy,"  which 
Mas  formerly,  and  perhaps  still  may  be,  attached  to  the  Norfolk  Navy 
Yard.  Their  draft  is  five  feet.  Each  mounts  a  13-inch  mortar. 

GUN  BOATS. — The  largest  of  these  vessels  are  three-masted  schooners, 
of  fine  models,  of  800  tons,  and  210  feet  long,  with  engines  of  350  horse 
power,  and  a  speed  under  steam  of  10  to  11£  knots. 

They  have  a  crew  of  100  men,  and  their  armament  consists  of  two  68- 
pounders,  of  95  cwt.,  on  pivots — one  between  the  fore  and  main  masts  and 
one  the  forecastle — and  four  32-pounders  on  truck  carriages.  The  most 
note-worthy  peculiarity  of  these  craft  is  the  arrangement  of  their  boilers, 
which  is  as  follows  :  Their  light  draft  renders  it  impossible  to  place  the 


*  See  Pahlgren's  account,  p.  27  et  *eg.,  ante.      Nothing  heavier  than  a  32-pound 
shot  was  fired  by  the  Russian  batteries  at  Kinburn. — (Author's  note.) 


APPENDIX.  55 

boilers  out  of  danger  below  the  water-line,  without  occupying  too  much 
of  the  floor  of  the  vessel ;  therefore  they  are  furnished  with  two  descrip 
tions  of  boiler — the  "service"  and  the  "righting"  boiler.  The  first  is  of 
the  usual  form  of  British  marine  boiler  ;  the  latter,  cylinder  tubular.  For 
ordinary  service,  both  boilers  are  used  ;  but  in  close  action,  the  lower  or 
righting  boilers  only — these  being  sufficient  to  furnish  rather  more  than 
half  speed. 

The  Second-Class  Gun  Boats  are  schooners  of  650  tons,  and  180  feet 
long,  with  engines  of  200  horse  power,  and  a  speed  under  steam,  of  nine 
knots.  They  are  manned  with  eighty  men,  and  mount,  on  pivots,  one  68- 
pounder,  95  cwt,  and  one  32  of  65  cwt,  and  four  12-pounder  howitzers. 

The  Third  Class,  the  most  numerous,  are  schooners  of  about  110  feet  in 
length,  with  engines  of  60  horse  power,  and  a  speed,  under  steam,  of  eight 
knots,  with  a  draft  of  about  6|-  feet  ;•  they  have  a  crew  of  40  men,  and  the 
same  armament  as  the  second  class. 

The  Fourth  Class  are  schooners  of  80  feet  in  length,  a  draft  of  five 
feet,  engines  of  20  horse  power,  and  a  speed,  under  steam,  of  six  knots,  a 
crew  of  30  men,  and  are  armed,  a  part  of  them  with,  one  68  pounder,  and 
one  32-pounder ;  others  with  two  32-pounders. 

The  two  latter  classes  are  provided  with  movable  shields  of  iron  plate, 
bullet-proof,  which  are  shipped  at  pleasure  ;  raising  the  height  of  the  bul 
warks  to  about  seven  feet  in  case  of  having  to  force  a  passage  defended  by 
riflemen. 

The  engines  of  all  these  vessels  are  "  non-condensing  "  "  direct-acting," 
of  great  simplicity  and  compactness,  and  work  to  three  times  their  nomi 
nal  power. 

They  usually  carry  a  pressure  of  60  pounds  ;  the  "boilers"  are  tested 
to  1 80  ;  and  such  is  the  fidelity  with  which  the  work  has  been  executed, 
that  no  break-down  or  accident  has  occurred  on  board  of  any  one  of 
them.* 


*  "  Notes  and  Observations  on  the  Review  at  Spithead,"  by  Commander  M.  M. 
Walker,  U.  S.  Navy. 

A  very  detailed  account  of  these  vessels  (as  also  an  immense  mass  of  interesting 
matter,  which  would  have  been  of  great  service  to  me  in  preparing  this  paper,  but 
which  I  have  been  unable  to  avail  myself  of;  though  I  ha%e  received  much  valuable 
information  from  its  author)  is  contained  in  the  able  Report  to  the  Secretary  of  War 
of  Major  R.  Delafield,  Corps  of  Engineers,  one  of  the  Commissioners  sent  to  Europe, 
during  the  recent  European  war,  by  the  Hon.  Jefferson  Davis,  then  Secretary  of  War, 
for  the  purpose  of  examining  and  reporting  upon  the  state  of  the  military  art  at  a 
period  deemed  so  favorable  for  observing  its  modern  developments. 

This  Report,  unfortunately  for  the  cause  of  military  science  in  this  country,  has 
not  yet  been  published;  neither  has  that  of  his  able  coadjutor,  Major  Mordecai,  of 
the  Ordnance  Corps. 

The  Report  of  Capt.  McLellan,  the  third  Commissioner  (from  which  an  extract 
is  made  in  Appendix  "E"),  was  published  more  than  a  year  since,  and  has  been 
promptly  appreciated  by  the  military  profession. 


56  APPENDIX. 


[D.] 


The  Engineers  are  not  the  inventors  nor  makers  of  ordnance.  They 
can  but  apply  to  the  best  advantage  such  as  is  supplied  to  them. 

It  does  strike  me  that  it*  obstruction  should,  so  far  as  it  is  intended 
for  harbor  defence,  be  studied  exclusively  in  the  light  of  its  adaptability 
to  that  object,  and  without  regard  to  conformity  to  other  models.  Large 
calibres  are  imperatively  demanded  for  coast  defence,  nor  is  there  any 
objection  arising  from  the  wfiyht  of  the  guns,  which  applies  so  strongly 
in  naval  use.  Yet  the  navy  have  successfully  introduced  a  gun  (Dahf- 
gren's  11-inch  gun)  which  throws  a  solid  shot  one-third  heavier  than  our 
10-inch  colmnbiad 

It  is  even  reported  that  the  Ordnance  Department  are  about  abandoning 
the  use  of  solid  shot  in  our  10-inch  guns,  as  if  against  these  new  means  of 
attack  (iron-clad  floating-batteries  constructed  expressly  to  batter  on  for 
tifications)  a  10-inch  shell  could  have  any  effect  whatever. 

If  we  must  throw  shells,  at  least  let  us  throw  them  of  such  size,  that 
they  may  have  thickness  enough  not  to  break  against  any  thickness  of  iron 
a  vessel's  >ide  may  oppose.  Let  us  make  them  such  that  (to  use  the 
sportsman's  phrase)  "every  shot  shall  be  a  bird." 

The  Turks  have,  for  the  defence  of  the  Dardanelles,  guns  of  30  inches 
calibre,  carrying  a  stone  ball.  I  do  not  know  whether  there  is  any  impos 
sibility  or  impracticability  in  the  construction  of  guns  of  this  size ;  but  I 
cannot  see  why  a  gun  of  greatly  superior  calibre  to  anything  we  now  have, 
should  not  be  made  expressly  for  harbor  defence. 

Such  guns  could  not  be  fired  with  the  rapidity  of  smaller  ones;  perhaps 
too,  like  the  Turkish  guns,  it  would  be  found  best  to  establish  them  on 
fixed  lines  of  direction ;  but  one  such  shot  that  hits,  would  be  worth  a 
hundred  smaller  ones.  A  30-inch  hole  could  not  be  plugged ;  and  the 
explosion  of  a  30-inch  shell  would  send  a  vessel  to  the  bottom. 

Of  the  capability  of  such  guns  to  inflict  injury  and  of. the  efficiency  of 
batteries  mounted  with  them,  an  opinion  may  be  formed  by  the  single 
instance,  (so  far  as  I  know)  that  their  qualities  have  been  exhibited,  viz  : 
the  retreat  in  1807  of  the  fleet  of  Admiral  Duckforth. 

"The  defences  of  the  channel  had  been  allowed  to  go  to  decay;  but 
"few  guns  were  mounted,  and  the  forts  were  but  partially  garrisoned.  In 
"Constantinople  not  a  gun  was  mounted,  and  no  preparations  for  defence 
k'  were  made  ;  indeed,  previous  to  the  approach  of  the  fleet,  the  Turks  had 
"  not  determined  whether  to  side  with  the  English  or  the  French,  and  even 
"the  French  ambassador  had  the  greatest  difficulty  in  persuading  them  to 
"resist  the  demands  of  Duckforth. 

"The  British  fleet  consisted  of  six  sail  of  the    line,  two  frigates,   two 


APPENDIX.  57 

"  sloops,  and  several  bomb-vessels,  carrying  eight   hundred   and    eighteen 
"  guns  (besides  those  in  the  bomb-ships.) 

"  Admiral  Duckforth  sailed  through  the  Dardanelles  on  the  19th  of 
"  February,  1807,  with  little  or  no  opposition.  This  being  a  Turkish  fes 
tival  day,  the  soldiers  of  the  scanty  garrison  were  enjoying  the  festivities 
"  of  the  occasion,  and  none  were  left  to  serve  the  few  guns  of  the  forts 
"  which  had  been  prepared  for  defence.  But  while  the  Admiral  was 
"  waiting  on  the  sea  of  Marmora  for  the  result  of  negotiations,  or  for  a 
"  favorable  wind  to  make  the  attack  upon  Constantinople,  the  fortifications 
"  of  this  city  were  put  in  order,  and  the  Turks  actively  employed,  under 
"  French  engineers  and  artillery  officers  in  repairing  the  defences  of  the 
"  Straits.  Campbell,  in  his  Naval  History,  says  : — "  Admiral  Duckforth 
"  now  fully  perceived  the  critical  situation  in  which  he  was  placed.  He 
'•  might,  indeed,  succeed,  should  the  weather  become  favorable,  in  bom- 
"barding  Constantinople;  but  unless  the  bombardment  should  prove 
"  completely  successful  in  forcing  the  Turks  to  pacific  terms,  the  injury  he 
"  might  do  to  the  city  would  not  compensate  for  the  damage  which  his  fleet 
"  must  necessarily  sustain.  With  this  damaged  and  crippled  fleet,  he  must 
"  repass  the  Dardanelles,  now  rendered  infinitely  stronger  than  they  were 
"when  he  came  through  them." 

"  Under  these  circumstances,  the  Admiral  determined  to  retreat ;  and 
"on  the  3d  of  April  escaped  through  the  Dardanelles,  steering  midway  of 
"the  channel,  with  a  favorable  and  strong  current. 

"  This  escape,  however,"  says  Baines,  "  was  only  from  destruction,  but 
"  by  no  means  from  serious  loss  and  injury.  In  what  instance  in  the  whole 
"  course  of  our  naval  warfare,  have  ships  received  equal  damage  in  so 
"short  a  time  as  in  this  extraordinary  enterprise  ?  In  detailing  the  extent 
"  of  this  damage,  we  will  take  the  ships  in  the  order  they  descended.  The 
"first  had  her  wheel  carried  away,  and  her  hull  much  damaged,  but 
"  escaped  with  the  loss  of  only  three  men.  A  stone  shot  penetrated  the 
"second,  between  the  poop  and  quarter  deck,  badly  injured  the  mizzen- 
"  mast,  carried  away  the  wheel,  and  did  other  serious  damage,  killing  and 
"wounding  twenty  men.  Two  shot  struck  the  third,  carrying  away  her 
"  shrouds  and  injuring  her  masts ;  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  thirty.  The 
"fourth  had  her  mainmast  destroyed,  with  a  loss  of  sixteen.  The  fifth  had 
"a  large  shot,  six  feet  eight  inches  in  circumference,  enter  her  lower  deck  ; 
"  loss  fifty-five.  The  sixth  not  injured.  The  seventh,  a  good  deal  damaged, 
"  with  a  loss  of  seventeen.  The  eighth  had  no  loss.  The  ninth  was  so 
"much  injured  that,  had  there  been  a  necessity  for  hauling  the  wind  on 
"  the  opposite  tack  she  must  *  gone  down  ;'  her  loss  was  eight.  The  tenth 
"  lost  twelve.  The  eleventh  was  much  injured,  with  a  loss  of  eight — 
"  making  a  total  loss  in  repassing  the  Dardanelles,  of  one  hundred  and 
"sixty-seven;  and  in  the  whole  expedition  two  hundred  and  eighty-one, 
"  exclusive  of  two  hundred  and  fifty  men  who  perished  in  the  burning  of 
"  the  Ajax. 

"  Such  was  the  effect  produced  on  the  British  fleet,  sailing  with  a 
"  favorable  wind  and  strong  current  past  the  half-armed  and  half-manned 
"  forts  of  the  Dardanelles.  Duckforth  himself  says,  that  had  he  remained 
'*  before  Constantinople  much  longer — till  the  forts  had  been  completely 


58  APPENDIX. 

"put  in  ordt-r — no  return  would  have  been  open  to  him,  and  the  unavoid- 
"  able  sacrifice  of  the  squadron  must  have  been  the  consequence.  Scarcely 
'•had  the  fleet  cleared  the  Straits  before  it  (the  fleet)  was  reinforced  with 
"  eight  sail  of  the  line ;  but,  even  with  this  vast  increase  of  strength,  the 
"English  did  not  venture  to  renew  the  contest.  They  had  emoted  a  most 
"  fortunate  escape.  General  Jomini  says  that  if  the  defence  had  been  con 
ducted  by  a  more  enterprising  and  experinirrd  people,  the  expedition 
"  would  have  cost  the  English  their  whole  squadron."* 

Truly,  if  halt-dilapidated  batteries  (worked  probably  by  unpractised 
hands)  could  inflict  these  serious  damages  upon  a  fleet,  not  engaged  in 
actual  contest,  by  merely  trying  to  run  6y,  under  the  most  favorable  cir 
cumstances  of  wind  and  tide,  what  might  not  such  batteries  be  capable  of? 

"In  what  instance,"  says  Ad.  r.aines,  ••  in  the  whole  course  of  our  naval 
"  warfare,  have  ships  received  equal  damage  in  so  short  a  time  as  in  this 
"  extraordinary  enterprise  ?" 

It  is  to  be  remarked,  however,  that  we  have  as  yet  had  no  fair  instance 
of  the  power  of  modern  shell  guns  from  land  batteries  against  ordinary 
ships  of  war.  In  the  few  direct  contests  which  the  Allies  had  with  Rus 
sian  fortifications,  the  modern  armament  does  not  appear  to  have  existed  ; 
and  where  shells  were  thrown  from  guns,  they  appear  to  have  been  of  in 
ferior  calibre.  Yet  the  Russians  with  the  shefl-guns  of  their  fleet  blew  up 
two  Turkish  frigates  at  Sinope,  in  fifteen  minutes. 

One  of  the  main  causes  of  inefficiency  in  coast  batteries,  which  has 
givi-n  color  to  the  idea  that  they  may  be  passed,  or  even  attacked  with 
impunity,  I  conceive  to  be  the  want  of  skill  and  care  in  the  use  of  the 
guns.  The  result  is  a  prodigious  smoke,  and  a  prodigious  throwing  away 
of  balls,  and  very  little  damage  done.  This  has  been,  however,  by  no 
means  a  peculiarity  of  coast  defences  The  same  system  of  random  firing 
has  hitherto  prevailed,  both  in  the  use  of  small  arms  in  land  and  of  heavy 
ordnance  in  sea  battles ;  nor  has  it  occurred  apparently  to  even  the  great 
est  masters  of  the  art  of  war,  to  ask  why,  for  one  man  wounded,  or  for  one 
effective  shot  in  a  vessel's  hull,  so  many  thousands  of  shot  should  be  thrown 
uselessly  into  the  air. 

But  this  question  is  now  asked,  both  in  the  use  of  the  soldier's  rifled 
musket,  and  in  the  management  of  ships'  guns,  as  well  as  of  artillery  of  all 
kinds. 

It  is  at  last  discovered  that  it  is  of  more  importance  to  teach  the  soldier 
to  direct  his  piece  with  accuracy  of  aim,  than  to  perform  certain  motions  on 
parade  with  the  precision  of  an  automaton.     The  same  idea  is  now  infused 
into  all  the  departments  of  military  and   naval   science,  and  is  a  necessary 
result  of  the  recent  great  improvements  in  the  construction  of  arms.     I 
short,  the    truth  has    at  last    become    apparent   that   the  old-fashione 
system  of  random  firing,  though  perhaps  like  the  "charge  of  the  six  hun 
dred  "  at  Halaklava,  "  bicn  magnifique,  rfest  pas  la  guerre" 

It  is  of  the  utmost  importance  that  we  should  apply  this  principle  to 
the  management  of  our  sea-coast  batteries,  and  give  it  a  practical  effect. 
The  volunteers  of  our  cities  will  constitute  mainly,  in  time  of  war,  the 

*  Halleok,  "Military  Art  and  Science." 


APPENDIX.  59 

gunners  of  our  forts  and  manipulators  of  our  sea-coast  guns.  In  time  of 
war,  they  will  probably  be  exercised  in  these  duties.  But  it  is  most  desi 
rable  that  we  should  have  at  all  fc'megabody  of  gunners,  practised  in  these 
exercises.  The  result  would  be,  not  only  to  give  to  our  citizens,  as  well  as 
citizen-soldiers,  confidence  in  the  defences  provided  for  their  security,  but 
it  would  disseminate  military  knowledge,  and  an  intelligent  idea  of  the 
bearing  and  objects  of  the  different  defensive  works.  To  carry  out  this 
idea,  it  would  be  dcsirab'e  that  there  should  be  at  each  considerable  sea 
port  town,  a  sufficient  garrison  of  artillery  troops  to  aid  in  the  instruction 
of  the  volunteers.  In  the  present  condition  of  the  army  this  cannot  be 
hoped,  but  perhaps  it  might,  at  least,  be  found  practicable  to  detail  an 
artillery  officer  or  two  for  the  purpose. 


60 


APPENDIX. 


[E.] 

On  the  relative  value  and  strength  of  earthen  and  masonry  revetted 
works,  the  following  extracts  will  be  read  with  interest. 

The  first  is  from  the  Report  of  Capt.  George  B.  McLcllan,  1st  Cavalry, 
one  of  the  u  Military  Commission  to  Europe." 

"  This  would  seem  to  be  the  proper  place  to  notice  a  popular  fallacy, 
"  which,  for  a  time  at  least,  gained  extensive  credence.  It  was,  that  the 
"siege  of  Sebastopol  proved  the  superiority  of  temporary  (earthen)  fortifi- 
"  cations  over  those  of  a  permanent  nature.  It  is  easy  to  show  that  it 
"proved  nothing  of  the  kind;  but  that  it  only  proved  that  temporary 
"  works  in  the  hands  of  a  brave  and  skillful  garrison  are  susceptible  of  a 
"  longer  defence  than  was  generally  supposed.  They  were  attacked  as 
"field  works  never  were  before,  and  were  defended  as  field  works  never  had 
"  been  defended.  The  main  difference  between  properly  constructed  per- 
"  manent  fortifications  (intended  to  resist  a  siege)  and  temporary  works,  is 
"  that  the.  latter  seldom  present,  an  insuperable  obstacle  against  assault, 
"while  the  former  always  do.  In  addition,  permanent  works  have  a 
u better  command  over  the  adjacent  country,  and  are  more  carefully  and 
"  perfectly  planned.  The  masonry  walls  which  render  an  assault  impos 
sible,  cannot  be  seen  from  the  distance,  and  can  be  destroyed  only  by 
"  establishing  batteries  on  the  crest  of  the  glacis,  or  the  edge  of  the  ditch  ; 
"the  earthen  parapet  alone  being  visible  beyond  that  point,  they  may,  nn- 
"  til  the  besiegers  arrive  there,  be  regarded  in  the  same  light  as  field  works, 
"  with  the  difference  that  the  garrison  are  not  harrassedby  the  necessity  of 
"  being  constantlv  prepared  to  repel  an  assault. 

"  Now,  in  the  siege  of  Sebastopol,  the  trenches  of  the  besiegers  never 
"  reached  the  edge  of  the  ditch  ;  so  that,  had  the  fortification  been  a  per- 
"  manent  one,  the  most  difficult,  slow,  and  dangerous  part  of  the  siege 
"  remained  to  be  undertaken,  viz.,  the  crowning  of  the  covered  way,  the 
u  establishment  of  the  breach  batteries,  the  descent  and  passage  of  the 
"  ditch,  and  the  a— ault  of  the  breach  ;  in  other  words,  at  the  moment  when 
"the  weakness  of  the  temporary  works  became  apparent  and  fatal,  the  true 
"strength  of  the  permanent  defences  would  have  commenced  coming  into 
"play:1 

"  Assuming  the  progress  of  the  attack  to  have  been  as  rapid  as  it  was 
"under  existing  circumstances,  the  boir-vrs,  on  the  8th  of  September, 
"would  not  yet  have  been  in  a  condition  to  crown  the  covered  way,  the 
"siege  would  certainly  have  extended  into  the  winter ;  and  it  may  even  be 
"  doubted  whether  the  place  would  eventually  have  fallen,  until  the  Allies 
"  were  in  sufficient  force  to  invest  the  north  as  well  as  the  south  side." 


APPENDIX.  Cl 

These  views  are,  I  believe,  fully  sustained  by  the  other  commissioners, 
Majors  Delafield  of  the  Engineers,  and  Mordecai  of  the  Ordnance  Corps. 

But  a  more  remarkable  confirmation  is  found  in  the  recently  published 
"Journal  of  the  Operations  of  the  Engineers"  at  the  siege  of  Sebastopol, 
by  the  French  Engineer-in-Chief,  Gen.  Niel,  which  I  also  extract. 

It  furnishes,  at  the  same  time,  a  simple  and  intelligible  explanation  of 
the  extraordinary  length  of  defence  of  that  place. 

"  Struck  by  the  length  of  the  siege  of  Sebastopol,  certain  foreign  offi- 
"  cers  have  expressed  the  opinion  that  masonry-revetted  scarps  are  not  of 
44  incontestable  utility  in  fortified  places." 

"  Sebastopol,  a  vast  retrenched  camp,  defended  by  field  fortifications  of 
44  strong  profile,  derived  its  principal  strength  from  an  armament  such  as 
"  could  only  exist  in  an  extensive  maritime  arsenal,  and  from  a  large  army 
44  which  always  preserved  its  free  communications  with  the  interior  of 
44  Russia." 

44  If  the  enceinte  had  been  provided  with  good  revetted  scarps;  if  it 
44  had  been  necessary  to  breach  these,  and  subsequently  have  been  com- 
44  polled  to  penetrate  through  difficult  passages,  in  rear  of  which  the  heads 
44  of  our  columns  would  have  met  an  army,  Sebastopol  would  have  been  an 
44  impregnable  fortress." 

44  When  we  compare,  in  effect,  the  works  of  attack  at  Sebastopol  with 
44  those  of  an  ordinary  siege,  we  will  see  that  on  the  8th  of  Sept.,  1855,  the 
44  day  of  the  last  assault,  we  had  only  executed,  after  the  greatest  effort, 
44  the  besieging  works  which  precede  the  crowning  of  the  covered  way  ;  we 
44  had  not  then,  as  yet,  entered  upon  that  period  of  the  works  of  a  siege 
44  which  is  the  most  difficult  and  the  most  murderous  ;  and  there  was  no 
44  occasion  to  engage  ourselves  in  them,  since  the  ditches  and  parapets  of 
44  the  enceinte  were  not  insurmountable,  as  the  sequel  has  proved." 

44  The  difficulty  consisted  in  conquering  the  Russian  army  upon  a  posi- 
44  tion  prepared  long  beforehand  for  its  defence,  quite  as  much  as  in  sur- 
44  mounting  the  material  obstacle. of  the  fortification." 

44  Our  places  of  arms  being  established  at  thirty  metres  from  the  besieged 
44  works,  we  were  able  to  choose  our  own  time  for  action,  and  to  throw 
44  ourselves  unexpectedly  upon  the  enemy  when  the  fire  of  our  artillery  had 
44  forced  him  to  shelter  himself,  up  to  the  last  minute,  behind  his  numerous 
4k  blindages  ;  to  have  gone  further  would  have  been  inviting  the  initiative 
44  in  the  attack  on  the  part  of  the  Russian  army." 

44  The  absence  of  scarp  walls,  which  would  have  secured  the  place  from 
44  escalade,  did  not  exercise  a  less  influence  upon  the  defence  ;  for  the  be- 
44  sieged  were  compelled  to  keep  permanently  at  the  gorges  of  the  works, 
44  strong  reserves,  in  readiness  to  repulse  the  assault,  which  they  saw  them- 
44  selves  menaced  with  from  the  commencement  of  the  siege." 

44  Finally,  it  can  be  remarked,  that  these  reserves,  which  were  decimated 
44  night  and  day  by  the  concentric  fire  of  our  batteries,  were  able  to  issue 
44  out  from  the  enceinte  through  wide  debouches,  without  having  to  pass 
44  through  the  narrow  defiles  which  are  formed  by  the  draw-bridges  of  re- 
44  vetted  places  ;  they  ivere,  then,  a  permanent  threat  for  the  besiegers,  who 
44  were  exposed  to  seeing  their  trenches  unexpectedly  invaded  by  the 
44  greater  part  of  the  Russian  army." 


C2  APPENDIX. 

"Neither  side,  consequently,  \\as  in  a  position  analogous  to  that  which 
"  is  prorntrd  in  tin-  siege  of  a  fortified  place,  protected  from  insult  by  good 
"masonry  scarps."  (Note  to  page  443.) 

And  again,  page  423,  the  same  authority  remarks  (the  italics  are  mine) : 

*•  Now,  it  (the  Russian  army)  is  no  longer  able  to  escape  from  the  con- 

"  centric  fires  of  our  batteries;  for,  not  being  protected  by  manonry  scarps, 

"  it  is  obliged  constantly  to   keep  united  strong    reserves,  in  order    to 

"  repulse  the  assault  with  which  it  is  at  every  instant  menaced." 


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12 


Pamphlet 

Binder 
Gaylord  Bros. 

Makers 
Stockton,  Calif. 

PAT.  JAN.  21.  1908 


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